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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Differenzierung des Rechtssystems in Chile. Die 
grundlegende Frage der Arbeit ist: Welche Bedingungen ermöglichen die Entstehung 
eines funktional differenzierten Rechtssystems in Chile. Diese Fragestellung führt 
unweigerlich zum Problem des funktionalen Differenzierungsprozesses. Während die 
soziologische Diskussion über funktionale Differenzierung in Chile in vollem Gange ist, 
findet die Frage nach der Ausdifferenzierung des Rechtssystems in der aktuellen Debatte 
kein Platz. 
Die Hypothese der vorliegenden Arbeit weist darauf hin, dass die funktionale 
Differenzierung des chilenischen Rechtssystems Teil eines evolutionären Prozesses ist, 
der mit der Eroberung und Kolonisierung der Spanier im 16. Jahrhundert begonnen hat. 
Diese Entwicklung wird außerdem durch Veränderungen der Form der Differenzierung 
der chilenischen Gesellschaft sowie der Entstehung einer Reihe spezifischer evolutionärer 
Errungenschaften geprägt. Anhand von historischen, soziologischen und juristischen 
Dokumenten wird dieses Prozesses analysiert. 
Die Dissertation gliedert sich in sechs Kapitel. Jedes Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit 
bestimmten Problemen, die der Analyse ihre Struktur geben. 
Im ersten Kapitel „Einführung“ werden der Hintergrund der Dissertation sowie ihre 
Ziele, Thesen und Methodik erläutert.  
Das Weitern wird auf die Struktur der Arbeit eingegangen. Die funktionalistische Analyse 
orientiert sich an einer Reihe von Problemen und Fragen, die auch die Arbeit 
strukturieren. Im Folgenden gehen ich auf diese „Probleme und Fragen“ ein. 
In Kapitel 2 werden die Kernaspekte der Rechtssoziologie erläutert und die Genealogie 
der Rechtssoziologie aus den Bewegungen der sogenannten „soziologischen 
Jurisprudenz“ aus Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten untersucht. Dafür werden die 
Ideen der vier klassischen Autoren der Rechtssoziologie, nämlich Émile Durkheim, Max 
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Weber, Talcott Parsons und Jürgen Habermas charakterisiert. Ein separater Abschnitt für 
die Rechtssoziologie von Niklas Luhmann wird präsentiert, der als Grundlage für die 
späteren Kapitel dient. Das Kapitel endet mit einigen Überlegungen zu einer regionalen 
Analyse des Rechts. 
 
In Kapitel 3 wird die Analyse der Begriffe „Evolution“ und „Differenzierung“ aus einer 
systemtheoretischen Perspektive in Betracht bezogen. Es werden Ähnlichkeiten und 
Unterschiede zwischen beiden Konzepten diskutiert. In diesem Zusammenhang werden 
zwei Begriffe, die die Analyse leiten, eingeführt. Diese sind: „evolutionäre 
Errungenschaften“ und „Formen der Differenzierung“. Schließlich werden vier 
theoretische Ansätze in Bezug auf funktionale Differenzierung in Chile diskutiert. 
 
In Kapitel 4 wird die Entwicklung des chilenischen Rechtssystems dargestellt. Hier teilt 
sich die Arbeit auf in zwei Analysestränge. Zum einem werden eine Reihe von 
„evolutionären Errungenschaften“ erörtert, die das chilenische Recht strukturieren. 
Hierzu wird sich auf die Rolle der Justizbehörden, der subjektiven Rechte, Verfassungen 
und Menschenrechte bezogen. Zum anderen werden drei „Formen der Differenzierung“ 
charakterisiert, nämlich: Stratifikation-Zentrum/Peripherie, funktionale Differenzierung 
mit Klassenstruktur und funktionale Differenzierung. Das Kapitel endet mit einem 
kurzen Exkurs über die semantischen Beschreibungen der chilenischen Rechtssoziologie 
im Hinblick auf die Rechtskultur. 
 
In Kapitel 5 werden zeitgenössische Tendenzen der Differenzierung des chilenischen 
Rechts untersucht. Diese Tendenzen werden im Kontext der Sinndimensionen und 
bestimmten Paradoxien thematisiert. Schließlich wird die Situation mit anderen nationalen 
Rechtssystemen in Lateinamerika verglichen. 
 
In Kapitel 6 werden die Schlussfolgerungen dieser Forschung dargestellt. Probleme und 
Fragen werden abschließend ausgewertet, die zuvor in Kapitel 1 identifiziert wurden. 
Schließlich wird auf einige zusätzliche Beiträge und allgemeinere Überlegungen, die sich 
aus dieser Forschung ergeben, hingewiesen.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a wide tradition of explanations coming from the sociological, political, 
juridical, cultural, historical fields, which indicate that the Chilean legal system 
(besides the political and the economic system) has the stability that is hardly 
achievable by other Latin American countries. This juridical stability would be the 
result of a relatively stable constitutional order,1 among several other factors (from 
1833 up to this writing, Chile has had only three constitutions; Bolivia has had 
seventeen and Peru, twelve). 
 
The early enactment of a Chilean civil code in 1857 served as model for the rest of 
Latin America and signified a relative stability in all the institutions of the Chilean 
State. Internally, it helped establish a long tradition of respect and widespread 
obedience to the law and its institutions.2 Political stability in the country further 
complemented the state of affairs. Until the military coup of 1973, it is worthy to 
note that Chile has had more than forty years without a political disruption or 
disorder. Even so, since the end of the military regime that governed Chile from 
1973 to 1990, Chile has elected five presidents in a peaceful manner. Moreover, the 
corruption perception rates in Chile are the lowest in all of Latin America (in 2010, 
Chile ranked 21° in the International Ranking of Transparency International, with 
7.2 points, placing the country two places above the United States and directly 
behind the United Kingdom).  
 
Several decades of stability and economic growth also transpired. After the 
economic and banking crisis of 1982, Chile has since experienced sustained growth, 
 
                                                            
1 Hans Kelsen (1926) himself was interested in the Chilean constitutional order expressed in the 
Constitution of 1925. 
2 Bravo Lira (1986: 82) notes that in 1541, Pedro de Valdivia, founder of Chile, asked to leave a 
written record of his appointment and the circumstances under which he assumed the post. This 
fact, according to Bravo Lira, would already demonstrate the respect that Chileans have for the law. 
This would reveal the “deep juridical consciousness” of the founders of Chile and a “strong sense 
of law” of the Cabildo (council) that named Valdivia as governor. 
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driven by a set of policies of economic liberalization. The country has signed free 
trade agreement with forty-nine states, including United States, Canada, the 
European Union, Korea and China, and is in constant negotiation for new 
agreements. In 2010, Chile became the first country in South America to be a 
member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). The institutional stability of Chile, almost as a paradigmatic example of 
the neoliberal formulae, would be the key to its development. 
 
Nevertheless, each of the three above-mentioned dimensions of the Chilean stability 
has its dark side, their unmarked spaces (Spencer-Brown 1979). Correspondingly, the 
economic growth in Chile is shrouded by deep economic inequalities. Chile appears 
to be one of the countries, which have greater income inequality in international 
measurements. It obtains the lowest record in the GINI index among the countries 
of the OECD (2012) and is located in one of the most backward positions of the 
world (in the 2012 rankings, it occupies the Nº 127 place, from a total of 147 
countries, according to Gini Coefficient. In comparison, Germany is located in the 
Nº 10 position).  
 
In spite of the political dimension, the stable Chilean democracy not only has a low 
rate of public credibility, which appears constantly in opinion surveys, but also an 
increasingly low turnout of new voters. This variance with Chilean politics has been 
expressed in recent years through massive protest movements. Put simply, Chile 
exists in a political system that combines indifference and indignation. On the legal side, 
the juridical stability of the Chilean institutions is offset by the increase in urban 
crime, the victimization of the population, the high rates of incarceration (Walmsley 
2011) – and this rate is, in South America, surmounted only by Suriname -, and a 
low evaluation of the legal system (Latinobarómetro 2011).   
 
This dual panorama can be characterized as a particular way of deployment of the modernity 
in Chile. There are voluminous studies that feature the central role that the economy, 
as well as politics, plays in this process. However, the traditional stability of Chilean 
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law has not been treated in the discussion as a decisive contribution to such 
modernization. 
 
In this dichotomic picture of stability and change, a capacity to adapt to changes 
that occur in their environment rather than from an inner development seems to be 
demanded of the law.  In this context, institutional responses, which have occurred 
in the judicial system during recent decades under the slogan of reforms, appear. An 
example of this is the so-called Criminal Justice Reform that was implemented in the 
nineties throughout the country to replace the old Chilean criminal justice system, 
the inquisitional character of which was not only extremely slow but also not very 
transparent. Instead, the new procedure possesses a faster character, provides 
warranties, and is more transparent, not to mention oriented to equity (Witker & 
Nataren 2010).3 The main context in which this reform has been tangible is on the 
issue of urban crime. In this particular type of crime, there are also changes to 
Adolescent Criminal Liability, and these amendments aim to adjust punishments to the 
age of the accused, establish rehabilitation, and implement precautionary measures 
(Hernández 2007). Another amendment that must be mentioned is the Reform to the 
Family Courts, which was launched in the nineties and oriented to expedite judicial 
processes in matters of family law, juridical protection of children, divorce, and 
cases of domestic violence (Casas et al. 2006). 
 
 
                                                            
3 This procedural change also has taken place in other Latin American countries with impacts 
comparatively more limited. Indeed, the above cited study of Witker and Nataren mentions that the 
Chilean Criminal Justice Reform is the only one in the region that may be called “of second 
generation”, since it has achieved goals far superior to other countries. “The only country that goes 
along such reforms of the second generation is Chile, since it had the advantage of creating from 
the beginning a Public Prosecutor and a Criminal Defence. (…) Chile adopted a basic definition, in 
the sense of all judicial actions, except very precise and few exceptions, must be held in public and 
contradictory hearings, being the suitable aptitude of the system to organize these hearings, the best 
effectiveness indicator.” (Witker and Nataren 2010: 15). 
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However, these reforms do not seem to fully address the tensions, which currently 
accompany the law in Chile, whose character seems to rest instead in the visibility of 
conflicts and incongruities. Most relevant conflicts include: the prosecution of 
human rights violators (Skaar 2003), the judicialisation of environmental conflicts 
(Vallejos 2005), the problem of urban crime (Dammert 2005; Lagos & Dammert 
2012), the protection of consumers’ rights (Guerrero 2008), allegations of 
pedophilia, the cases of political and economic corruption (Latinobarómetro 2010; 
2011; CEJA 2010), and, more recently, the judicialisation of educational conflicts. 
The worsening of these conflicts allows for serious consideration of the relevance 
that normative expectations pose concerning the law, or simply: legal decisions are 
increasingly expected in areas where, earlier, they were not expected to be made or applied. 
 
A question that remains unanswered in this situation is if these conflicts are due to a 
growing loss of the (old) stability of the law, in reference to problems of integration or 
adaptation to the environment, or is instead due to a radicalization of its functional 
differentiation. The present considerations lean towards this second hypothesis. 
 
This question about social change in the law is present throughout the long history of 
the sociology of law. Questions as: ‘What relevance do social changes in law have?,’ 
‘How is the change in the law a social change?,’ or: ‘How important are changes in 
the law to the society?’ - all of them appear within the oldest concerns of sociology. 
These questions about social change in the law has been answered varyingly, 
understanding this change, for example, like a special process of rationalization 
(Weber 1922a), as a change in social solidarity (Durkheim [1893] 2001), as a universal 
evolutionary change in the society (Parsons 1964), as a change in the moral integration of 
the society (Habermas 1982b), or as a process of functional differentiation (Luhmann 
1995a).4 In each of these strategies lies a wide diversity of explanatory principles. 
Consistent with Weber’s theory of the law, rationalization largely explains the 
changes in the law by increasing predictability and proceduralization. With regard to the 
 
                                                            
4 On this latter, in detail in Luhmann (1987; 1991a; 1991b; 1997a; 1999a; 1999b). 
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theory of change in social solidarity of Durkheim, for his part, the problem of 
change appears in the form of integration of society through the law - a problem that 
starts with Durkheim and, thereafter, reaches its highest complexities with Parsons 
and Habermas. Only the last type of explanations, i.e., in the theory of the 
functional differentiation, renounces the assignation of a socio-integration function, at 
the very least, to the law, but also puts to doubt the rationalization of the same. This 
way, it problematizes the aspect of social change in the law from the description of 
its own functioning and limitations. Thus, the theory of differentiation is better 
prepared than other theories of social change and the law to understand the changes 
in the law on a more widespread sense and attend to the problems of an increasingly 
complex society. This functions without having to justify the predictability of the 
law at all costs, even when the increase in its contingency is evident (Luhmann 1995a; 
Münch 1990) and without having to be stylized as a normative theory that 
prescribes mechanisms for social integration, but then also highlighting the social 
differentiation process without having a normative telos towards a unit, but a declared 
vocation for describing differences (Luhmann 1991a). 
 
Since the moment that the theory of the differentiation made its entry into 
sociology, it has had the task of describing a universal model of social change. This 
also applies to the theory of differentiation of functional systems, as it describes a 
set of “forms of differentiation” (Luhmann 1977), which indicates general structural 
arrangements. However, this universalistic character of the differentiation theory has 
been complemented in recent decades by a promising field of research on the 
functional differentiation applied to regions of the world. This development 
unfolded following the analyses on the consequences of the world society 
(Luhmann 1997a) and the problem of radicalization of social inclusion and 
exclusion in certain regions of the world (Luhmann 1995b; 1995c). Thus, the study 
has encompassed the process of functional differentiation of the politics in China 
(Tang 2004), the role of the constitutions in the Brazilian functional differentiation 
(Neves 1992), the university system in Latin America (Arnold Cathalifaud 1987), 
and the structural and semantic aspects of the functional differentiation also in Latin 
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America (Birle et al. 2012), to name a few. It is precisely within the context of 
regional functional differentiation that the foregoing research is inscribed.   
 
1.1. Objectives and hypotheses of the research 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the functional differentiation of the legal system in Chile in the 
context of the evolution of a “national legal system” (Stichweh 1990, 1991). The 
fundamental question that this work wants to answer is: How has the evolution of a 
juridical system been functionally differentiated in Chile? This brings us to the problem of 
the functional differentiation process itself. The sociological discussion on 
functional differentiation in Chile is in full force, although its treatment of the 
concept of functional differentiation seems to serve largely as a functional 
equivalent to the classical explanation of modernization, whose semantics have fallen 
into disuse since the 1990s. Indeed, it is held in the current literature that since the 
last decades, Chile has been subject to a wide process of functional differentiation of 
social systems (see Cousiño and Valenzuela 2012; Mascareño 2000; 2010; Robles 
2005; Rodríguez 2007), which would appear exemplarily in the differentiation of an 
autonomous market economy and, to a lesser extent, in the differentiation of the 
political system. According to this idea, it would only be towards the end of the 20th 
century that an evolutionary leap towards functional differentiation takes place. 
Nevertheless, neither the functional differentiation of law nor the relations that this 
functional differentiation process has, with regard to the form of differentiation that 
Chile would have adopted in the last decades, has been discussed in this debate.  
 
For this reason, it is necessary to add to the present work a general hypothesis that 
is useful in the preparations for further reflections on the subject. The hypothesis of 
the present investigation points out that the functional differentiation of the Chilean 
legal system consists of an evolutionary process initiated together with the conquest and 
colonization of Spain over the territory in the 16th century. This development is 
characterized by changes in the form of differentiation of Chilean society in the 
emergence of a set of specific legal evolutionary acquisitions. The consequence of this 
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process would be that at the end of the 20th century, Chile could have a functionally 
differentiated legal system. 
 
1.2. Methodological Approach 
  
It is necessary to point out, that the present work corresponds to an analytical 
research constructed from previous works on the Chilean legal system 
transformations within the scope of history, sociology, and law. The aim of this 
work is to characterize the evolution of Chilean law, based on historical, 
sociological, and juridical documents. Given the character of such sources in formal 
terms “documentary analysis” is used (Bohnsack 2010; Vogd 2010). Nonetheless, 
since attention is given to the evolutionary explanation, the material will not be 
discussed in separated units or in consideration of manifest and latent concepts 
(Bohnsack 2010; Vogd 2010) or in other indicators. However, the work uses 
documentary sources in subordination to “problems” and “central questions.” 
 
Since the main instruction of the theory of the differentiation is to analyze the 
historical material in order to discuss theoretical-evolutionary hypotheses, this work 
then uses sociological research based on historical remarks, although guided by a 
theoretical reflection of the system differentiation. Given this methodological 
character, a clarification of the methodological approach herein is necessary. The 
sources used herein have been selected in consideration of the following themes: 
Classical Sociological Theory of Differentiation (9 Books and Monographs and 9 
Articles in Journals or Chapters in Books), Social Systems Theory (28 Books and 
Monographs and 53 Articles in Journals or Chapters in Books), Law and Sociology 
of Law (37 Books and Monographs, 92 Articles in Journals or Chapters in Books 
and 4 Statistical Compendia), Chilean and Latin-American Sociology especially 
dedicated to Differentiation (13 Books and Monographs, 13 Articles in Journals or 
Chapters in Books and 2 Statistical Compendia), History of Chilean Law (17 Books 
and Monographs and 12 Articles in Journals or Chapters in Books), and National 
and International Jurisprudence (14 Legal decisions).  
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These sources have been selected in accordance with the following problems and 
research questions: 
 
1) First, we analyze the observation problem of the sociology of law, especially around 
the constitution of an own observation point. With this, the formation of the 
sociology of law from the figure of the sociological differentiation of law, i.e., a 
sociological field of observation for the juridical phenomenon, is brought into 
focus. The problem to develop in this reconstruction of the sociology of law is the 
reflexivity of the sociological observation of the law, i.e., not only the identification 
of the differentiation process of a social system as an object of research, but at the same 
time the highlighting of the conditions of possibility of its observation in sociology. The 
questions that guide these reflections are: what are the fundamental aspects of a sociological 
observation of the law and how does the sociology of law allow for an understanding of the 
differentiation of social systems at the regional level? To resolve this compound problem, the 
study will deal with the main works in the sociology of law. 
 
2) Second, the problem of the status of the theory of the differentiation as a theory of 
social change will be investigated. To face this problem, it will be necessary to clarify 
differences between the explanatory strategy of the theory of differentiation of social 
systems and the theory of social evolution. Clarifying this relation is a significant factor to 
this study since the relation, as it is, tends to confuse both concepts, especially at the 
level of its explanatory yields (Stichweh 2007b). The key point in this task is to 
clearly define the particular characteristics of the differentiation of social systems 
theory, so as to be able to test their respective assumptions. The question that 
guides this task is: which elements characterize the explanation of social change in the system 
differentiation theory and how is this explanation related to the theory of social evolution? 
Addressing this problem requires theoretical documents framed inside the systemic 
theory of differentiation and evolution, especially the reflections of Parsons and 
Luhmann. Moreover, we will examine the ways in which differentiation theory in 
the Chilean sociology has been understood. 
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3) Once the general theoretical guidelines are developed, the specific problem 
concerning the concept of “evolutionary acquisition” (Luhmann 1997a: 506) will 
then be addressed. Thus, we will analyze the historical concurrence of certain 
acquisitions in Chilean legal system, which allows for an observation of movements 
across certain thresholds of social change. The questions that guide the reflections 
on this matter are: do evolutionary acquisitions that have been a key factor to the process of 
differentiation of law in Chile exist and, if so, what would these be? To attend to this, we will 
discuss historical and sociological documents that deal with changes introduced to 
Chilean law, highlighting significant elements therein. 
 
4) The concurrence of certain factors that may characterize a set of changes in the 
functional differentiation of the Chilean law also poses as a problem that will need 
to be discussed. Along with the identification of certain evolutionary acquisitions, 
we also settle: if it is possible to identify relatively defined periods or phases in the differentiation 
of Chilean law and if so, what its features, characteristics, and processes are. At this point, this 
work draws anchor on the theorem of the “forms of differentiation” (Luhmann 
1977). Here, the problem of functional differentiation in Chile based on sociological 
diagnoses, which indicate some characteristics of this process at regional level, will be 
discussed. Thereafter, these diagnoses will be contrasted with historical materials 
related to the evolution of Chilean legal system. It serves to note that consideration 
will not only be drawn to a set of concepts that serve as explanations of Latin-
American sociology, but also the relation of these concepts to legal change.  
 
5) Finally, we consider certain current tendencies in the differentiation process of 
Chilean law. Based on the previous analyses, a set of phenomena that would 
characterize the differentiation of the Chilean law in recent years will be 
investigated. The key question here will then be: which tendencies can currently be observed 
in the development of Chilean law? To deal with this problem, sociological, historical and 
juridical literature will be used. Comparatively, similar trends in other Latin 
American countries will be analyzed. 
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The model problems/questions belong to the methodological strategy of 
“functional analysis” (Luhmann 1974a, John 2010). This type of strategy, as noted 
by Knudsen (2011: 125) “can be characterized as a scheme for observation, a 
scheme observing in the frames of problem and solution” or, rather, between a 
problem and its possible solutions. Stemming from the functionalist strategy, this 
work adopts an “operational” approach. That is to say, this work tackles problems 
and solutions, bearing in mind a horizon of contingency with regard to the 
problems that are solved by means of certain solutions. As noted in Nassehi (2011: 
67), the question is: “What problem solves this solution?”5 As an observation 
scheme, functional method states that problems should be constructed from 
theoretical formulations and from these, possible problem/solution schemas can be 
identified. Thus, the relationship between theory and method is “circular” (Knudsen 
2011: 127). 
 
The functional model is expressed in the research in two ways. First, theory is used 
to define problems to be solved in the analysis and, in another respect, as guided by 
evolutionary theory that this study proposes, referring to the way how certain 
problems in the treatment of complexity make it possible to observe solutions that 
later generate different orders. The strategy question/problem gives form to the first 
level, while the second level will be accounted for by way of concepts of “forms of 
differentiation” and “evolutionary acquisition.”  
 
The systemic methodological approach proposed is guided by an opening to an 
interpretive approach with regard to the observed material (Schneider 2010). This 
interpretation is not given in the sense of a comprehensive sociology (Weber 1922b), but 
rather in the treatment of the material concerning explanatory complexes oriented by 
central problems and guiding questions. As rightly noted by Marcelo Neves (1992: 112) in 
the context of systemic sociology of law, research of this type should be concerned 
 
                                                            
5 “Welches Problem löst diese Lösung?]” 
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with “social and legal interpretation” adapted to the historical and empirical material 
that has been observed. 
 
1.3. Methodological Projections and its Boundaries 
 
As noted by Saake (2010: 76), it is very important for systemic approaches to also 
recognize their boundaries. To carry out the analysis on the differentiation of law in 
Chile, it is necessary to develop a research strategy according to the research 
problem. As we have seen, this implies problems of definition and focus. 
 
First, it should be noted that the theory of differentiation, in spite of its antiquity, 
which in its systemic version can be traced back at least to Spencer ([1876] 1912) 
and Durkheim ([1893] 2001), does not describe a specific methodology of study. Although 
researches on the social systems differentiation are located between evolutionary and 
historical approaches (Luhmann 1976), history is largely subsumed within 
evolutionary schemes. This is the case of Spencer, Durkheim, Parsons and 
Luhmann. An “Evolutionary sociology”, more than a historical sociology, is 
developed in all of them (Holmwood and O’Malley 2003). In general terms, this 
predilection for the type of evolutionary explanation is clearly in Parsons’ studies on 
social change (1966; 1971) and in Eisenstadt on modernization (1964; 1990) or 
civilization (1999; 2000). It also appears clearly in the reconstructions on the 
differentiation of law in Luhmann (1991b; 1995ta; 1999a; 1999b) and in other 
theoreticians with regard to other functional systems, as the differentiation of 
science (Stichweh 1979), of mass media (Alexander 1990), of educational system 
(Vanderstraeten 2004), or art (Krauss 2012), to mention some cases. 
 
The present research makes use of an analytical strategy that declares from the 
beginning the type and subject of its sources and the way in which these are 
organized concerning problems and questions. This constitutes an advancement 
with regard to the weak methodological explanations of the previous works on 
differentiation, which specify neither the type nor the subject of their sources, nor 
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their explanatory strategy. By means of a methodological perspective that arranges 
its ideas from questions and problems, it is possible then to identify the points of 
rest and also the blind spots of the research, the type of sources, the approaches, the 
hypotheses, or the scope of the results that can be then discussed. This is one of the 
contributions of the chosen methodology, which allows a projection for other 
researches focused on the processes of differentiation of social systems. 
 
This strategy, nevertheless, consists of an election that is aware of its own 
boundaries. In contrast to qualitative researches based on interviews or content 
analysis, the setting of work units must be wider and hence, less accurate. Working 
with large sources as classic monographs, new theoretical treatises, or historical 
compilations cannot be made on the basis of reduced analysis units, as in other 
qualitative methods, but based on central subjects of every bibliographical source, 
which are then structured concerning research objectives. For this reason, the 
material is arranged around questions and problems, by means of which makes it 
possible to arrange a diverse material, based on central subjects for every source. In 
spite of the advantages and possible projections of such election, the nature and the 
limits of the method are undoubtedly still tentative and they need further 
explorations in the future.  
 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
This document is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 corresponds to the present 
introduction which reviews the background of the dissertation, its objectives, 
hypotheses, and methodology. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the analysis of the central concepts of sociology of law. In this 
chapter, we investigate the origin of the sociology of law in the so-called movements 
of “sociological jurisprudence” in Europe and in the United States. It then 
characterizes the ideas of four classic authors of the sociology of law, namely: Émile 
Durkheim, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and Jürgen Habermas. A separate section 
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is reserved to characterize the sociology of law of Niklas Luhmann, which serves as 
basis for subsequent reflections. The chapter ends with some considerations on a 
regional analysis of law. 
 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the analysis of the concepts of “evolution” and 
“differentiation” from the perspective of social systems theory. Herein, similarities 
and differences between both concepts from a formal point of view are discussed. 
Moreover, two concepts that will guide the development of this study are 
introduced. These are “evolutionary acquisitions” and “forms of differentiation”. 
Finally, we analyze a set of four proposals with regard to functional differentiation 
in Chile based on the ideas of the sociologists Eduardo Valenzuela, Carlos Cousiño, 
Aldo Mascareño, Fernando Robles, and Darío Rodríguez. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of the evolution of Chilean legal system. This 
analysis is structured in two main axes. One is a set of “evolutionary acquisitions,” 
which structured Chilean law explained. For this, the analysis refers to the role 
fulfilled by judicial organizations, subjective rights, constitutions, and human rights. 
Additionally, three “forms of differentiation” in which the evolution of the Chilean 
law is located are characterized, namely: stratification-center/periphery, functional 
differentiation with class structure, and functional differentiation. The discussion in 
this chapter concludes with a brief excursus on the semantic descriptions of the 
Chilean sociology of law with regard to legal culture. 
 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the analysis of a set of contemporary tendencies of 
differentiation in Chilean law. The analysis is organized around the dimensions of 
meaning and has indicated additionally a set of paradoxes in each of them. Finally 
some comparisons with other national juridical systems in Latin America are 
indicated. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of this research. Here, the problems and 
questions previously identified in chapter 1 are recapitulated and, accordingly, 
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indicate some additional contributions and general considerations arising from this 
research. 
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2. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
 
The perspective, which we take in the observation of the differentiation of the legal 
system is the sociology of law. It is from this tradition that we focus our issues and 
problems. Therefore it will be necessary for this work to first recognize some 
general aspects of this type of observation, its historical precedents, as well as its 
relevant problems. 
 
The sociology of law arose in the late nineteenth century between the margins of the 
reflections of philosophy of law and the rising sociology. It thus clearly shares both 
sociological aspects as well as reflections of a philosophical character. This is 
brought about by its predecessors, which are made up of some early sociologists and 
some influential jurists. 
 
The purpose of sociology of law was to put in place a polemic proposal of sorts. 
Before its emergence, law was largely understood in a purely conceptual and rational 
way. The positivist and formalist movements of law encouraged the idea of a 
conceptually “pure” law, i.e., beyond any social contamination. Justice was at most 
the social problem (rather political) of the law. With the emergence of the sociology 
of law, paraphrasing Max Weber (1922b), law suffered a “disenchantment”. The old 
law charisma, its image of perfection and purity, with its rational or natural origin 
(or a mixture of both), was questioned. Of this rupture, two major consequences are 
highlighted. 
 
The first one made way for a ‘social question’ with regard to the law: how separated 
from society can the law be? Or rather: how can the presence of law itself be 
justified independently from other social phenomena? From this ‘opening’ of the 
observation of law towards society, the ‘sociological jurisprudence’ in the United 
States and Europe arose, as parallel movements with similar objectives. One main 
objective was to improve existing law. In both cases the reorientation of law 
towards society was caused by a ‘pragmatic’ intention and with ‘empirical’ emphasis. 
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The audience towards which these efforts were headed were the juridical science 
and the philosophy of law, and only secondarily to sociology. 
 
The second consequence is the production of ’sociology of law’ with sociological 
orientation, through the conceptual and rational vision of law, and the opening to 
the social question of law. Since the study of law was now understood as a segment 
of the society, sociology finds an object within its jurisdiction and could 
conceptualize it in a historical, evolutionary, and structural way. This ‘sociology of 
law’ shapes the ‘sociological differentiation’ of law, along with the understanding of 
law as a social phenomenon dependent on sociological conditions of observation.6 
 
This chapter discusses these two phenomena: on one hand, the opening of law 
‘towards society’ in sociological jurisprudence and, on the other hand, the 
understanding of law ‘within society’ made by sociology. The distinction will serve 
as a guide to describe the concerns and objectives of the discipline. The causal 
relations sought are of a functional type, i.e., no questions (or suspicions) for the 
reasons of the emergence of sociology of law will be sought, but rather the question 
for the functions fulfilled by sociology of law or, in other words, the way in which 
sociology of law defines a specific problem to resolve. To address these questions, it 
is necessary to point out some theoretical backgrounds. 
 
Tomasic (1985: 6-7) has noted that the history of the sociology of law can be seen in 
three phases. The first is the ‘European phase,’ where the ‘founding fathers’ (Weber, 
Durkheim, Ehrlich, Petrazycki, Gény, Pashukanis, Gurvitch, Renner, and 
Timasheff) appeared. Its main themes were: the macro-social and abstract 
 
                                                            
6 Certainly, the distinction between ‘sociological jurisprudence’ and ‘sociology of law’ has been 
subject of many discussions. For example Friedmann (1962: 2) argues that the terms ‘sociology of 
law’ and ‘sociological jurisprudence’ differ only “artificially” since their concerns are similar. This 
work shares the position of other authors as Machura (2001: 41), who notes that both concepts 
refers to two scientific movements with different purposes, or Deflem (2006), who understands 
sociological jurisprudence as a special application of sociology for legal ends. 
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theorizing, the study of the relationships between law and social evolution, or the 
emergency of capitalism. An almost parallel ‘North American’ phase, which would 
have initiated in 1911 and reached its peak in 1960, including Roscoe Pound, E.A. 
Ross, W.G. Summer, R.T. Ely and J.R. Commons. Its main foci would have been: 
legal realism, ‘social engineering,’ and empiricism. Finally a phase called 
‘international’, which would have begun about 1970 where Parsons, Habermas and 
Luhmann are the main figures. In this phase, the main themes would be: macro 
theories and the substitution of empirical approach in favor of historical researches. 
Although this work will largely agree with the Tomasic classification, since he 
accurately describes different stages of development of the socio-legal thought, the 
study will nevertheless focus on ‘three problems of reference’ rather than 
‘chronological phases’ of sociology of law, since we are not interested in the 
historical correlation itself, but its particular functional configuration during the 
differentiation of sociology of law. 
 
Following this scheme, we will address first the problem of the North American and 
European sociological jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. In this particular locale, we will observe the introduction of a ‘social 
dimension’ in law. Then we will analyze first the sociological perspectives of law in 
Durkheim and Weber and will see its extension up to the structural-functionalist 
proposal of Talcott Parsons and the synthesis of Habermas. Accordingly, we will 
problematize the idea of ‘sociological differentiation of law’ as a separated segment 
of the society. Finally, we will address the problem of differentiation of law from the 
sociology of law of Niklas Luhmann, where we will emphasize the main 
mechanisms that serve as background to the description of the process of 
‘differentiation.’ 
 
2.1. The Sociological Jurisprudence 
 
In studies made in the early years of the sociology of law (Baumgartner 2001; 
Deflem 2006; Friedmann 1962; Kidd 1938; Krawietz 1998; Machura 2001, 2010; 
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Rehbinder 1972; Tomasic 1985) exists an agreement in pointing out that by the end 
of the nineteenth century, both in Europe as in the United States, ‘antiformalist’ 
juridical movements appeared, which criticized the idea of law as a ‘coherent unit’ 
and questioned the absence of the society in the study of law. Granting that before 
that time, criticism of this type can be found – among the oldest and with 
philosophical inspiration, the historical school of law of Von Savigny (1850) and 
Puchta (1828-1837), the German free law movement (Flavius [Kantorowicz] 1906) 
and the jurisprudence of interests of Ihering (1894)7 - the truth is that it was only in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that these descriptions become 
plausible and were able to connect with other descriptions. Next, the development 
of these criticisms and the formation of a sociological thought of the law in the so-
called “sociological jurisprudence” will be explained. 
 
2.1.1. The North American Sociological Jurisprudence 
 
Scholars of the sociology of law as Baumgartner (2001) or Deflem (2006) argue that 
sociological interest in law first appeared in the United States in the works of the 
judge Oliver Wendell Holmes (1897), who laid the basis of ‘realism’ in the study of 
law. His ideas were later further explored by the North American jurist Roscoe 
Pound (1911a; 1911b; 1912), in what he called “sociological jurisprudence.” This has 
served as a guide-concept to understand the phase of development in the socio-legal 
thinking. We will follow this line of development, knowingly that the thought of 
Wendell Holmes also had a ramification in the ‘legal realism,’ which was rather 
related to the conceptual interpretation of law than to a subsequent sociological 
development (cf. Llewellyn 1930, radically in Frank 1930). 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes was a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, a 
remarkable jurist and an author of several treatises on Common Law (Wendell 
 
                                                            
7 Eugen Ehrlich (1916: 583) even proposed to include L'Esprit des Lois of Rousseau as a pioneering 
work in the sociology of law. 
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Holmes 1881). In 1897, he published a brief essay about what should be understood 
under the concept of law and the relations of law with morality. In this work is the 
statement that the law is a set of “prophecies of what the courts will do in fact” 
(Wendell Holmes 1897: 461). This citation is well known, although the implications 
that his ideas have in the sociology of law have not been quite studied. Three of 
them we will distinguish here. First, the component of ‘sanction’ in the law is 
emphasized from its formulation. In the discussion on the relationships between law 
and morality, Wendell Holmes points out that to understand the separation between 
law and morality should be marked by the difference between good and bad 
morality. Undoubtedly, it would be that the law protects good morality and is 
dependent on its nature. Nevertheless, if one wants to understand what 
distinguishes law from morality, it is necessary to adopt an opposite position to 
good morality and to observe how this one allows the outlining of the contours of 
law. In simple terms: one must observe how one understands the law - not the good 
man but the bad man. For the bad man, who deviates from the norm and the good 
morality, law is a ‘prophecy’ that is possible to be fulfilled. That means, law is, unlike 
morality, an expectation of sanction:8 
 
But what does it mean to a bad man? Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy that 
if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way 
of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money. (Wendell Holmes 1897: 459) 
 
Second, in a doctrinaire sense, the concept of ‘prophecy’ is also related to what 
Wendell Holmes understands by ‘norms.’ The North American system of Common 
Law, as is known, is a system based on precedents, which constitute the basis for 
later decisions. As soon as the decision is made and is registered, the precedents 
become part of the corpus of knowledge to make decisions in the future. For 
Wendell Holmes (1897: 458), “[t]he primary rights and duties with which 
 
                                                            
8One can also easily read here ‘normative expectations’, i.e. a sociological idea of law that indicates 
that points at the law as an expectations horizon. We will revisit this idea as we discuss Luhmann. 
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jurisprudence busies itself again are nothing but prophecies,” that is to say, the value 
of this knowledge is accidental and not systematical. It indicates only mere linkage 
possibilities in a future temporary horizon. The law is a prediction because its 
normative content consists only of fulfillment probability. The knowledge of law is 
of an empirical and practical character, and in no case provides exact causal 
relationships. Norms are precedents, which, as ‘prophecies,’ point to a horizon of 
possibilities and whose realization in the decision has to be defined a posteriori. In 
other words, they are prophecies that are tested only in the praxis of judicial decisions. 
 
Finally, the idea of law as “prophecy” contains an ‘organizational’ component. What 
is considered as knowledge by law corresponds neither to a logic of the system nor 
to an order of a higher instance. The law is settled, on the contrary, in the decisions 
of the courts and those decisions do not necessary produce a coherent normative 
system (Wendell Holmes 1897: 465). Moreover, law comes not from the authority 
of a sovereign power but from judicial decisions, especially in common-law 
jurisdictions. On these two ideas Wendell Holmes builds his criticism of the legal 
formalism. The law cannot be understood as a coherent system, or as a command of 
the sovereign power (such as Rousseau or Hobbes). The law is created in the courts 
that operate in the law and which decide about cases, and while the result of its 
operations attempts to create a coherent body of norms, its coherence is a matter of 
operative character and not structural a priori. Thus, Wendell Holmes (1897: 469ff.) 
indicates that law should be viewed from a historical and also economic perspective 
and that the science of law has to deal first with social desires that move the law, 
and later with the coherence of a system or a normative tradition. 
 
From his point of view, it is not possible that a legal theory would lose its social 
conditionings, hence his attempt to establish an ‘empirical concept’ of law, based on 
the result of specific decisions that are produced in it. Any philosophical 
consideration about the law must be made, therefore, under the scrutiny of the 
results of its social aspects. The science of law is the jurisprudence that takes in 
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consideration nothing more than what happens empirically in the law. This 
particular doctrine will bear fruit in the early twentieth century. 
 
Roscoe Pound, jurist and professor of law at Harvard University, was a connoted 
follower of the ideas of the judge Wendell Holmes. Pound (1911a; 1911b; 1912) 
established a programmatic axis called “sociological jurisprudence”, which inserted 
into the teachings of the law schools in the United States. While Pound (1921) 
recognizes Wendell Holmes as one of his main influences, unlike the Holmes, 
Pound was aware of the ‘sociological’ movements of law in Europe and he used 
them to strengthen his position (cf. Pound 1938; 1943). 
 
For Pound (1910), sociological jurisprudence is based on a distinction with critical 
purposes, namely: ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action.’ This distinction points to two 
ways of understanding the law. In the first case it is a question of a doctrinal and 
conceptual understanding of law, and in the second case of the observation of the 
current conditions within which it operates. The focus of sociological jurisprudence 
is “law in action,” which allows for a better understanding of the dynamic and social 
character of law and, thus, improves its performance. Sociological jurisprudence, 
which deals with ‘law in action’, would have developed, for Pound (1912: 491), in 
four stages: mechanical, biological, psychological, and unified. The first one is 
associated with the positivism of Comte; the second stage is related to Spencer’s 
sociology and evolutionary theory; the third stage would have been influenced by 
the ideas of Gierke, Ward, and Tarde; finally, the stage of unification, according to 
Pound, would contain the foundations of sociological jurisprudence program, since 
it would already be given the conditions to establish the study of ‘law in action.’ 
 
Sociological jurisprudence aims to observe law in a critical and comparative way and 
in relation to social conditions and social progress, paying more attention to the real 
operation of the law (“the working of the law”) than to its abstract content, which is 
identified as “law in books” (Pound 1912: 516). The program of sociological 
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jurisprudence, according to Pound (1912: 513-515; 1914: 20-21), dictates that it has 
to deal with six fundamental issues: 
 
1) Study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines; 
2) Sociological study in preparation for law-making;9 
3) Study of the means of making legal rules effective; 
4) A sociological legal history; 
5) The importance of reasonable and just solutions of individual cases; 
6) That the end of juristic study is to make more effective efforts in achieving 
the purposes of law. 
 
Pound later added to these tasks, ‘social control’ as a social function of the law. 
With this, law would gradually subordinate other modes of control and ‘social 
engineering’ as morality and religion. Social control as a function of the law is, 
according to Pound (1942), the arrangement of human relations to carry out 
requirements, demands, and desires within a politically-organized society at 
personal, individual, or collective level. 
 
Pound’s sociological jurisprudence is similar to the approaches of Wendell Holmes, 
since Pound considers that law is not necessarily logical or coherent but mere 
doctrine applied with extra-legal criteria (social ends, preferences, etc.). Both 
Wendell Holmes and Pound assume that law has performative functions for social 
order and that sociological jurisprudence is an ‘auxiliary discipline’ for the 
optimization of the social function of law. In doctrinaire terms, sociological 
jurisprudence is the nexus of jurisprudence with empirical foundations for its 
decisions. As long as jurisprudence becomes more sociological, its decisions would 
be more pertinent and law enforcement would become more effective. The concept 
of law – as an object for the discipline - would be the same, since sociology would 
not deal with its formulation but only with the improvement of its functions. In any 
 
                                                            
9 This issue is discussed in detail in Pound (1913). 
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case, it is a question of formulating a concept of the law, not embedded in the State, 
but rather one that reinforces the functions of law attending the existing social 
conditions. 
 
Following the foregoing, it turns out to be clear that sociology of law must be 
understood separately from sociological jurisprudence, which constitutes a special 
use of sociological knowledge for legal purposes. For this reason we need to 
examine further the particular case of sociology of law in sociological jurisprudence 
developed in an almost parallel way in Europe. 
 
2.1.2. The European Sociological Jurisprudence 
 
The European sociological jurisprudence in the late nineteenth century was more of 
a reaction to the so-called ‘jurisprudence of concepts’ from the Kantian idea of 
natural law, than a definition of a sociological program for the study of law. This 
must be emphasized, since in the studies on the origins of the sociology of law, 
sociological concerns are often confused with the purely legal. Indubitably, 
sociology of law has ties with the sociological movements of the North American 
and European jurisprudence. We will later see Max Weber and Talcott Parsons 
reflecting some of these ideas in sociological formulations. This confusion usually 
occurs because, although in the United States sociological jurisprudence clearly 
differed from sociology of law (cf. Pound 1943). In Europe, the use of sociology for 
the interpretation and application of law was commonly called ‘sociology of law,’ 
without reaching a sociological program for the study of law. It is worth insisting on 
this. The main concern of these movements was to provide guidelines for science 
and philosophy of law in dealing with social conditions and the effects of the law. 
For these reasons, we prefer to call this movement as ‘sociological jurisprudence’ 
and not ‘sociology of law,’ a term we reserve for later. 
 
In the context of the European sociological jurisprudence, the works of Thimashef 
(1939), Gurvitch (1947), or Ehrlich (1989) surface. Ehrlich provided a connection 
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between the North American sociological jurisprudence and the European and later 
with the sociology of law of Max Weber. With regard to Gurvitch, Mc Donald 
(1979) supports that his sociology of law was despised in the United States for a 
long time, partly by the wide diversity of influences of the Russian thinkers settled in 
France, which ranged from phenomenology, Marxism, structuralism, the sociology 
of Durkheim (whom he succeeded as scholar in La Sorbonne), and empiricism, and 
also because he supported a position that was more philosophical than sociological. 
The work of Thimashef meanwhile, although recognized by Pound (1943), did not 
have the impact that, on the contrary, Eugen Ehrlich obtained. 
 
Ehrlich significantly influenced the North American sociological jurisprudence. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes was interested in his works and took up contact with him, 
as related by Ehrlich (1916: 582). Nevertheless, his ideas will take force only up to 
the programmatic formulation of the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound. 
In his first writings, Pound (1914) commented that the work of Ehrlich was an 
important influence for the consolidation of the sociological jurisprudence. Later in 
1922, Pound (1922: 130) published a brief Laudation to the work of this author, in 
which occasion he lamented that, because of the First World War, Ehrlich had to 
decline the invitation to travel to the United States and present his ideas. The 
similarities between the thought of Pound and of Ehrlich are evident. Perhaps the 
clearest of all is the use of a dichotomy that distinguishes the traditional study of law 
and the new approach of sociological inspiration. The Ehrlich dichotomy (1989: 
409ff.) between “state law” and “living law” was re-formulated by Pound in his first 
writings as the distinction, as already discussed, between “law in books” and “law in 
action”. In both cases, it is a question of differentiating an ambience of explanation 
of law from social considerations, separately from the traditional understanding of 
law. This distinction served to open the interpretation of precedents and doctrine 
towards social aspects and thus adjust judicial decisions in the North American 
sociological jurisprudence. Meanwhile, in case of European sociological 
jurisprudence, this distinction served to deal jurisprudence with concepts of Kantian 
inspiration. Indeed, in contrast to North American sociological jurisprudence, which 
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tried to reorient judicial decisions towards sociologically empirical aspects, Ehrlich, 
his contemporaries, and predecessors (Ihering, Kantorowicz, Savigny, etc.), aside 
from trying to reorient this judicial praxis, faced constant attacks of conceptual 
jurisprudence. 
 
The criticism towards sociological jurisprudence in Europe was based on a famous 
postulate of Kant about the impossibility of founding an ‘empirical science of law.’ 
Kant (1797: 32) was referring to this option pejoratively: “A doctrine of law that is 
merely empirical may (like the wooden head in Phaedrus’s fable) be a beautiful head, 
but unfortunately it has no brain!,”10 since the true source for the science of law had 
to be reason and not empirical experience. Sociological jurisprudence was stubborn 
on developing a science of law of empirical character and, thus, subordinating the 
pretensions of rationality to the results of current and operative knowledge of the 
law. Facing this Kantian idea of the impossibility of an empirical science of law, 
Ehrlich (1989: 33) argues that: “the sociology of law is the scientific doctrine of 
law,”11 since jurisprudence as science is a part of the theoretical science of society, 
i.e., sociology. Moreover, for Ehrlich (1907), conceptual and rational jurisprudence 
obey only the products of historical conditions, for example, an interpretation of 
Roman law concerning customary law. 
 
Sociological jurisprudence to Ehrlich (1989: 405, 421) – which he refers to as 
sociology of law - would deal with the living content of law and not with its 
conceptual abstractions. This living content of law is the ‘living law’, i.e., non-state 
law produced by society beyond legal formalizations; it is also the law that 
dominates social life but one that is not reduced to formal or conceptual legal 
postulates (Ehrlich 1989: 415) and that while it can take state law – legal documents 
or judicial decisions - as a source, this type of law is not the main theme. Living law 
 
                                                            
10 “Eine bloß empirische Rechtslehre ist (wie der hölzerne Kopf in Phädrus' Fabel) ein Kopf, der 
schön sein mag, nur schade! daß er kein Gehirn hat.” 
11 “Die Soziologie des Rechts ist die wissenschaftliche Lehre vom Rechte.” 
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comes from social relations that occur empirically and historically, since “social 
order” precedes state law (Ehrlich 1922: 132) and the “social function” of living law 
is aimed exactly at the production of such order (Ehrlich 1989: 422). State law is 
located in the opposite bank. Following Ehrlich’s own writings, state law can be 
defined as a counter-concept of living law, since the former is located in judicial and 
administrative norms. In Ehrlich words: “[t]hat is living law in contrast to that 
which applies only to the court and authorities”12 (Ehrlich 1989: 415) or also “[s]tate 
law consists for the greater part of rules of administration (instructions addressed to 
administrative officials). Still it includes also rules of decision (instructions to the 
judge as to how to proceed and how to decide in litigation)” (Ehrlich 1922: 137). 
Every law that is not reduced to administrative or judicial disposals constitutes living 
law and, for Ehrlich, many norms are not formalized in state law.13  
 
Ehrlich’ idea of ‘living law’ will serve as input to sociology of law for over half a 
century.14 His sociological postulates are, nevertheless, rather scarce and are not 
systematized towards a social theory of law of major scope. An example of this is 
the idea that the social and economic order produced by living law would be based 
on four fundamental (juridical) facts, namely: “Exercise, domination, property, 
declaration of interest”15 (Ehrlich 1989: 84) and in five necessary (juridical) 
institutions: “marriage, family, possession, contract, succession” (Ehrlich 1922: 131). 
This conjunction would produce society: “Society is the totality of human relations 
that are in close contact with each other. These relations that they form society are 
 
                                                            
12 “Das ist also das lebende Recht im Gegensatze zu dem bloß vor Gericht und den Behörden 
geltenden.” 
13 The problem of state law seems to be for Ehrlich a problem of complexity, i.e. a problem of 
“requisite variety” (Ashby 1957: 202ff) to answer to its environment. 
14 Recently attention has turned to the idea of living law of Ehrlich and its possibilities for a 
‘juridical pluralism’ (cf. Nelken 2008; Hertogh 2009). 
15 “die Übung, die Herrschaft, der Besitz, der Willenserklärung.” 
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of very different types”16 (Ehrlich 1989: 34). If we pay attention to these facts, 
institutions and bonds, we see that what Ehrlich understands about ‘social order’ is 
rather a ‘non-state’ juridical order. The way in which social order is understood 
tends to rather justify an idea of law, as an idea of society. Put another way, the idea 
of living law tends to be a juridical description of society and not a social description of law. 
 
The fundamental difference between the ideas of sociological jurisprudence of 
Pound and Ehrlich is that, for Pound, ‘law in books’ is a situation that should be 
improved by sociological jurisprudence, while for Ehrlich, ‘living law’ is the true law 
and not the juridical fictions that create doctrinaire concepts. In spite of this, in both 
cases it is a question of a practical task. In both cases, the concept of law is 
incomplete and in both cases, the nation-state law must be either replaced or 
improved. 
 
2.2. The Sociology of Law 
 
Sociological jurisprudence served as a base for the emergence of the sociology of 
law, though its main concerns were rather oriented towards the internal 
improvement of law. By establishing criticism on the way in which law is 
understood, sociological jurisprudence allowed sociology to emphasize the social 
character of law and transform law into an object of sociological observation. 
 
The distinction between living law and state law made the question about a ‘social 
dimension’ of law possible. This social character of law was taken as a rudimentary 
argument by sociological jurisprudence for a more empirical rather than conceptual 
treatment of law. In its formulation, as we know, a ‘sociological’ concept of the right 
was not pursued, but the practical knowledge of law was to be perfected. However, 
 
                                                            
16 “Die Gesellschaft, das ist die Gesamtheit der menschlichen Verbände, die miteinander in 
Fühlung stehen. Und diese Verbände, die die Gesellschaft bilden, sind sehr verschiedener Art.” 
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sociology will soon take charge of this opening of law towards social aspects, 
formulating approaches to law with clear sociological orientations. 
 
This process, which may be called ‘sociological’ differentiation of law, can be 
understood as a part of a broader process of differentiation of law, which includes 
the differentiation of sociology as a science. The law, in its own process of 
differentiation, enters into a crisis with regard to the delimitation of its borders, 
which appears clearly in the disputes between sociological jurisprudence and rational 
ideas of law. The borders of law from thereon cannot be understood in purely ideal 
terms, and, with the emergence of sociological jurisprudence, every setting of limits 
must seek its own justification. 
 
If we agree with Luhmann that law takes charge of “normative expectations” and 
science of “cognitive expectations” (Luhmann 1991a: 440-441) and that these 
expectations are opposites, this differentiation process will then be less dramatic for 
sociology than for law. The differentiation of knowledge in sociology oriented to 
law occurs as part of a novel process but without relevant critical repercussions. On 
the other hand, in the differentiation of the legal system, which is eminently 
normative, this differentiation process occurs with various problems, like those we 
have previously described. 
 
It might seem that the emergence of sociological jurisprudence announces the 
appearance of a social dimension in law, although this ‘social dimension’ of law 
must be understood in a slightly different way. It is not in any way a social 
differentiation between alter egos (Luhmann 1991a: 119), but rather that social 
aspects of law are treated as ‘themes’ in the law and that they serve to satisfy certain 
normative demands. In other words, it is a question of a differentiation in the 
factual dimension (Luhmann 1991a: 123-124), i.e., in the internal understanding of 
law and its praxis. Sociological jurisprudence can also be seen as a symptom of the 
differentiation of law and sociology and also as a curious “structural coupling” 
(Maturana & Varela 1984; 1998) between sociology as science and law. 
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So far, we have concentrated on the side of law, its reflections in sociological 
jurisprudence and its pretensions. We have therefore seen this process only from 
one side of the “form” (Spencer-Brown 1979), namely of law, where the 
fundamental problem of reference is normative production and decisions, an 
interest that appears clearly in sociological jurisprudence. Next, we will see the 
problem of reference of sociology and how a sociological differentiation of law 
appears, that is to say, law as a sociological object. 
 
Similar to the development of a sociological jurisprudence into juridical praxis, 
sociology of law emerges under cognitive pretensions of diverse character. In this 
initial situation, the first classics of sociology of law appear. In this section we will 
deal with the ideas of Durkheim, Weber, Parsons and Habermas with regard to law. 
The motive for highlighting these authors is because their ideas contain fundamental 
premises that pave way for the understanding of various aspects of this ‘sociological 
differentiation of law’, i.e., a specific field of sociology which horizon is the law. For 
this reason, we will discuss the central aspects of their sociological proposals to 
understand law. Once this is done we will deal with the sociology of law of 
Luhmann as a theoretical closure on the sociological differentiation of law. 
 
2.2.1. Durkheim: Law and Morality 
 
In a different way from sociological jurisprudence, the position of law in society is, 
for Émile Durkheim (2001),17 an essential element for understanding the social 
whole. For Durkheim, law is the fundamental social organism in which the ‘form of 
differentiation’ of society, so to speak, can be seen. In any case, his understanding of 
law pointed to an improvement in juridical praxis, but knowledge of law allows the 
accounting for society and its transformations. Thus, law is a fundamental condition 
 
                                                            
17 Translation from Spanish. 
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of society and also of modernity. Therefore, to understand modern society one has 
to pay attention to the conditions under which law appears and shapes society. 
 
His study on the moral character of law in the Leçons of sociologie (Durkheim 1958) 
closely follows the distinctions used in De la Division du Travail Social (Durkheim 
2001) with regard to the type of sanctions (Durkheim 1958: 3ff.). Durkheim 
addresses law from an essentially moral perspective and analyzes the different 
manifestations of this morality, on law, on the relations between the individual and 
the State, up to property law. For him, as for many of his contemporaries, the 
problem of the law was a problem of morality, which was especially evident in the 
punitive character shared between law and morality (Durkheim 1958: 2). 
 
This ‘moral problem’18 appears throughout all his works and is problematized in a 
particular way in De la Division du Travail Social (Durkheim 2001). The social division 
of labor, per Durkheim (2001: 65), resolves a moral problem more than an 
economic problem, and its function lies in morality. The moral character of the 
society is expressed in the solidarity, which comes from society and its obligations, 
representations, and reciprocal commitments between individual and society. In 
these moral terms, social solidarity must be understood as the fundamental social 
tie. The task of sociology is exactly to study the solidarity: “the study of solidarity 
thus grows out of sociology. It is a social fact we can know only through the 
intermediary of social effects” (Durkheim 2001: 78). 
 
Law appears for Durkheim as a problem of observation. When attempting the study 
of solidarity, Durkheim (2001: 75) focused his remarks on the law, which he 
considered as a “visible symbol” of such solidarity. The study of law is, therefore, 
 
                                                            
18 Durkheim did not develop an explanatory term about its conception of morality, it is possible to 
conclude that, from its position, morality resembles altruism, and sociability is a consequence of 
this disposition of conscience towards others. With regard to the uses that Durkheim gives to the 
term “moral”, see Catoggio (2004); Coterrell (1991). 
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the study of a social fact which tangible manifestation allows the accounting for the 
predominant solidarity in society. Solidarity is expressed in customs, of which there 
exist some whose knowledge is obligatory and whose non-compliance is punished. 
These customs are the core of law and of social life itself. 
 
Every law is, in principle, ‘customary.’ Each social group has certain representations 
and collective feelings that are inherited by successive generations. Certain aspects 
related to social practices acquire a mandatory character, and respect and 
responsibility are demanded. Some of these aspects acquire such relevance that 
organs emerge to guarantee its respect, such as the Courts (Durkheim 2001: 113). 
When this happens, moral judgments become ‘juridical formulae’ and a legal order is 
constituted. 
 
Since the society is understood by derivation of morality and, in turn, morality is 
understood by its juridical manifestations, the types of social solidarity that are 
transformed with the advent of modern society are directly related to the 
preponderance of certain juridical forms. The categories of “mechanical solidarity” 
and “organic solidarity”, which correspond to a “repressive” and “restitutive” law 
respectively (Durkheim 2001: 80ff.), show a differentiation process of law based on 
sanctions and, consequently, a process of social differentiation represented in the 
transformations of law. 
 
The differentiation of society is the result of moral differentiation, which is 
expressed in law. From penal forms of law, which are placed on mechanical 
solidarity, up to civil forms of law, which come from organic solidarity, society 
maintains solidarity as basis for the relations between individuals and only changes 
the way that these relations are established in laws. The differentiation of society 
also occurs at the level of its representations, in what Durkheim (2001: 94ff.) calls 
“collective conscience”, which is gradually fragmented as division of labor advances 
in front of individual conscience (Durkheim 2001: 124). With force in mechanical 
solidarity, collective conscience punishes crimes (Durkheim 2001: 96ff.) since its 
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presence in this kind of solidarity is more intense and its concrete manifestation 
occurs by punishment (Durkheim 2001: 101ff.), which primarily makes mechanical 
solidarity a form of ‘criminal law.’ 
 
The transition to modern society occurs through the division of labor, in which not 
only specialized tasks are developed in a differentiated way, but wherein the kind of 
social bond are also differentiated, i.e., the solidarity that characterizes it. The law 
that symbolizes this kind of solidarity is the “restitutive law” (Durkheim 2001: 
131ff.) and it appears under the aspect of an “organic” solidarity, or solidarity based 
on “differences” (Durkheim 2001: 153ff.). In such solidarity, complementarity 
relations prevail and these gradually replace “mechanical solidarity” (Durkheim 
2001: 181ff.). Organic solidarity does not eliminate collective conscience, but this is 
differentiated in diverse perspectives. 
 
This is not to say, however, that the common conscience is threatened with total 
disappearance. Only, it more and more comes to consist of very general and very 
indeterminate ways of thinking and feeling, which leave an open place for a 
growing multitude of individual differences. (Durkheim 2001: 205)  
 
The function of law to produce ‘solidarity’ and maintain the cohesion of society and 
the integrity of the collective conscience remains unaltered in this evolutionary 
transition, even if the social division of labor demands to enact a specification of its 
tasks and to take form in organs increasingly specialized. 
 
In modern society, based on organic solidarity and restitutive law, collective 
conscience (and morality) is increasingly reduced to the State. This is one of the 
reasons by which, on the one hand, Durkheim has been classified to be within the 
so-called “methodological nationalism” (Smith 1983: 26) and, on the other hand, his 
ideas about law are explained to have greater impact when in a state concept of law. 
Durkheim (2001: 216) also took care to emphasize that organic solidarity is only 
possible when a “center” in society exists. Such center belongs to the State 
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(Durkheim 2001: 259). Hence, the problem of “integration” in society is a moral 
problem, fundamentally between the individual and the State (Durkheim 1958: 
42ff). 
 
Durkheim’s sociological concept of law has no doctrinaire function or concerns for 
its internal character. Law is a normative representation of the moral character of 
society. The same distinction between two types of law follows a classifying 
principle based on tangible aspects, i.e., on the social facts that form law. Law is 
relevant for sociology as long as this manifests in its punitive functions that the 
conditions of solidarity have changed. It is interesting to observe that the 
understanding of law in Durkheim is situated far from the schism between 
philosophy of law and practice of law (such as in the North American sociological 
jurisprudence), without discussing with some of them (such as the European 
sociological jurisprudence). Instead, he looks first of all for a differentiation of law 
as a proper object of sociology itself. However Durkheim does not go so far as to 
obtain a ‘proper object’ of law but he uses the sanctioning character of law as a 
moral equivalent to determine the type of social solidarity, as a social fact. Finally, a 
sociological theory of the law is not intended, but rather a sociological theory of 
morality based on the law (Durkheim 1958) or a theory of differentiation starting 
from the law (Durkheim 2001). 
 
The question about law is nevertheless a question of purely sociological character. 
The law manifests not only relevant aspects of social life – a matter that sociological 
jurisprudence had also emphasized - but this is a concrete manifestation of social 
morality that governs the social order altogether. The study of solidarities and law of 
Durkheim shows how relevant the knowledge of the law is in understanding social 
phenomenon. The study of law is, for Durkheim (inversely to the study of sociology 
for sociological jurisprudence), an input of primary importance for understanding 
the social change and the moral character of society. Durkheim not only initiates 
this type of sociological reflection about law but also opens relevant questions about 
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the function of law, which, from the idea of ‘solidarity’ and ‘differentiation,’ will 
echo in the later formulations of Parsons, Habermas, and Luhmann. 
 
2.2.2. Max Weber: Rationalization of Law 
 
In a different way from the appreciation of Durkheim about law and its character, 
Weber argues that the law operates and is obeyed, not for its “coercive” character 
but for its “legitimacy” and, especially in modern societies, for its “rationality” 
(Weber 1922a).19 
 
The juridical element, from Weber’s perspective, must be understood from a 
‘historical’ and ‘comprehensive’ point of view and also according to a generalized 
process of ‘rationalization.’ In this study of law, it is necessary to explain its 
transformations, from its irrational and magical origins up to the abstract and formal 
character of modern law, and, in parallel, to study those factors, which contribute to 
the historical constellation of this rationalization. In this process of rationalization, 
Weber pays special attention to the theoretical phases (ideal types) of the 
rationalization of law. 
 
The starting point of the sociological knowledge of law is the distinction between 
the ‘sociological’ and the ‘doctrinaire’ approach to law. Here, Weber follows closely 
the ideas of Ehrlich and of the German Free Law Movement.20 For him, the 
‘dogmatic’ uses an abstract and formal ‘normative-logical method’, which looks for 
the coherence of juridical propositions. While, on the other hand, ‘sociology’ uses 
‘empirical methods’ to discover causes and effects of the factual existence of a 
particular legal system. Sociology wonders: 
 
 
                                                            
19 A recommended guide for a socio-legal reading of Weber is in Fariñas-Dulce (1989). 
20 In more detail in Fariñas-Dulce (1989: 57-74).  
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What actually occurs in a community owing to the probability that persons 
engaged in community action, especially those exerting a socially relevant 
amount of power, subjectively consider certain norms as valid and practically 
act according to them, in other words, orient their own conduct towards 
these norms. (Weber 1922a: 368)21 
 
The ability to develop sociology of law for Weber depends on the definition of an 
object of study for the new discipline. The object of sociology of law is the 
understanding [das Verstehen] of behavior, subjectively oriented by a legal order 
considered as “valid” (Weber 1922a: 19), i.e., regular social actions resulting from 
the representation of this order regarded as valid. Therefore, sociology of law, for 
Weber, does not study the juridical order as a set of rules or logically coherent 
normative propositions, but as a “complex of factual determinants of human 
conduct” (Weber 1922a: 369).22 
 
Law, i.e. the legal order, expresses itself empirically since it is a causal factor of social 
action. What produces social action oriented by a juridical order is a representation 
that actors have of that order. The legal order is: “A complex of maxims in the 
minds of particular empirical people, which causally influences their factual action 
and thereby indirectly the action of others” (Weber 1922c: 348).23 Therefore the 
legal order consists not only of that which is ‘in accordance with law’ but also of its 
nonfulfillment, since both cases are orientated by the legal order. 
 
 
                                                            
21 “Was innerhalb einer Gemeinschaft faktisch um deswillen geschieht, weil die Chance besteht, daß 
am Gemeinschaftshandeln beteiligte Menschen, darunter insbesondere solche, in deren Händen ein 
sozial relevantes Maß von faktischem Einfluß auf dieses Gemeinschaftshandeln liegt, bestimmte 
Ordnungen als geltend subjektiv ansehen und praktisch behandeln, also ihr eigenes Handeln au 
ihnen orientieren.” 
22 “Komplex von faktischen Bestimmungsgründen realen menschlichen Handelns.” 
23 “Komplex von Maximen in den Köpfen bestimmter empirischer Menschen auf, welche deren 
faktisches Handeln und durch sie indirekt das anderer kausal beeinflussen.” 
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a) Legitimacy and coercion 
 
This empirical character of the legal order ensues owing to the special conjugation 
of two key elements, namely ‘legitimacy’ and ‘coercion.’ As we have seen, for 
Durkheim, the second element was the most relevant in understanding law from a 
sociological perspective. For Weber, however, coercion is not sufficient to account 
for legal order as a social factor of an action. 
 
The legal order is characterized more by its ‘legitimacy’ than by its coercion. The 
legitimacy of the legal order is related to the subjective representation that makes an 
actor, with regard to his acceptance of the legal order, a model of action. The law, as 
model of action: “enjoys the prestige of being considered exemplary or binding” 
(Weber 1922a: 16).24 The recognition of the legitimacy of the legal order implies 
“fundaments of validity” (Fariñas-Dulce 1989), through which the actors attribute 
meaning to a given legal order. 
 
According to Weber (1922a: 19-20), the validity of the legal order can be given in 
four ways: 
 
1. According to tradition: The validity of the legal order is given by the “validity 
of what has always been” (Weber 1922a: 19).25 It is the most ancient and 
universal type of validity and is related to the respect and fear for the 
holiness of the tradition. For the same reason, it is a validity of conservative 
character. 
 
2. According to an affectual belief, especially emotional: The validity of the legal order 
is given by the “validity of what is newly revealed or exemplary” (Weber 
 
                                                            
24 “Prestige der Vorbildlichkeit oder Verbindlichkeit.” 
25 “Geltung des immer Gewesenen.” 
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1922a: 19).26 Through oracles and other prophetic forms, law turns out to be 
associated with the legitimacy of the “prophet” and the belief in its virtues. 
 
3. According to a rational belief in its absolute value: The validity of the legal order 
is given by the “validity of what has been considered as an absolute” (Weber 
1922a: 19).27 This validity is represented by the pure type of “natural law”, 
and is associated with the orientation of the action on values considered as 
absolute. 
 
4. According to a belief in legality: The validity of the legal order is given by “the 
readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been 
imposed in the usual manner” (Weber 1922a: 19).28 The validity of the legal 
order is obtained by compliance with the rules and procedures and not with 
individuals, traditions, or specific values. 
 
Weber then relates these types of legitimacy to the emergence of ‘ideal types’ in the 
rationalization of law.  
 
From the point of view of the actor, “legitimacy” is a factor that operates in an 
“internal” way (Weber 1922a: 17) with regard to beliefs that guide his orientation for 
action. Nevertheless, it is not the only factor. In addition to legitimacy, legal order 
turns out to be guaranteed by “coercion” which operates in an “external” way 
(Weber 1922a: 17). By means of these two factors: legitimacy and coercion, social 
action is reinforced towards legal order. 
 
 
                                                            
26 “Geltung des neu Offenbarten oder des Vorbildlichen.” 
27 “Geltung des als absolut gültig Erschlossenen.” 
28 “die Fügsamkeit gegenüber formal korrekt und in der üblichen Form zustandegekommenen 
Satzungen.” 
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This is the plane of the ‘guarantees’, with which law makes probable its acceptance 
as model of conduct. Thus, law, as legitimate order, is characterized by having 
“specific guarantees of the probability of its empirical validity” (Weber 1922a: 
369).29 These guarantees can be ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the actor. The “internal 
guarantees” are given by “beliefs” that an actor possesses about the legal order and 
that grant “validity” to this, as an emotional and affective feeling to law, and a 
rational appreciation of law as having an absolute value (moral, aesthetic, etc.) or a 
religious belief in law as a mean of salvation (Weber 1922a: 17). The “external 
guarantees” are related to the expectation of “external consequences”, i.e., 
“sanctions” of some kind (Weber 1922a: 17). The latter type of guarantees operates 
independently of the actor and reinforces that the action be guided by law beyond 
the mere belief in the validity of an order, which, by itself, cannot be considered as a 
causal factor of the action for the legal order. To execute these external guarantees, 
a “coercive apparatus” is organized (Weber 1922a: 369) in which a group of 
individuals are in charge of coercion (physical or psychic) to force the observance of 
this order or to punish its transgression. In a way similar to Durkheim, Weber pays 
special attention to the role played by sanctions in the law. Nevertheless, as we have 
indicated, sanctions are not the decisive factor in understanding the reasons why a 
legal order is causal and empirically related to real human behavior. Indeed, the 
rationalization of law and its legitimization are focused on its fundaments of validity 
and not on its sanctioning character. 
 
Since ‘coercion’ is not a fundament of legitimacy of the order (internal to law) this 
has a role only as ‘external guarantee.’ Within the external guarantees of law this is 
the most relevant but it is not unique. In effect, ‘coercion’ disputes its place as 
external guarantee against ‘convention’, since there is the expectation of certain 
‘external consequences’ and situations of interest in both. 
 
 
                                                            
29 “spezifischen Garantien für die Chance ihrer empirischen Geltung.” 
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For Weber, coercion plays a double role in the legal order. On the one hand, it 
allows the understanding of the empirical character of law as a guide for behavior 
and, on the other hand, it allows for the delimitation of a specific type of social 
action that is coupled with law. ‘Coercion’ serves mainly to distinguish the legal 
order against other social orders as convention and custom. The force of legal order 
is greater than the force of custom or of convention because it is not only 
established in social action, but also possesses structures that affirm its compliance. 
 
With regard to ‘custom,’ Weber points out that this is an action that is repeated 
without having any more fundamental rationale than the mere fact of its regularity: 
 
We understand for “custom” a typically uniform activity which is kept on the 
beaten track simply because people are “accustomed” to it and persist in it by 
unreflective “imitation”. It is an “action of masses”, the perpetuation of which by 
the individual is not “required” in any sense by anyone. (Weber 1922a: 374)30  
 
‘Convention’, on the other hand, is based on the probability of reprobation, which 
can be empirically sensitive to the actor in its immediate environment: 
 
For convention, on the other hand, we understand that this exists wherever a 
certain behavior is sought to be induced without, however, any coercion, physical 
or psychological, and, at least under normal circumstances, without any direct 
reaction other than the expression of approval or disapproval by those persons who 
form the “environment” of the actor. (Weber 1922a: 374)31 
 
                                                            
30 “Wir wollen unter „Sitte“ den Fall eines typisch gleichmäßigen Verhaltens verstehen, welches 
lediglich durch seine „Gewohnheit“ und unreflektierte „Nachahmung“ in dem überkommenen 
Geleise gehalten wird, ein „Massenhandeln“ also, dessen Fortsetzung dem Einzelnen von 
Niemanden in irgendeinem Sinn „zugemutet“ wird.” 
31 Unter „Konvention“ wollen wir dagegen den Fall verstehen, daß auf ein bestimmtes Verhalten 
zwar eine Hinwirkung stattfindet, aber durch keinerlei physischen oder psychischen Zwang, und 
überhaupt zum mindesten normalerweise und unmittelbar durch gar keine andere Reaktion als 
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What distinguishes law as a normative order is not only coercion as a guarantee of 
order, but its application by a “coercive apparatus.” The law is guaranteed by this 
external coercive apparatus, i.e. for the probability of coercion exercised by this 
organ composed by individuals with the mission to compel the observance of the 
order and to punish its transgression. Therefore, a norm is ‘legal’ (and not ‘custom’ 
or ‘convention’) when it appears sanctioned by this ‘apparatus.’ Weber recognized 
that coercion is not in all laws and that there are diverse kinds of law in which 
coercion does not play a fundamental role. Nonetheless, for the delimitation of the 
specific field of the law, coercion plays a very relevant role as external guarantee. 
 
In short, the probability of the emergency of a legal order is both in internal 
guarantees (validity of law) and in the mechanisms that guarantee its compliance at 
the external level (coercion). The sociological differentiation of law by Weber 
defines law based on these two manifestations, which allow the law to be a decisive 
factor in social action. 
 
b) Sources of Law 
 
For Durkheim, law is inherently ‘customary.’ For Weber, on the contrary, it is 
indeed probable that law has custom for its source, but also the creation of law 
institutes customs and conventions, without thereby diminishing either the 
compelling character of the law or its empirical validity. 
 
According to Weber the law arose to protect “situations of interests” as that 
guaranteed by customs or conventions, but at some point they were not sufficient to 
guarantee the legal order (Fariñas-Dulce 1989: 192). These situations of interests 
could be due to the existence of a stratified social structure and to the demands of 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
durch die bloße Billigung oder Mißbilligung eines Kreises von Menschen, welche eine spezifische 
„Umwelt“ des Handelnden bilden. 
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social groups located in the summit of this structure on grounds of legal safeties. 
Other factors such as environmental alterations or wars could have also been 
relevant, so that they altered the existing living conditions and pressed for changes 
in social structure. 
 
However, the law is largely a product of deliberate actions and it appears as a social 
invention, either through the natural transit of custom to the law, via conventions, 
or by means of the creation of a new law that imposes itself to preexisting customs 
and conventions. Indeed, the latter way of creating law leads to the formation of a 
more complex law. Among these sources, with which law is deliberate created, are 
contracts, judicial decisions, charismatic revelations, and the positive law. 
 
In this process of artificial creation of law the “bearers” [Träger] of law play a 
fundamental role in the historical process of creation of law. They determined the 
different stages of the process of rationalization of the legal order. These “bearers” 
of law are the following: 
 
Theoretically, the general development of law and procedures may be viewed as passing 
through the following “stages of development:” charismatic legal revelation through 
“law prophets;” empirical creation and finding of law by legal honoratiores (i.e., law 
creation through cautelary jurisprudence and adherence to precedent); imposition of 
law by secular or theocratic powers; and finally, systematic elaboration of law and 
professionalized administration of justice by persons who have received “legal training” 
in a learned and formally logical manner. (Weber 1922a: 503)32  
 
                                                            
32 Die allgemeine Entwicklung des Rechts und des Rechtsgangs führt theoretisch in 
„Entwicklungsstufen“ gegliedert von der charismatischen Rechtsoffenbarung durch 
„Rechtspropheten“ zur empirischen Rechtsschöpfung und Rechtsfindung durch 
Rechtshonoratioren (Kautelar- und Präjudizienrechtsschöpfung) weiter zur Rechtsoktroyierung 
durch weltliches Imperium und theokratische Gewalten und endlich zur systematischen und zur 
fachmäßigen Rechtssatzung, auf Grund literarischer und formallogischer Schulung sich 
vollziehenden „Rechtspflege“ durch Rechts gebildete (Fachjuristen). 
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Each of these “bearers” of the law helped in the rationalization of the law from its 
own specificities. The ‘legal prophets,’ who obtain the law by means of a charismatic 
revelation, certainly contributed to the “pacification” (Fariñas-Dulce 1989: 254) of 
revenges and social conflicts; ‘honoratiores’ (both theoretical and practical), who, 
after the revelation of law by legal prophets, interpreted this already existing norms 
(that they should have been specializing in; their work was becoming progressively 
increasingly secular). They contributed by developing ‘procedures’ and the 
‘formalization’ of the legal order. The ‘princes’ and ‘magistrates’ also played an 
important role since, although they initially respond to criteria of substantial and 
practical character, they influenced the ‘rationalization’ and ‘secularization’ of the 
law, both in its procedures as in its fundaments. Finally, from a point of view of the 
modern law, the specializing jurist, i.e., the ‘professionals of the law’, contributed to 
the development of the ‘codification’ and the modern ‘proceduralization’ of the law. 
 
In all these cases, the “bearers” are part of the sources of law in their different 
theoretical stages, as well as the sources of legitimacy of law in each of them. The 
contribution is observed as not only relating to the general rationalization process, 
but also to the emergence of a specific legal order. Each of these ‘theoretical stages’ 
corresponds to an ‘ideal type’ of law, which is related largely to these “bearers.” 
   
c) The Types of Law 
 
For Weber, law must be appreciated both from a subjective point of view (as 
legitimate order) and from a historical-theoretical point of view (as an ideal type). 
About the first approach we have already seen the rudiments of legitimacy of the 
legal order and also how these are expressed historically in theoretical stages and 
“bearers.” 
 
In the second aspect, that is to say, the study of law as an ideal type, law is 
understood as the conjugation of a constellation of value orientations that determine 
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the type of a historically predominant legal order. Weber constructs the ideal types 
of law by means of the oppositions ‘rational/irrational’ and ‘substantial/formal.’ 
 
We know that the concept of ‘rationality’ plays an important role in Weber’s theory, 
but in the analysis of law, the temporal factors of “predictability” and “calculability” 
of the actions and decisions in the law are added to this concept (Fariñas-Dulce 
1989: 214), namely: “the rational calculation of legal consequences and likely 
outcomes of purposeful actions” (Weber 1922b: 468).33 The largely unpredictable 
and arbitrary character of a legal order, which does not permit this ‘rational 
calculation’ of the action, therefore instigates the irrationality of law. 
 
Accordingly, the ‘rationality’ of law must, thus, be understood from the point of 
view of the predictability of decisions inside the legal order, from its generalization 
or systematization. The ‘formal’ or ‘substantial’ character of law, on the other hand, 
denotes the orientation of the decision with regard to its contents. The law can be 
understood in a ‘formal’ way when its orientation is towards the system itself as a 
source of content, while the ‘substantial’ character of law is expressed in the 
adoption of contents, whose source is external to the system. 
 
They are formally irrational when in lawmaking or law-finding means which cannot 
be controlled by the intellect are applied, for example recurring to oracles or 
substitutes of them. Lawmaking and law-finding are substantively irrational on the 
other hand to the extent that decisions are influenced by concrete factors of the 
particular case as evaluated upon an ethical, emotional, or political basis rather than 
by general norms. “Rational” lawmaking and law-finding may be rational in a 
formal or a substantive way. (…) Law is however “formal” to the extent that, in 
both substantive and procedural matters, only unambiguous general characteristics 
of the facts of the case are taken into account. (Weber 1922a: 395)34 
 
                                                            
33  “die rationale Berechnung der rechtlichen Folgen und Chancen seines Zweckhandelns.” 
34 “Irrational sind sie formell dann, wenn für die Ordnung von Rechtsschöpfung und 
Rechtsfindungsproblemen andere als verstandesmäßig zu kontrollierende Mittel angewendet 
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Based on these oppositions, Weber indicates the ‘ideal types’ of law: 
 
a) Irrational-Formal Law: This type is sometimes called ‘revealed law’ and is related 
(though not exclusively) to the law that originated from the ‘legal prophets’ and its 
‘charismatic revelations.’ To regulate the creation of norms or judicial activity, 
rationally uncontrolled procedures are used, for instance: religious divination. Due 
its characteristics of irrationality and materiality, this type of law would be present in 
primitive societies. The irrational-formal law is unforeseeable and rationally 
incalculable with regard to the result of its decisions, although it is accompanied in 
its procedures by a marked ritual formalism, which gives it its character of formality. 
“This ancient legal procedure was rigorously formal like all activities oriented 
towards the invocation of magical or divine powers; but, by means of the irrational 
supernatural character of the decisive acts of procedure, it tried to obtain the 
substantively “right” decision.” (Weber 1922a: 469).35 Put another way: one doesn’t 
know the possible results of the procedure or even the reasons for the decision, but 
one can expect a ritual formalism. When compared with the types of domination, 
this law corresponds to the type of ‘charismatic domination.’ 
 
b) Irrational-Substantive Law: This type of law presents uncertainty not only about the 
result in the decision but also the contents within which the decisions are taken. It 
consists in situational and substantive character and orients not to general norms 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
werden, z. B. die Einholung von Orakeln oder deren Surrogaten. Materiell sind sie irrational 
insoweit, als ganz konkrete Wertungen des Einzelfalls, seien sie ethische oder gefühlsmäßige oder 
politische, für die Entscheidung maßgebend sind, nicht aber generelle Normen. „Rationale“ 
Rechtsschöpfung und Rechtsfindung können wieder in formeller oder in materieller Hinsicht 
rational sein (…) „Formal“ aber ist ein Recht insoweit, als ausschließlich eindeutige generelle 
Tatbestandsmerkmale materiell rechtlich und prozessual beachtet werden.” 
35 “Streng formal, wie alle auf Anrufung magischer oder göttlicher Mächte ausgerichtete Tätigkeit, 
erwartete dieser Rechtsgang ein material „richtiges“ Urteil durch den irrationalen, übernatürlichen 
Charakter der entscheidenden Prozeßmittel.” 
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but to concrete evaluative judgments. Weber places in this type the so-called “Kadi’s 
Justice” (Weber 1922b: 485), wherein cases are judged by representatives of the 
community, who claim to represent the feelings of the community. “The finding of 
the judgment, to the extent that it is not magically conditioned, is oriented towards 
substantive rather than formal standards. When measured by formal or economic 
“expectations,” it is thus a strongly irrational and concrete type of fireside equity.” 
(Weber 1922a: 485).36 Weber called this type of law, ‘traditional law.’ 
 
c) Rational-Substantive Law: This law is a modern type of law, which is present 
especially in the countries with common law tradition. Here, the resolution of legal 
problems are influenced by “ethical imperatives, utilitarian, and other expediential 
rules, or political maxims, all of which diverge from the “external characteristics” 
variety as well as from that which uses logical abstraction” (Weber 1922a: 396).37 In 
any case the content of the decision is uncertain, as the fundaments of these are 
external to legal system. That’s why semantics of justice, equity, peace, etc. are 
included in this law. Its rational character comes from firmly established procedures, 
while its substantial character derives from the source for its decisions. It is, 
however, a modern law. 
 
d) Rational-Formal Law: For Weber, this corresponds to the most rationalized state 
of law. It is formal because it does not take into consideration anything aside from 
the specific aspects determined in the system, and it considers the facts with regard 
to its systematization and generalization. Originating from the changes introduced 
by the ecclesiastical natural law and the influence of the Roman law, rational formal 
law arose from the internal needs of law: “[i]t was the consequence of intrinsic 
 
                                                            
36 “Die Urteilsfindung ist, soweit sie nicht magisch bedingt ist, an materialen, nicht an formalen 
Maßstäben orientiert und daher, an den ersteren oder an ökonomischen „Erwartungen“ gemessen, 
stark irrationale und konkrete „Billigkeits“-Justiz.” 
37 “ethische Imperative oder utilitarische oder andere Zweckmäßigkeitsregeln oder politische 
Maximen, welche sowohl den Formalismus des äußeren Merkmals wie denjenigen der logischen 
Abstraktion durchbrechen.” 
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intellectual needs of legal theorists and their disciples, the doctors, i.e. of a typical 
aristocracy of legal literati” (Weber 1922a: 492).38 The rational formal law consists of 
abstract norms, which are applied through logical interpretation in the decision of a 
singular case, and its orientation in these decisions is towards the logical coherence 
of the system. Weber thinks that the European continental law is the best example 
of this type, since both the procedure and the content of the decision are 
foreseeable and calculable. This law is oriented towards itself and produces, as a 
result, a rational and highly specializing legal order. 
 
The types of law explain not only the changes within the law, but also the relations 
of law with other institutions, which are similarly rationalized in the transition to 
modernity. Thus, the rationalization of law goes hand in hand with the 
rationalization of the ‘bureaucracy’ in the modern State and the modern ‘capitalist 
enterprise.’ Rational-formal law granted the possibility of rational calculation to 
capitalist enterprise, and this, in turn, gave structure to the administration of law. 
With regard to the State, rational-formal law granted legitimacy to legal domination 
exercised by the State and its monopoly of physical coercion. For its part, the State 
acted as a guarantor of the legal order, which, due to its legality, is legitimate. 
 
Weber discerns between the rationality and irrationality, and formality and 
substantively with which the types of law are characterized, and which are related to 
the way law gains predictability and self-orientation. For Weber, the bureaucratic 
character of modern law, in its substantive and formal aspects, shows a law whose 
fundaments of legitimacy should be sought in the political structure of society. This 
point will be further developed later by Habermas (1982a; 1982b; 1987), although he 
replaces the instrumental rationality (or formal) by “discourse.” 
 
 
                                                            
38 “es waren interne Denkbedürfnisse der Rechtstheoretiker und der von ihnen geschulten 
Doktoren: einer typischen Aristokratie der literarischen „Bildung“ auf dem Gebiet des Rechts” 
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For Weber, the sociology of law as autonomous discipline faces a, ‘cultural’ concept 
of law, so to speak. This is understood as the result of ‘representations’ from which 
its legitimacy comes. From this, Kelsen (1915) claims a lack of an object for the 
sociology of law. The caution that must be taken with regard to this criticism relates 
to the inability of sociology to establish itself as support for the science of law and 
not because sociology must be a concept itself that holds and provides its own 
explanations. 
 
By the mid-twentieth century, the situation of the sociology of law changes. On the 
one hand, the differentiated observation of law is radicalized with regard to 
sociology. The ancient legal realism movements take form as criticism to the 
fundamentals of the ‘law in books.’ In the United States, this occurred in the so-
called ‘critical legal’ studies, which had their greatest popularity in the early seventies, 
and, similarly, in peripheral theoretical formulations of law, partly heirs of the 
behavioral phase of Parsons, and especially the theories of law of Donald Black 
(1976). 
 
Indeed, along with Parsons, an attempt for conciliating the ideas of Durkheim and 
Weber in a general theory of social systems can be observed. Herein, law has a 
special place. From his studies on social systems, Parsons formulates a theory of law 
embedded within a scheme of the society. This does not admit disciplinary or 
conceptual exceptions, thus transcending the distinction between ‘doctrine’ and 
‘sociology’ and formulating a sociological and universal concept of law. 
 
2.2.3. Talcott Parsons: Law and Social Integration  
 
Both Durkheim and Weber describe the process of differentiation of law in social 
life. As we have seen, for Durkheim this differentiation came from the 
crystallization of moral norms of collective conscience into legal norms with 
organized sanctioning power. Weber, for his part, observed this “differentiation of 
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the factual areas of law” (1922a: 386ff)39 in the rationalization of law, its ways of 
legitimization, and action. Parsons go back to these approaches, paying special 
attention both to Durkheim’s functionalist formulations and to Weber’s culturalist 
principles for the development of a general theory of action systems. Indeed, at this 
point in the sociological theory of legal differentiation, the concept of a system 
appears clearly and the differentiation of law as a ‘social system’, which fulfills 
‘functions’ for the social whole, is problematized. 
 
a) The Functional Differentiation of Law   
 
It should first be noted that while law plays an important role in Parsons’ system 
theory, its function, structural elements and core features are, compared to other 
aspects of his own theory, underdeveloped. This can clearly be observed from his 
‘structural-functionalist’ up to his ‘cybernetic’ phase. In both periods, reflections on 
the law appear, but without a clear status of an institution or of a functional system. 
Within the wider spectrum of the action, law is located inside the social system as an 
institution. Nevertheless, its specific function or, rather, its place as a system of 
action inside a social system is not clearly defined. 
 
It is necessary to emphasize that Parsons early addressed the analysis of law in his 
structural-functionalist perspective and in the context of a role theory. He was 
interested in the place that legal profession has within a general theory of social 
action. This context appears in his first definition of the law: “Law, of course, 
consists in a body of norms or rules governing human conduct in social situations, 
that is, involving the relations of men to other men.” (Parsons 1954: 372-373). This 
definition is certainly general and it is difficult to see in it a characteristic aspect of 
Parsons’ ideas, but it is nevertheless his first approach to law in a systematical way. 
What is particularly interesting of this stage is that although his reflections are 
focused on legal profession and in very general terms on law as a social system or 
 
                                                            
39 “Differenzierung der sachlichen Rechtsgebiete.” 
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institution, in the analysis of the functions of legal profession, with regard to the 
society, a description of the legal function of law as a mechanism of social control 
already appears, to wit: 
 
The professions in this sense may, sociologically, be regarded as what we call 
“mechanisms of social control.” They either, like the teaching profession, help to 
“socialize” the young, to bring them into accord with the expectations of full 
membership in the society, or they bring them back into accord when they have 
deviated, like the medical profession. The legal profession may be presumed to do 
this but also two other things, first to forestall deviance by advising the client in 
ways which will keep him better in line, and also “cooling him off” in many cases 
and, second, if it comes to a serious case, implementing the procedure by which a 
socially sanctioned decision about the status of the client is arrived at, in the 
dramatic cases of the criminal law, the determination of whether he is innocent or 
guilty of a crime. (Parsons 1954: 382) 
 
There are two theoretical axes that appear in Parson’s whole theoretical 
development of the law. One of them is the definition of a function of ‘social 
control’ for law (to which he later added other functions). The other refers to the 
analysis of law not as a differentiated social subsystem related to a function – as 
economy or politics - but like a ‘mechanism’ – in some cases as an ‘institution’ - that 
is part of a set of other mechanisms or institutions, which together collaborate in 
performing specific functions. These two theoretical paths are present during all his 
formulations on law. 
 
In the sixties, Parsons writes systematically about law, and these reflections are 
present throughout the whole development of his ideas, from the socio-cybernetic 
analysis in the context of the AGIL scheme (which already appears in 1953 in the 
“Working Papers”) up to the evolutionary ideas of the seventies.40 
 
                                                            
40 Regarding the transformations from the ‘interactive’ model to the ‘systemic’ in Parsons, see 
Almaraz (1979). 
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In the context of a theory of social systems, Parsons maintains the idea of law as a 
mechanism of social control, as part of a set of other mechanisms: 
 
It seems justified to infer from these considerations that law should be treated as a 
generalized mechanism of social control that operate diffusely in virtually all sectors 
of the society (…) Nevertheless, it is one of the most highly generalized 
mechanisms in the whole society. It is located primarily, as I said, on the 
institutional level. It is not isolated but is one of a family of mechanisms of control. 
(Parsons 1962: 57) 
 
Besides reaffirming this paradoxical trend of emphasizing the importance of law 
while also relativizing its differentiated status, Parsons points out that law not only 
deals with social control, but also assumes functions of ‘social integration.’ In his 
view, both functions, ‘control’ and ‘integration,’ seem to be compatible with the 
need to be solved by these functions, namely, that both social control and 
integration refer to the way law treats conflicts and maintain the social order: “Let 
us suggest that in the larger social perspective the primary function of a legal system 
is integrative. It serves to mitigate potential elements of conflict and to oil the 
machinery of social intercourse” (Parsons 1962: 58). 
 
Parsons seems to see the problem of control and integration as the tendency of 
social system in the maintenance of its “equilibrium” (Parsons 1962: 71). This 
equilibrium in the exchanges of social system refers primarily to the cybernetic 
controls of information flows inside the system, which are needed in order to 
maintain the structure of the system, and its equilibrium with respect to its flows. 
For this reason, the ways in which the relations of “interpenetration” between law 
and other subsystems are so important, as with politics, economy (Parsons 1961a: 
55), or societal community (Parsons 1965a: 258ff.), as well as the problem relative to 
the way with which social system could maintain its “stable structure” by means of 
generalized norms (Parsons 1961b: 223ff.; Parsons & Shils 1962: 108ff). 
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In spite of plausible compatibilities between the old function of ‘control’ and the 
new function of ‘integration,’ the latter function in Parsons’ theory seems to be 
explained by the coherence of law with the AGIL scheme, rather than by a 
theoretical delimitation of the functions of law. In this new functional paradigm, 
there are indeed no functional imperatives for social control, but for integration. 
Thus, Parsons located law to be inside the quadrant of social integration, along with 
other institutions that pursue the same function inside the social system. As outlined 
below, in spite of the semantic insistence of Parsons’ theory relative to social 
control, the operative and binding function of law in the social system is ultimately 
related to social integration. 
 
b) The Law of Modern Society   
 
Before delving into the situation of modern law, some formal aspects that allow for 
a better explanation of the central characteristics of law must be considered. For 
this, we will briefly refer to the aforementioned AGIL scheme. 
 
Parsons introduces the idea of a four-function scheme with regard to conditions 
that constitute a boundary for the maintenance of a system of action, such as 
organic, psychological, social, or cultural system. What remains in the environment 
is the “ultimate reality” (Parsons 1966: 8), i.e., everything that does not constitute a 
system of action. The system theory appears then as a formalization of the 
principles of the action theory and derives from four fundamental questions. For 
Parsons, all action takes place in four systems, which are ‘opened’ up for inputs and 
outputs of the environment: 
 
More specifically, the theory of social systems belongs within the more general class 
of conceptual schemes seen in the frame of reference of action. Within that 
framework, the boundaries of social systems have been defined in terms of their 
relations, first to each other, then to the behavioral organism, to the personality of 
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the individual, and to cultural systems. The relation to the physical environment is 
mediated through these others, and hence is not direct. (Parsons 1961a: 30) 
 
A ‘social system’ is, therefore, a part of a wider system, defined as ‘a system of 
action.’ The boundaries thereof are marked by the social system’s relations towards 
the ‘behavioral organism’, the ‘personality,’ and the ‘cultural system.’ In each of 
these systems are the same functional requests. Every action system must be able to 
satisfy at least four fundamental functions so as to maintain the structure of the 
system and its internal and external equilibrium: “I have suggested that it is possible 
to reduce the essential functional imperatives of any system of action, and hence of 
any social system, to four, which I have called pattern-maintenance, integration, 
goal-attainment, and adaptation” (Parsons 1961a: 38).41 
 
In other formulations of this idea, Parsons calls the function of ‘pattern-
maintenance,’ as ‘latency.’ The model is known by its acronym in English as AGIL 
or LIGA. According to Parsons, this model is applicable to any action system, and 
that social systems are action systems. 
 
Inside a ‘social system,’ these four functional imperatives must be satisfied as well, 
and certain institutions are in charge of these functions. Thus, economic 
organization pursues “adaptation,” and, in a similar vein, politics carries out the 
“goal-attainment” element of social system (Parsons 1961a: 40ff). The function of 
“pattern-maintenance” is, on the other hand, fundamentally religious and evaluative 
(Parsons 1966: 11). The function of the “integration” inside social system – which 
is, from a general point of view, the system responsible for the function of 
integration of action – is to provide for a set of institutions, among which law is 
located. 
 
 
 
                                                            
41 In detail in Parsons (1971: 4ff). 
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Table 1 Action System AGIL 
 
 
Adaptation 
 
 
Goal Attainment 
 
Latency (or Pattern 
Maintenance) 
 
 
Integration 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Parsons (1971: 6) 
 
The scheme of differentiated functions is only fully reached in highly differentiated 
modern societies, wherein each of these functions is associated with specific 
institutions. The law appears, then, as one of the most relevant institutions for the 
“integration” of modern society (Parsons 1961a: 40). According to Parsons, along 
with this, law is one of the key institutions for the “industrialization” in the West 
(Parsons 1965b: 142) and for the evolutionary leap from the “intermediate society” 
to “modern society.” The relevance of law in this sense is only comparable with 
language: 
 
For the transition from primitive to intermediate society, the focal development is 
in language, which is primarily part of the cultural system. In the transition from 
intermediate to modern society, it is in the institutionalized codes of normative 
order internal to the societal structure and centers in the legal system. (Parsons 
1966: 26) 
 
In modern societies, the functional differentiation of legal norms finally occurs 
(Parsons 1961a: 55). This allows for law to actively participate in the exchange 
processes inside a social system and to fulfill its integrative function. Thus, law 
appears as an “evolutionary universal” of modern society (Parsons 1964: 351) and as 
an intrinsic and indispensable aspect for these highly differentiated modern societies 
(Parsons 1965c: 191). In this sense, the scheme of four functions certainly applies to 
modern society and it is here that law properly fulfills its functions. 
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Although we have seen that Parsons gives considerable importance to law from a 
functional and evolutionary standpoint, this does not have a clearly differentiated 
role inside the AGIL scheme. The closest formulation to this refers to the 
identification of four fundamental problems for modern law, namely: 
“legitimization,” “interpretation” of norms, “sanction,” and “jurisdiction” (Parsons 
1962: 58-59). But Parsons himself does not explicitly include these problems inside 
an AGIL analytical matrix. What is usually known as an AGIL scheme of law 
corresponds to the approach of Bredemeier (1962), regarding the inputs and outputs 
of law, or to the ideas about rationalization of law of Münch (1990). Parsons himself 
did not develop an analysis of functions and exchanges for law under the AGIL 
scheme. 
 
Law is located, as a partially responsible institution for social integration, in a 
normative level. Parsons emphasizes that the integrative institutions of the social 
system consist of norms, which institutionalize cultural values, which acquire a 
moral character in the quadrant of the integration, and which circulate along social 
system as information (Parsons 1972: 256f). This allows for the control of the 
system and the integration of its parts. In the late 60’s, Parsons begins to call this 
quadrant of integration in social system, “societal community” (Parsons 1969).42 
 
This subsystem of the society is of special importance for purposes of the present 
paper because, as part of the structure of a society, it is in this subsystem that I 
would place the legal system, in a sense of paramount functional significance, 
although of course concretely it involves other functional components, notably 
political. (Parsons 1977: 32) 
 
One of the central aspects in the transition from the primary bases of social 
solidarity towards solidarities of major generalization appears in societal community 
 
                                                            
42 Although the idea of ‘community’ was already present at least four years before, law appears 
clearly as a central structure for community by means of the concept of “jurisdiction” (Parsons 
1965a). 
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law (Parsons 1965b: 142f). This appearance makes the generalization of legal norms 
and its circulation throughout the society possible. For this generalization, the moral 
character of norms (an issue that Durkheim had already assumed) is not only 
necessary, but this normative character of law must also be generalized for the entire 
social system by means of the legal principles of “universalism,” “specificity,” and 
“proceduralization” (Parsons 1965b: 14; Parsons 1966: 27), which embody cultural 
values legitimized in legal norms and, in turn, is justified by the same. Thus, law – 
within societal community - can build relationships with other subsystems of society 
and, this way, ensures social integration. 
 
Parsons emphasized on the function of integration of law until the end of his career. 
His subsequent writings on law seem to adopt a position much closer to Weber, 
with regard to the “legitimate” character of law (Parsons 1977: 33ff) and to the 
importance of cultural values for this institution. Despite these ideas on law and 
some accurate defenses of its importance for the sociology of law (Deflem 2006), 
Parsons did not build a unitary description of law in his theory. The importance of 
Parsons as a ‘bearer’ for the sociological differentiation of law lies primarily in his 
character as a mediator between socio-legal traditions. His ideas are bridges for the 
continuity of the sociological reflection on this phenomenon and they also represent 
an interesting, though incomplete, essay for determining the character of the social 
and sociological differentiation of law. 
 
We will discuss the attempt of Jürgen Habermas for conciliating the ideas of Talcott 
Parsons with a subjectivist phenomenology and a liberal philosophy, wherein law 
appears as a central actor. This reflection will serve as a link between this section on 
sociological differentiation of law and the sociology of law of Niklas Luhmann, with 
which we will conclude with these reflections and then continue with our analysis. 
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2.2.4. The Consensual Synthesis: Habermas  
 
It would be a mistake to categorize Habermas as a mere sociologist of law, since he 
has sought to go beyond sociology and to construct a theory of society from a 
philosophical-political perspective. Nevertheless, this theory of society is developed 
in narrow relation –and it cannot be otherwise - to sociology, particularly in dialogue 
with the classic sociological theories of Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Parsons. It is 
precisely from the latter that Habermas finds the connection between a theory of 
society and a sociological reflection on law. 
 
a) System and Lifeworld 
 
To some extent, Parsons serves as a constant background to the social theory of 
Habermas. Thus, it may not be entirely wrong to place Habermas in the history of 
sociology as a prominent follower of the work of Parsons, similar to Richard Münch 
(1981; 1982), Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander & Colomy 1990), Neil J. Smelser (1962), 
or Shmuel Eisenstadt (1964). Indeed, the debate with Luhmann in the seventies was 
focused precisely on how to rebuild a social theory based on the concept of action 
systems (cf. Habermas & Luhmann 1990) and in one of his first approaches of his 
theory of society, namely, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Habermas 1973), 
there already exists a clear mention of the need for a division of Parsons’ AGIL 
model, in accordance with a rupture between instrumental and phenomenological 
logics, i.e., between “system” and “lifeworld.” 
 
From the lifeworld perspective, we thematize the normative structures (values and 
institutions) of a society. We analyze events and states from the point of view of 
their dependency on functions of social integration (in Parsons’ vocabulary, 
integration and pattern maintenance), while the non-normative components of the 
system serve as limiting conditions. From the system perspective, we thematize a 
society’s steering mechanisms and the extension of the scope of contingency. We 
analyze events and states from the point of view of their dependency on functions 
of system integration (in Parsons’ vocabulary, adaptation and goal-attainment), 
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while the goal values serve as data. If we understand a social system as a lifeworld, 
then the steering aspect is screened out. If we understand a society as a system, then 
the fact that social reality consists in the facticity of recognized, often 
counterfactual, validity claims is not taken into consideration. (Habermas 1973: 14-
15)43 
 
System and lifeworld are differentiated by the type of social action on which they 
are configured and for the rationality that characterizes them. A social system is a 
network of instrumental success-oriented actions, where individuals pursue selfish 
purposes and the purpose of the system is to maintain a level of consistency and 
autonomy. Instrumental rationality guides the action of systems. These social 
systems are self-regulated and self-governed, and they developed by themselves 
beyond the participants in communication. In this systemic level, systemic 
mechanisms of social coordination, as money and power, which are “delinguistified 
media” (Habermas 1982b: 230), operate under their own logics without taking into 
consideration the communicative pretensions of the subjects around them. The 
economy and administrative politics are the clearest examples of these systems since 
they function based on money and power respectively (again, A and G of Parsons’ 
AGIL).   
 
 
                                                            
43 “Unter dem Aspekt der Lebenswelt thematisieren wir an einer Gesellschaft die normativen 
Strukturen (Werte und Institutionen). Wir analysieren Ereignisse und Zustände in Abhängigkeit 
von Funktionen der Sozialintegration (in Parsons' Sprache: integration und pattern maintenance), 
während die nicht-normativen Bestandteile des Systems als einschränkende Bedingungen gelten. 
Unter dem Systemaspekt thematisieren wir an einer Gesellschaft: die Mechanismen der Steuerung 
und die Erweiterung des Kontingenzspielraums. Wir analysieren Ereignisse und Zustände in 
Abhängigkeit von Funktionen der Systemintegration (in Parsons' Sprache: adaptation und goal-
attainment), während die Sollwerte als Daten gelten. Wenn wir ein soziales System als Lebenswelt 
auffassen, dann wird der Steuerungsaspekt ausgeblendet; verstehen wir eine Gesellschaft als System, 
so bleibt der Geltungsaspekt, also der Umstand, daß die soziale Wirklichkeit in der Faktizität 
anerkannter, oft kontrafaktischer Geltungsansprüche besteht, unberücksichtigt.” 
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With regard to this type of instrumental action – and Habermas asserts its argument 
against Weber - the specific rationality of modern society is not only a success-
oriented rationality (of means-ends adequacy or strategy), but one that is oriented to 
understanding. If systems are characterized by instrumental action, lifeworld is 
characterized by communicative action, and communicative rationality is its telos. 
Communicative rationality is the ability of social actors to give reasons and 
arguments about their actions and “they can orient themselves to criticizable validity 
claims” (Habermas 1982b: 224). Converse to the success-oriented instrumental 
action, understanding and consensus are central. Lifeworld would be a 
“transcendental place,” where communicative action is fully developed as well as the 
recourse to arguments with the aim of a rational understanding that is oriented to 
consensus. 
 
Lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental place where speaker and hearer meet, 
where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, 
social, or subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, 
settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements. (Habermas 1982b: 192)44 
 
Lifeworld provides evidences and certainties about the world to individuals. 
Understanding or consensus is supported by language, which creates bonds between 
persons. This is possible since, according to Habermas, world objects are only such 
insofar as they are exposed, i.e., as states of affairs in sentences expressed. This 
supposes that “thoughts are propositionally structured” (Habermas 1994: 26), and 
the structure of sentences would allow for the structure of thoughts to be read. 
 
 
                                                            
44 “Die Lebenswelt ist gleichsam der transzendentale Ort, an dem sich Sprecher und Hörer 
begegnen; wo sie reziprok den Anspruch erheben können, daß ihre Äußerungen mit der Welt (der 
objektiven, der sozialen oder der subjektiven Welt) zusammenpassen; und wo sie diese 
Geltungsansprüche kritisieren und bestätigen, ihren Dissens austragen und Einverständnis erzielen 
können.” 
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Lifeworld operates culturally based on tacit assumptions that serve as a background 
for understanding and rational consensus, and it enables interactants to find pre-
structured convergence points on which arguments can be developed. For this 
motive, cooperations and social solidarities are reproduced by means of 
communicative action. None of these would be possible without a specific discourse 
ethics, which allows the reproduction of this rational principle. 
 
The distinction system/lifeworld is present throughout all the sociological ideas of 
Habermas (cf. Habermas 1973; 1982a; 1982b; 1987; 1994), and based on this, he 
problematizes the long-standing issue of the integration of society, since even the 
modern societies must be confronted with the problem of integration – an idea that 
Habermas shares with Durkheim and Parsons. 
 
The integration of society according to Habermas (1973: 14; 1982b: 226-227) occurs 
on two levels: there is the integration that occurs at the level of the subjects engaged 
in a level of reasoning and communicative understanding, which he calls “social 
integration,” and, on the other hand, there is the integration produced by self-
regulated mechanisms of money and power, foreign to the subjects, namely the 
“systemic integration.” These two mechanisms are respectively associated with the 
two types of social formations previously mentioned: system and lifeworld. 
 
Based on this, Habermas argues that societies evolve in two ways. On the one hand, 
systems gain in “complexity” while lifeworld is “rationalized,” and both are 
decoupled (Habermas 1982b: 180ff). Nevertheless, a hierarchy exists between these 
two evolutions. Through rationalization of society, that is, by means of 
communicatively increasing the rational understanding between actors, systemic 
complexity of society is made possible. Systems could only gain autonomy and 
complexity when anchored upon “institutions,” which belong to lifeworld 
(Habermas 1973: 230). 
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In the heart of this two-level analytical theory of society, a conflict between these 
two social formations appears. Social systems would be constantly threatened with 
the “colonization” of lifeworld (Habermas 1982b: 522ff), and thus impose its 
instrumental logic over discursive logics aimed at understanding. Democracy, civil 
society, and the rule of law would be the keys in the resistance to colonization 
processes of lifeworld. It is precisely in this relation between system and lifeworld 
that the place and function of law in society lie. 
 
b) Law and Social Integration 
 
Like Parsons, Habermas argues that the function of law is social integration through 
universal subjection to rationally created norms and the regulation of conflicts 
orienting them to consensus. By means of the generalization of norms, law can stop 
the colonization of lifeworlds of social actors and, on the other hand, legitimizes 
political power that, without law, is a mere facticity. Therefore, the possibilities of 
social integration (not systemic) lie in the possibilities of establishing a law that is 
anchored in lifeworld. 
 
For Habermas, social integration, in spite of being problematic for modern societies, 
is made possible by the dichotomy system/lifeworld. Durkheim and Weber had 
already identified how difficult it is to consider the integration of modern society 
under some kind of unique mechanism. The situation resulted in a paradox. 
Division of labor caused no satisfactory levels of social and moral integration and 
generated a dysfunctional state of “anomie” (Durkheim 2001: 433) or bureaucracy 
itself generated an “iron cage” (Weber 2002: 224).45 Habermas argues in a different 
way and, from this paradox, postulates that modern societies have two integration 
mechanisms tied by law. 
 
 
                                                            
45 “stahlhartes Gehäuse.” 
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Modern law emerges as a structure destined to mediate between system and 
lifeworld as organizational spheres of society. So that law could carry out this 
mission, certain essential conditions must be met. One of them is the positivación 
of law. 
 
Positivación of law, for Habermas, effectively allows for law to have a relative 
degree of autonomy – not in the sense of the constitution of an autonomous system 
- of morality. It permits, first of all, the separation of law from morality and the 
institutionalization of the formation and application of norms into its very own 
structure. In other words, norms fall within the law as means of formulation and 
diffusion. Nevertheless, this moral autonomy is always partial since it always remains 
to be a moral conscience, which evolves together with society. 
 
Table 2 Stages of Legal Evolution 
 
Stages of moral 
consciousness 
Basic socio-
cognitive 
concepts 
Ethics Types of  law 
Preconventional Particular 
expectations of  
behavior 
Magical ethics Revealed law 
Conventional Norm Ethics of  the law  Traditional law 
Postconventional Principle Ethics of 
conviction and 
responsibility 
Formal law 
 
Source: Habermas (1982b: 260, fig. 26) 
 
In modern societies, the integration of society is only possible in forming legal 
institutions that embody a moral conscience of a conventional or postconventional 
level. As an original phenomenon, morality suffers deinstitutionalization and 
remains anchored, on the one hand, in the personality of the subject. For its part, 
law becomes an external power sanctioned by the State based on a system of 
abstract norms. From this evolution, it is understood that modern law owes its 
legitimacy to the rational production of its norms. The norms of the law rest on 
ethical principles of discourse that obey a proceduralized morality. 
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Law in modern societies operates as a maintenance structure of social integration 
because it assembles both elements of lifeworld and the sphere of the self-regulated 
systems. 
 
Law functions as the “transformer” that first guarantees that the socially integrating 
network of communication stretched across society as a whole holds together. 
Normatively substantive messages can circulate throughout society only in the language 
of law; without their translation into the complex legal code that is equally open to 
lifeworld and system, these messages would fall on deaf ears in media-steered 
spheres of action. (Habermas 1994: 78)46 
 
Still, this social integration is tied only to one side of the legal system. The authentic 
place of social integration in law is given – inside the legal system - in the 
production of norms, which is the place of understanding and communicative 
reason, and not in the application of law, which is systemic. This is due to the fact 
that in the production of norms, communicative action oriented to understanding 
should be used. Hence, on the basis of law, a certain political community must be 
included.  
 
The political community is a supposed rational consensus among subjects who 
decide on their self-legislation and determination. A political community presume a 
“democratic principle” in society, which is reflected in the same sense as 
positivization of law: “[p]ositivity of law expresses, not the facticity of an arbitrary, 
absolutely contingent choice, but the legitimate will that stems from a presumptively 
 
                                                            
46 “Das Recht funktioniert gleichsam als Transformator, der erst sicherstellt, daß das Netz der 
sozialintegrativen gesamtgesellschaftlichen Kommunikation nicht reißt. Nur in der Sprache des 
Rechts können normativ gehaltvolle Botschaften gesellschaftsweit zirkulieren; ohne die Übersetzung in 
den komplexen, für Lebenswelt und System gleichermaßen offenen Rechtskode, würden diese in 
den mediengesteuerten Handlungsbereichen auf taube Ohren treffen.” 
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rational self-legislation of politically autonomous citizens” (Habermas 1994: 51).47 
Social solidarity in modern societies is given in terms of the (self-determined) citizen 
and, ultimately, it comes from communicative action. Positive law can only aspire to 
social integration if recipients of the legal norms can be assumed as rational authors 
of the same norms, as co-producers of the norms under a postconventional 
morality: “The members of a legal community must be able to assume that in a free 
process of political opinion- and will-formation they themselves would also 
authorize the rules to which they are subject as addressees” (Habermas 1994: 57).48 
This assumption of political autonomy of individuals (self-legislation) is, according 
to Habermas, the only one capable of performing or solving the pretension of 
legitimacy of rules, since it makes its rational acceptance possible. In this sense, law 
finds its foundations on rational assumptions of lifeworld and not on systemic 
mechanisms of self-regulation and control. 
 
In the production of norms, the recourse to arguments occurs. Thus, for Habermas, 
modern law succeeds on tying the problematic bond of facticity and validity. The 
validity of a (linguistic) proposition must achieve its validation in fact; that is, it must 
be subjected to the examination of its arguments by a community of interpreters, 
who analyze its pretention of validity (Habermas 1994: 47f). In other words, truth is 
subject to a rational acceptability. This relationship between facticity and validity is 
always manifested as a tension, which becomes stable in modern society by means 
of the positivization of law and its emergence as a normative structure. Within this 
tension, argumentation plays a fundamental role. By means of the use of arguments, 
the actors display its rationality and inject such into the law with communicative 
rationality. In practical terms, legal argumentation enables law to persist as a 
 
                                                            
47 “In der Positivität des Rechts gelangt nicht die Faktizität eines beliebigen, schlechthin 
kontingenten Willens zum Ausdruck, sondern der legitime Wille, der sich einer präsumptiv 
vernünftigen Selbstgesetzgebung politisch autonomer Staatsbürger verdankt.” 
48 “Die Rechtsgenossen müssen unterstellen dürfen, daß sie in freier politischer Meinungs- und 
Willensbildung die Regeln, denen sie als Adressaten unterworfen sind, auch selber autorisieren 
würden.” 
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normative structure in lifeworld and constantly perform its possibilities of legitimacy 
to society. Law, in this sense, has a relative autonomy, precisely with regard to its 
rational ability to produce a consensus that legitimizes it in society. 
 
Modern law has three legitimating institutions that release a permanent 
argumentation.49 Institutions are a kind of reformulation of the normative principles 
of society, in which those principles are settled in social configurations that enjoy 
relative stability and obligation. These legitimating institutions of law are: the 
principle of popular sovereignty and the fundamental rights, on the one hand, and 
the constitution of the bourgeois State, on the other. Both emerge with modernity 
and positivación of law. 
 
Law produces social integration; either by means of the social solidarity of a political 
community, or by means of services that law performs to economic and 
administrative systems. Those systems are ultimately possible because they are 
regulated (morally grounded) by means of communicative action. Thus, the 
operations of systemic integration performed by economic system and state 
apparatus, through money and administrative power respectively, must be 
connected to the process of social integration of the praxis of self-determination of 
citizens (Habermas 1994: 59). 
 
In synthesis, law can be characterized as an evolutionary acquisition of society in 
order to the rationalization of the norms on which it is based. This way, law plays a 
fundamental role in the integration of society (of the systemic spheres and of the 
lifeworld) since, on one hand, it establishes the normative boundaries on which 
systemic differentiation can be unfolded and, on other hand, it provides lifeworld 
with legitimacy for the pretensions of validity of the subjects when they claim norms 
for their daily praxis. 
 
 
                                                            
49 In this respect Habermas uses the concept of “institution” of Arnold Gehlen (1973: 94-105). 
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In a certain way, law is, to Habermas, the most powerful normative structure to stop 
the uncontrollable deployment of complexity of self-regulated systems. Only by 
means of law is it possible to compel the systems and the subjects to obey a 
legitimate rational consensus. Certainly, this consensus is not a mere achievement of 
law but rather the ability of a political community to agree on a normative universe 
for its action. Law, thus, operates as a normative instrumentality of that community 
in order to rationalize the limitations of its own freedom and guide society towards a 
reasoned agreement. 
 
Habermas’ position concerning law has a pronounced normativism, which decanted 
into principles that societies must pursue in order to achieve its integration. Law 
appears precisely as a mechanism to ensure this integration with regard to 
communicative rationality. This is the social function of law. Discourse ethics and 
the principles by means of which communication must be the guided aim for society 
to achieve its integration protected by legal institutions. This theory of social 
integration through law, unlike that of Parsons, not only analytically assumes the 
integration of society through law, but it postulates conditions under which it is 
possible to achieve this purpose. 
 
This understanding of modern law correlatively has not only a sociological theory 
but also a political program for the building of consensus. From this, the tension 
between facticity and validity of the social order can be handled at a social level. Law 
clearly appears as the key element for the maintenance of social order performing a 
specific function. Much of this function is achieved in the political side of the law, 
i.e. in the production of norms. Nevertheless, the problem of the inner functioning 
of law cannot be appreciated. That is to say, the specificity of the law – either as 
system or institution - in the social order as a whole. It is, so to speak, a theory of 
the political functions of law and not of the legal functions of law. 
 
Habermas attempts to reconcile, on the one hand, the theories of social solidarity of 
Durkheim by arguing that law produces solidarity (Habermas 1994: 51ff) and 
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evolves in accordance with the evolution of morality (Habermas 1982b: 260), with 
ideas relative to the increasing rationalization of law similarly to Weber (1922a) – 
although distinguishing a different type of rationality. The connection between both 
traditions is undoubtedly Parsons – who also tried to reconcile both classic authors - 
based on the idea of the integration of society. Like Parsons, Habermas looks at the 
law with the integration of society in mind, without delving into the role of social 
control that legal institutions have – which worried Parsons. In both – and primarily 
in Durkheim - the recomposition of social solidarity is an essential task of law. 
However, Habermas advances beyond the cybernetic synthesis of Parsons and 
postulates a program of building the social order from a particular political praxis. 
In this sense, Habermas’ sociology of law abandons the mere theoretical reflection 
on law in favor of a practical proposal for improving the social order based on the 
law. 
 
Everything related to the inner working of the legal system is, for Habermas a mere 
procedural facticity. As long as a communicatively rational process of social action 
of the courts does not exist, legal specialists or schools of law have no practical 
relevance for the integration of society. Nevertheless, this theoretical decision 
ignores much of the complexity that characterizes the law. This theoretical decision 
is not exclusive to Habermas or Parsons, but is captured to a great extent by the 
whole sociology of law. Still, to understand the differentiation process of legal 
system, it is necessary to consider not only an ‘external’ theory about the ‘effects’ of 
law on society, but a theory that points to the specific functioning of this particular 
social system. To this purpose in the following section we will work in depth on the 
sociology of law of Niklas Luhmann. 
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2.3. Sociology of Law and Differentiation of Law in Niklas Luhmann 
 
Though similar elements to the ideas of Durkheim, Weber,50 and Parsons can be 
traced in Luhmann’s sociology of law, Luhmann devoted not only to describe law in 
its relations with other social systems, but also to understand particular features of 
the legal system51 and thus addresses the lack of a legal object for sociology. This 
lack comes from the criticisms of Hans Kelsen (1915) on the sociology of law. 
 
Niklas Luhmann’s sociology of law suffers various changes over time, making it 
difficult to establish a unique line of theoretical development. As in his theory of 
society, his sociology of law evolves in accordance with his conceptual use. 
Nevertheless, unlike other social systems, such as science, economics, or art, in the 
case of the sociology of law, numerous conceptual variations appear, which 
necessitates a differentiated treatment for that system. 
 
In strict terms, two main stages can be distinguished with relative clarity. In the first 
stage, ranging from his early writings to 1984, Luhmann seems to concentrate on 
improving a broader legal theory and on the formation of concepts for sociology of 
law. At this stage the most relevant issues are related to: the determination of the 
function of law (1999d [1974]), problems of evolution and differentiation of law 
(1999a [1970]; 1999b [1976]), discussions concerning elementary juridical concepts 
 
                                                            
50 Although an assimilation of the ideas of Luhmann with those of Weber was attempted, it is not 
entirely correct to equate the relation of the Weberian rationality and the systemic analysis of law of 
Luhmann. One of the most relevant objections to this is that law as social system is not 
characterized by its “predictability” but by its “contingency” and “risk” (cf. Capps & Palmer Olsen 
2002). 
51 With regard to Habermas, the known opposition between both authors persists with respect to 
the law. The criticisms that Luhmann dedicates all his works to Habermas are numerous. The most 
direct criticism to the legal analysis of Habermas can be found especially in his review (Luhmann 
1995d) to the book “Faktizität und Geltung” (Habermas 1994). For an overview on this, see 
Cadenas (2006). 
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as positivization of law (1999c [1970]); individual rights (1993b [1981]; 1999e 
[1970]), fundamental rights (1974e [1965]), violence (1999f [1981]), justice (1999g 
[1973]; 1974f), legal dogmatics (1974f), interpretation of norms (1969), ideologies 
and law (1974g [1967]), the problem of the procedural legitimization of politics 
through law (1983 [1969]), among others. In this stage, the following monographs 
are highlighted: Grundrechte als Institution (1974e [1965]), Legitimation durch Verfahren 
(1983 [1969]), the theoretical synthesis of Rechtssoziologie (1987 [1972]), and the 
compilation in Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts (1999a-g [1981]). 
 
The second stage is marked by the publication of Soziale Systeme (1991a [1984]) and 
extends to the final theoretical synthesis Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997a). 
Luhmann’s sociology of law at this stage is guided by a theory of self-referential and 
autopoietic systems. While maintaining much of his reflections on the role of 
positivization of law, fundamental and subjective rights, the evolution and 
differentiation of law, among others, a shift towards a constructivist system theory 
following the movement of the “second order cybernetics” can be observed (von 
Foerster 1981) as well as the adoption of the novel concept of “autopoiesis” 
(Maturana & Varela 1984; 1998). Here, concepts as operational closure and 
structural coupling of law (Luhmann 1991b), the problem of the sociological 
observation of the law from a self-referential systems theory (1986a; 1989), the 
paradoxes of law (1988b; 2000 [1984]), its binary coding (1986b), the problem of 
constitutions as evolutionary acquisitions (1990b), among other subjects, appear. In 
this stage, the monograph especially dedicated to law Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1995a) 
and other works concerning law in Soziale Systeme (1991a [1984]) and in Die 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997a) appear. 
 
Although it is possible to distinguish a significant change of paradigm in Luhmann’s 
theory from 1984, there are clear continuities in the development of a sociology of 
law throughout all his writings. As Parson’s transit of the actionalist theory towards 
cybernetics, the persistence of core elements, as well as the incorporation of new 
concepts and theories and the abandonment of previous ideas, can be stated in the 
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systemic thinking of Luhmann. With regard to the above-distinguished two stages, 
however, the theoretical consolidation only occurs in the second stage. In the first 
one various explanatory essays, which remain without further development, can be 
found, i.e., there is an abundance of what Luhmann himself called theoretical 
“prototypes” [null-series] (Baecker & Stanitzek 1987: 142). Some of them are 
discussed later, as it is not our purpose to pursue an exhaustive study of the 
abandonments and theoretical continuities of Luhmann but rather of the 
specificities and advantages of his sociology of law for the study of the 
differentiation of law, which is our central subject. 
 
From the foregoing, we will focus especially on the writings of Luhmann in the 
second stage but with the intention of comprehensively rebuilding a sociology of 
law, that is to say, to rescue some previous theoretical elements that can be 
connected with later developments of Luhmann. From this examination, it will later 
be possible to establish a definition of determined conceptual domains for a 
concrete study on the differentiation of the legal system in Chile. 
 
2.3.1. Sociology of Law and Legal Dogmatics 
 
The distinction between sociological and doctrinaire approaches goes across the 
entire history of the sociology of law. Based on this distinction, not only the 
sociology of law itself was constructed but also different objects for every discipline 
– legal sciences and sociology - were defined. For Luhmann, the fundamental 
difference between both perspectives are not caused by any particular ‘object’ – 
such as the living law/State law approach of Ehrlich or the law in the books/law in action 
dichotomy of Pound - but by the perspective adopted by an observer and the 
functions that both kinds of studies of law represent. Luhmann argues against the 
notion that it is impossible to observe an extralegal law, which is not recognized by 
the law itself. 
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Likewise there is no concept of a ‘supra-legal law’ (for sociologists) at a special level 
above legal operation from which an assessment could be made as to whether or 
not law is actually law. Rather, law makes this assessment of itself by itself, and if 
this does not happen it, does not happen. (Luhmann 1995a: 31f)52 
 
Although sociology and dogmatic produce self-descriptions (Luhmann 1987: 360), 
sociology is located in a different position in respect to dogma: “sociologists 
observe the law from outside and jurists from inside” (Luhmann 1995a: 16f).53 This 
consequently shows that the audience to whom the descriptions of the sociology of 
law are addressed is not the legal system but science. This does not certainly imply 
two kinds of law – as in the European or North American sociological 
jurisprudence - but only one system observed from two different perspectives 
(Luhmann 1995a: 31f). 
 
This way, the sociology of law is not interested in understanding the “unity” of the 
legal system but to see the legal system as a “difference,” as a system differentiated 
from an environment (Luhmann 1987: 361). Along with the above, the functions 
performed by both approaches are different. The dogmatic function has an 
important value for the internal differentiation of the legal system. The dogmatic 
function made possible for the system to observe its observations, to distinguish 
between norm and decision, and transfer contingency to decisional procedure 
(Luhmann 1974f). The sociology of law, for its part, does not perform internal 
functions for the legal system since, unlike the dogmatic function, it does not point 
at the internal arranging of the system. The sociology of law seeks comparisons not 
legitimizations (Luhmann 1987: 360). This certainly marks a rupture with all 
previous movements of sociological jurisprudence. 
 
                                                            
52 “Auch entfällt (für Soziologen) die Vorstellung eines »übergesetzlichen Rechts« als einer 
besonderen Geltungsebene oberhalb der praktizierten Rechtsordnung, von der aus geprüft werden 
könnte, ob das Recht überhaupt Recht ist oder nicht. Vielmehr prüft das Recht sich selbst, und 
soweit dies nicht geschieht, geschieht es nicht.” 
53 “Der Soziologe beobachtet das Recht von außen, der Jurist beobachtet es von innen.” 
 
 
71 
 
 
In spite of these differences, the sociology of law should not content itself with a 
mere external description of the law, as a pure examination of its consequences or 
effects on society, but should be capable of describing the internal functioning of 
this system. The waiver of a mere legal doctrine precisely points to open the debate 
on the law from a purely normative ambience to a comparative perspective. If law is 
a social system, then it should be viable to study it, as other social systems are 
studied, not only from the consequences of law in social morality (Durkheim), in its 
global rationality (Weber), or in its mere contribution to the social whole (Parsons, 
Habermas), but as a social system differentiated but comparable in its specificities. 
This way, the sociology of law formulates a proper law concept – a sociological 
concept of law - with which it is possible to observe and describe the functioning of 
this social system and its characteristics. 
 
2.3.2. The Change of Law as Institutionalization 
 
Luhmann is interested in describing the changes in legal system through the concept 
of institutionalization. Due to its peculiar development in the Luhmann’s theory, this 
concept constitutes one of the biggest obstacles for a coherent composition of his 
sociology of law and for a differentiation theory according to this paradigm. Indeed, 
it can be argued that there exist two big obstacles, which appear at the first stage of 
Luhmann’s theoretical development, for this task: (1) the matrix: person, role, program, 
value; and (2) the confusion between the concept of institutionalization and the 
theories of the change in law. We will briefly analyze these two problems, before 
focusing on our subject. 
 
Central to the writings of the first stage are the categories person, role, program, and 
value. Luhmann uses these concepts to refer to levels of social systems construction. 
The scale goes from the most concrete (person) to the most abstract (value) and is 
crossed by the opposition static/dynamic. The external axis (person/value) would be 
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the most static thing and the internal axis (role/program) would be the most 
dynamic aspect of the system (Luhmann 1987; 1974g). 
 
Table 3 Levels of construction of Social Systems 
 
 Static Dynamic 
 
Concrete 
 
Person 
 
 
Role 
 
Abstract 
 
Value 
 
 
Program 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Luhmann (1987) 
 
Although these four categories, person, role, program, and value, are similar to those 
used by Parsons in relation to roles, collectivities, norms, and values (Parsons 1961a: 41; 
1966: 19; 1965c: 71; 1971: 7), which are associated to the AGIL matrix, Luhmann 
does not link these abstraction levels with the formation of functional systems but 
with the attribution of expectations. Normative expectations may be directed to 
these four levels and, from them, may be generalized. This understanding of social 
systems based on abstraction levels is not deepened and appears briefly in Soziale 
Systeme (Luhmann 1991a: 429) in the same sense. Although these four concepts 
persist in different ways in the work of Luhmann, they don’t have the complexity of 
previous writings. The person reappears later in the concept inclusion/exclusion 
(Luhmann 1995c), programs are conceptualized within a cybernetic theory (Luhmann 
1991a), roles are subsumed to differentiation theory (Luhmann 1977), and values 
acquire a new sense in the theory of generalized symbolic media (Luhmann 1997th). 
In spite of this, the problems of both the levels of abstraction and the relative 
dynamism between these four concepts are not analyzed again. From these 
concepts, at this first stage, the idea of law as a system constructed at level of 
programs (Luhmann 1974g: 182ff), which is not continued or later deepened by 
Luhmann, also appears. 
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The concepts of institution and institutionalization are ubiquitous in this stage. Much of 
Luhmann’s writings on sociology of the law prior to 1984 are focused on the 
problem of law as an institution and on its institutionalization. The latter is partly 
understood in a procedural way, as an equivalent to the concept of differentiation or 
evolution of law, and also as being related to the problem of legal legitimization. 
The concept of institution allows for the observance of the strong influence of 
Parsons in this stage on the socio-legal ideas of Luhmann, since Parsons dedicates 
much of his theory to study the problem of the institutions and how these are 
generalized, which Luhmann assumes partially as a research program. 
 
In Grundrechte als Institution (1974e), the problem of the institutionalization is explicit, 
although such refers only to the field of fundamental rights and assumes a thesis, 
which is later abandoned, i.e., that legal and political institutionalization are part of a 
wider process of “civilization of expectations” (1974g: 95). In Legitimation durch 
Verfahren (1983), the analysis of institutionalization focuses on the ways in which 
certain procedures become institutionalized to give legitimacy to the political and 
legal order. Nevertheless it is not until the Rechtssoziologie (1987) where a special 
treatment to the institution concept occurs. 
 
The sociological problem behind the Rechtssoziologie (1987) is –based on the idea that 
the function of law is the stabilization of normative expectations- how an answer to 
disappointment is institutionalized. The expectations stabilize the disappointments 
and, depending on the type of expectation, emerge as a type of social system: a 
learning system or a non-learning system. The institutionalization of normative 
expectations of behavior meets evolutionary functions of selection and stabilization 
of procedural consensus in all the dimensions of meaning: 
 
Institutionalization produces an evolutionary selection when by means of 
consensus normative projections usable in a society are chosen. The factual 
identification produces, meanwhile, an evolutionary stabilization of these 
acquisitions incorporating the norm in a coherent meaning relation, which remains 
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so fastened and clear that she is capable of producing consensus qua interpretation 
and reasoning and of surviving to fluctuations in the mechanisms of 
institutionalization. (Luhmann 1987: 64)54 
 
The law would have also internally suffered a process of institutionalization, which 
would be probabilized by means of three evolutionary acquisitions: (1) the self-
commitment to the “contract;” (2) the differentiation of “groups of reference” 
specifics to certain expectations; and (3) the “institutionalization of institutionalized 
functions” in certain roles (Luhmann 1987: 74).  
 
The law is, in this stage, a social structure that owes its ability to guide action to 
institutionalization processes. This institutionalization makes law relevant and allows 
its social reproduction: 
 
Law must be seen as a structure that defines the boundaries and selection types of 
the societal system. Of course, it is not the sole societal structure; apart from law, 
we have to take account of cognitive structures, the media of communication, such 
as, for example, truth or love, and particularly, the institutionalisation of the scheme 
of societal system differentiation. However, law is essential as structure, because 
people cannot orient themselves toward others or expect their expectations without 
the congruent generalisation of behavioural expectations. This structure has to be 
institutionalised at the level of society itself, because it is only here that we can build 
beyond preconditions and create those establishments which domesticate the 
 
                                                            
54 “Institutionalisierung leistet evolutionäre Selektion dadurch, daß über Konsensbildung 
ausgewählt wird, welche Normprojektionen in einer Gesellschaft- brauchbar sind. Und sachlich-
sinnhafte Identifikation leistet evolutionäre Stabilisierung des so Errungenen dadurch, daß die 
Norm in einem konsistenten Sinnzusammenhang aufgenommen, befestigt und so klargestellt wird, 
daß sie nun ihrerseits qua Auslegung und Begründung Konsens zu erzeugen und Schwankungen 
der institutionalisierenden Mechanismen zu überdauern vermag.” 
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environment for other social systems. It therefore changes with the evolution of 
societal complexity. (Luhmann 1987: 134)55 
 
In this juncture, his “evolution of societal complexity” refers to two forms of 
differentiation, namely: segmentation and functional differentiation. The evolutionary 
problem of law is then characterized by the treatment of temporary complexity by 
means of selectivity, to the emergence of procedures to generalize social validity and 
to the capacity for factual abstraction of normative expectations in the system. 
 
In this first sociology of the law the concepts of differentiation and evolution are 
constantly related to institutionalization. However, there is no clear definition of 
each explanatory field. Meanwhile, the evolutionary theory is not developed beyond 
the evolutionary acquisitions. Also, the theory of system differentiation only provides an 
opposition between segmentation and functional differentiation, which only seems to 
replicate the dichotomy of two solidarities of Durkheim (2001). 
 
Luhmann later abandons the institutionalization concept and this has no subsequent 
connections either to his sociology of law or to his theory of society. Unlike the 
theoretical transit from action to communication, which is properly argued (cf. 
Luhmann 1982; 1991a), the abandonment of a theory of institutionalization occurs 
‘silently.’ It is possible to hypothesize however that the loss of a theory of 
 
                                                            
55 “Das Recht muß demnach als eine Struktur gesehen werden, die Grenzen und Selektionsweisen 
des Gesellschaftssystems definiert. Es ist keineswegs die einzige Gesellschaftsstruktur; neben dem 
Recht sind kognitive Strukturen, Medien der Kommunikation wie z. B. Wahrheit oder Liebe und 
vor allem die Institutionalisierung des Schemas der Systemdifferenzierung der Gesellschaft zu 
beachten. Aber das Recht ist als Struktur unentbehrlich, weil ohne kongruente Generalisierung 
normativer Verhaltenserwartungen Menschen sich nicht aneinander orientieren, ihre Erwartungen 
nicht erwarten könnten. Und diese Struktur muß auf der Ebene der Gesellschaft selbst 
institutionalisiert sein, weil nur hier ins Voraussetzungslose gebaut werden kann und jene 
Einrichtungen geschaffen werden können, die für andere Sozialsysteme die Umwelt domestizieren. 
Sie wandelt sich deshalb mit der Evolution gesellschaftlicher Komplexität.” 
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institutionalization is due, to a great extent, to the development and deepening of 
the concepts of differentiation, evolution, and to the theory of generalized symbolic 
media, all of which have their maximum expression in Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 
(1997a) but is part of a development that redesigns a theory of differentiation of law 
without reference to a theory of institutionalization. 
 
2.3.3. Evolution and Differentiation of Law 
 
Luhmann’s sociology of law cannot be appropriately explained without referring to 
the differentiation process of the law. In this sense, he shares much of the vision of 
the sociology of law. Indeed, a distinctive element of the sociology of law is, from 
its beginnings, the formulation of a general evolutionary theory of law. The stages of 
rationalization of law embodied in the various types of law in Weber (1922b), the 
social division of labor in Durkheim (2001) from the repressive to the restitutive 
law, or the phases of moral and legal evolution in Habermas (1982b; 1994) are clear 
examples of this. As Habermas pointed: “The development of law belongs to the 
undisputed and, since Durkheim and Weber, classical research areas of sociology” 
(Habermas 1982b: 523).56 
 
The distinctive element in the description of the law in all these traditions seems to 
be functionalist criteria, i.e., what function the law in the social whole plays. As we 
previously saw, the function of law for Durkheim had to do with the maintenance 
of the socially integrating morality, something shared to some extent by Habermas 
and Parsons, although in both, the analysis is complemented with the problem of 
legitimacy noted by Weber. For Luhmann, law also fulfills functions for society, 
although this fulfillment is not guaranteed a priori but it is a product of a particular 
historical process. For this motive, it becomes necessary to review the elements that 
allow the differentiation of law. 
 
                                                            
56 “Die Rechtsentwicklung gehört zu den unstrittigen, seit Durkheim und Weber klassischen 
Forschungsgebieten der Soziologie.” 
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Luhmann’s sociology reserves a special place for the evolution and differentiation of 
law. The concepts of evolution and differentiation have different emphasis on the 
theoretical development of Luhmann and constitute, in some terms, two different 
perspectives of observation. In his early formulations, both concepts are treated 
inside a hierarchy, where differentiation is subordinated as stabilization operation 
within a theory of evolution. Such is crafted in a very similar way to Parsons (1971: 
26), who distinguishes differentiation as a particular evolutionary mechanism among 
four: adaptive upgrading, inclusion, and valued generalization. Differentiation is for Parsons 
(1971: 26): “the division of a unit or structure in a social system into two or more 
units or structures that differ in their characteristics and functional significance for 
the system”, i.e., differentiation is functional specialization, or, as for Spencer (1912: 
449ff), “structural” and “functional” differentiation. Nevertheless, in Die Gesellschaft 
der Gesellschaft (1997a), Luhmann separates the two strategies as two independent 
research programs. We will later return to this subject in chapter 3. 
 
As previously indicated, although we focus on the second stage of Luhmann’s 
sociology of law, we do not treat the problem differentiation and evolution of law 
from two separated perspectives. Instead, we argue that in the case of law, it is more 
fruitful to integrate both theories using the differentiation theory inside the 
evolutionary theory and to also consider the evolutionary theory inside the theory of 
functional differentiation. This strategy seems to follow Luhmann himself in 
Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts (1999a-g) and in Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1995a). 
Differentiation is part of the evolutionary mechanisms of social systems and, 
simultaneously, the evolutionary processes appear inside the explanation of 
functional differentiation. That is, the differentiation process is explained by means 
of a theory of the evolution of law, which indicates the specific mechanisms by 
which this differentiation actually occurs in the system. The differentiation of the 
functional system is understood, in turn, as the stabilization of an evolutionary 
process. From the point of view of the theory of evolution, differentiation theory is 
a theory of the stabilization of functional systems. And from the point of view of 
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the theory of the differentiation, the theory of evolution describes mechanisms by 
means of which changes within the system are produced and stabilized. Added to 
this, the theory of differentiation of society corresponds – from a evolutionary 
perspective - to a theory that describes certain evolutionary thresholds, which 
constitute “forms of differentiation” as segmentation, stratification, and functional 
differentiation (Luhmann 1977). In sum, both approaches are complementary, 
although two problems must be properly indicated before proceeding with our 
explanation. 
 
First, to understand the complementary character of both approaches, it becomes 
necessary to leave the general use that Luhmann himself gives to the differentiation 
concept. This usage makes it difficult to distinguish by simple sight a theory of 
evolution from a theory of differentiation. This is mainly due to the processual 
sense that Luhmann gives to the differentiation concept without specifying the 
formal mechanisms by which differentiation occurs. In a general sense, the 
differentiation concept in the use of Luhmann appears as a general description of 
social change. In a lax sense, the differentiation of law is understood in these general 
semantic terms as the differentiation of a sphere of meaning: “[i]n the course of 
social development, law has differentiated itself as a sphere of meaning of its own 
kind” (Luhmann 1969: 15).57 
 
The second problem is related to the amplitude of both theories to describe social 
change. In this sense, if one follows the distinction - horizontal to whole society - 
between “social structure“ and “semantic“ (Luhmann 1993a), differentiation theory 
only covers the structural side, while evolution theory is compatible with both sides. 
Luhmann himself used the evolutionary study of semantics, while reserving 
differentiation theory only to structural changes. There is no explanation on how 
operational closure, coding, or programming operate inside semantics, since they 
 
                                                            
57 “Im Laufe der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung hat sich vielmehr das Recht als eine Sinnsphäre 
eigener Art herausdifferenziert.” 
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correspond to a different explanatory domain. The theory of evolution in this sense 
has a greater explanatory scope, but lacks the conceptual elements that do provide 
the theory of system differentiation. 
 
From this, we note that for our study we understand the differentiation of law as 
functional differentiation of law and exclude therefore the too general treatment of the 
concept of differentiation. The focus of our research is the reconstruction of the 
functional differentiation of law based on an evolutionary study with regard to the 
process. For this reason, it becomes necessary to understand the evolution concept. 
 
2.3.4. Evolution of Law   
 
Luhmann’s theory of evolution is based on neo-Darwinian developments 
concerning the factors and basic processes of organic evolution. Luhmann’s theory 
of evolution uses these concepts, especially the reconstruction of Darwinian 
evolution of Donald T. Campbell (1965). As previously noted, Luhmann recognizes 
in evolution three special functions: variation, selection, and stabilization. Based on these 
processes, the evolution of society and the law as social subsystem are characterized. 
 
Evolution is considered to be a circular process, in which the above-mentioned 
functions appear. First, (1) variation is characterized by an overproduction of 
communication possibilities of the system; (2) selection refers to those possibilities 
that are chosen by the system according to its possible connection capabilities with 
other communications; and finally, (3) stabilization refers to the structure of the 
system that becomes stable for the reproduction of new selections (Luhmann 1999a: 
14). In a more precise formulation, Luhmann argues that these three functions refer 
respectively to the elements of the system, to its structures, and to the unit of the 
system (Luhmann 1995a: 242). 
 
In the legal system, these three processes can be characterized according to those 
specific mechanisms: 
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If mechanisms for production of variety, selection and stabilization in the area of 
law are sought, can be distinguished three functional areas, as: (1) enrichment and 
production of conflict of normative expectations, (2) decision procedure and (3) regulatory 
formulation of valid law (Luhmann 1999a: 16).58 
 
According to Luhmann, the variation ability in legal system comes from the 
formation of normative expectations, whose diversity may increase. Crucial to this 
process is the invention of writing and its respective symbolic formalization. From an 
evolutionary standpoint, writing enables the duplication of meaning in the form 
text/interpretation (Luhmann 1995a: 256ff) an only secondarily the contents 
fixation. Thus, writing appears as an element that promotes first the variation of the 
system and not its fixation. Normative expectations can be more easily confronted 
with its disappointment (with past expectations) and a normative overproduction 
can be generated. Although the three evolutionary functions affect all dimensions of 
meaning, it can be argued that the variation that allows the writing has its greatest 
impact on the temporary dimension. It is precisely the possibility of recurring to 
writing, as a memory condensed on texts, which enables the extension of 
expectations in a wider temporary horizon. Based on writing, it is possible to 
confirm a normative expectation in the present, contrast it with the past, and test its 
congruence or the need for change. Thus, the variation of elements of the system 
appears first as a temporary problem of maintenance or change. 
 
Variations, as mutations in living organisms, may be capable (or not) of prevailing. 
For its continuity, the function of selection becomes necessary. For the function of 
selection, the law specifies formalized procedures of decision, independence from social 
influence of the strata, and arguments based on this dimension of meaning: “Thus, 
 
                                                            
58 “Sucht man im Bereich des Rechts nach entsprechenden Mechanismen der Erzeugung von 
Varietät, der Selektion und der Stabilisierung, so stößt man auf drei Funktionsbereiche, die sich (1) 
als Reichhaltigkeit und Konfliktsträchtigkeit normativer Erwartungen, (2) als Entscheidungsverfahren und (3) als 
regulative Formulierung des geltenden Rechts unterschieden lassen.” 
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social structures outside the law, specially strata-related status and familial 
relationships, friendships, and patronage are prevented from having an excessively 
direct influence on the administration of law” (Luhmann 1995a: 263).59 The 
function of procedures is, from the perspective of the dimensions of meaning, 
distinctly social. The procedures allow the system to become detached from social 
relations of support of those that are affected in the conflict, which may shortcircuit 
the search of a resolution. For this, the system uses the principle of “[s]ome for all” 
(Luhmann 1995a: 262),60 that is to say, from a few who represent the law and 
execute the procedures, the fiction of a generalized consensus is maintained and the 
conflicts are isolated into a functionally specialized social system. 
 
Finally, stabilization comes from the hand of the differentiation of regulatory 
formulations of the valid law, or more precisely, from a proper legal dogmatics 
(Luhmann 1995a: 274). Dogmatic functions enable the formation of stable 
structures for reproduction of normative contents, the capacity of self-observation 
of law, and its binary coding. As previously noted, the legal system owes its 
operational closure, to a great extent, to the formation of a legal dogmatics, which 
also performs functions for the evolution of law. In the dogmatics, the main 
problem is factual, i.e. the content to be taken into consideration for the law and the 
continuity of the system from its own operations. 
 
In addition to these above-described three functions in the evolution of law, a set of 
“evolutionary acquisitions” appears (Luhmann 1997a). These acquisitions have a 
higher degree of development at the moment of appearance and later allow 
structural linkage with other communications.61 Although the list of evolutionary 
 
                                                            
59 “Denn damit ist ein allzu direkter Einfluß von außerrechtlichen Sozialstrukturen, vor allem 
natürlich: von schichtbedingtem Status und Zusammenhängen der Verwandtschaft, der 
Freundschaft, des Klientelismus, auf den Rechtsbetrieb abgewehrt.”   
60 “Einige für alle.” 
61 In this sense Luhmann refers to these acquisitions as “preadaptive advances” (Luhmann 1981c: 
191). 
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acquisitions of law is difficult to synthesize, the existence of some of them as 
support in the evolution of law can be indicated. One of these acquisitions is the 
universalization of “subjective rights” (Luhmann 1995a: 291; 1999e), since they 
allow the formation of normative expectations based on the protection of freedom 
by negation, that is, through the possibility of denial of the freedom. Another 
evolutionary acquisition of importance for the differentiation of functional systems, 
such as law, has to do with the differentiation of roles. Differentiation would have, 
in the social dimension, the differentiation of roles and its complementary 
expectations as a precedent. By extending and generalizing these expectations, a 
process of differentiation of functional systems would begin. The function becomes 
gradually relevant first for these “complementary” or “limits” roles and then for the 
rest of society (Luhmann 1976a: 291; 1977: 35; 1999e: 367). Additionally, the 
emergence of “conditional programs” (Luhmann 1995a: 196), legal procedures 
(Luhmann 1995a: 209), “property,” and “contract” (Luhmann 1995a: 459) must also 
be understood as acquisitions of this nature. 
 
These three mechanisms, along with certain evolutionary acquisitions, support the 
evolution of law. This evolution can be characterized by a new kind of evolutionist 
approach that considers not only environmental factors or solely internal factors. 
That is, social evolution presupposes “structural coupling” – or in the old parsonian 
terminology of Luhmann, “Interpénétration” (Luhmann 1991a: 294) or “double 
interchanges” (Luhmann 1999f). 
 
The relations with politics are certainly a key element of the evolution of law. Not 
only because politics support variations in law, but also because political 
proceduralization of law reinforces its selections (Luhmann 1988c). The common 
element between both systems is the use of the same symbiotic mechanism, i.e., 
violence. Based on this mechanism, however, two different generalized symbolic 
media are differentiated and two different functional systems can take the form of 
the rule of law (Luhmann 1999f: 158). 
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From internal conditions of the system and its ability to deal with its own 
complexity, the emergence of certain evolutionary acquisitions and the structural 
coupling with other subsystems, law produces that specific case of structural change 
called evolution. 
 
Luhmann understands the evolution of law as a circular process of structural change 
in the system. In this sense, this concept has been criticized for having a strong 
ontogenetic accent, that is to say, for focusing in changes of the state of an individual 
without considering the collective character of evolution, i.e. the phylogeny. Hendrik 
Wortmann (2007; 2012) has argued that the theory of social evolution of Luhmann 
is based on a “cladogenetic” fallacy (Wortmann 2012: 377), since it only considers 
changes inside an organism (legal system), without considering the collective character 
of the evolution of populations. Although his reflections on the applicability of social 
sciences of concepts of “allopatric speciation” (Wortmann 2012) and “reproductive 
isolation” (Wortmann 2007) are very interesting and with undeniable projections for 
a theory of social evolution,62 his criticism of the evolution concept based on the 
dichotomy individual/group or organism/population is based on an evolutionary 
theory belonging to the old paradigm of system theory, i.e., whole/parts. This kind of 
questioning in a theory of the evolution of social systems based on meaning finds 
serious problems when it tries to explain – in lax terms - the populations as social 
systems, which Wortmann himself recognizes when he decides to adopt the vague 
concept of “social forms” (Wortmann 2012: 380) to explain the evolution as 
allopatric speciation. On the other hand, if the very theory of evolution of 
populations is followed, the evolutionist explanation of Luhmann is 
“morphogenetic” (Luhmann 1991a: 481ff.), which is compatible with the population 
theory postulated by Wortmann. 
 
In this sense, the theory of evolution of law is a theory that seeks to explain 
structural changes in the system based on variation, deviations, or mutations, which 
 
                                                            
62 In fact, we will discuss some of these ideas later. 
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are subsequently selected without prior planning, based on random events that allow 
later the reproduction of the system unit. 
 
The differentiation of law is associated with this kind of structural exchange, as the 
‘final’ step inside the evolutionary changes and is therefore a product of social 
evolution itself. This way, functional differentiation of law describes the emergency 
of a social system dedicated to a function, but whose genesis is due to specific 
evolutionary factors. 
 
2.3.5. Functional Differentiation of Law 
 
As previously noted, the legal system arises by evolutionary mechanisms. However, 
it only acquires its status as a specific social system when its differentiation occurs. 
This differentiation is achieved by means of a set of reciprocally related factors, 
which are the product of the evolution of society. Thus, the functionally 
differentiated modern law emerges. To understand the characteristics of the 
functionally differentiated law, it is necessary to examine those factors that 
contribute to its differentiation. 
 
a) The Law as Social System, Operational Closure and Positivation  
 
The system of law is a social system, that is to say, a system that belongs to society 
and reproduces it (Luhmann 1995a: 55). Like any social system, law is based on the 
difference between system and environment and, like all social systems, law is a 
product of its own evolution and has no assured place in the social structure, but its 
viability depends on real conditions, that is to say, on every communicative event of 
society: 
 
We do not understand “system”, like some jurists, as a context of congruent rules, 
but as a context of factually enacted operations, which, as social operations, have to 
be communicated. In addition to that, whatever that defines them have to be 
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communicated as legal communication. This means, nevertheless, that the basal 
distinction is not a typology of norms or of values but a distinction between system 
and environment. (Luhmann 1995a: 40f)63  
 
While this idea of social systems as communication systems appears clearly in his 
writings after Soziale Systeme (1991a), in the case of law, this is an older idea. Law 
appears early in his analysis as a modernizing institution that protects the social 
communication by means of “fundamental rights” (Luhmann 1974e). The evolution 
of law – along with fundamental rights - is seen within a wider process of 
“civilization of expectations” (Luhmann 1974e: 94ff), which are a condition for a 
modern differentiated order. Fundamental rights constitute a key factor against the 
threats from the called “dedifferentiation” (1974e: 24), which is, in turn, defined as 
“politicization.” Fundamental rights have as a function the protection of the 
“dignity” and “freedom” of the symbolic presentation of the person in the 
communication (Luhmann 1974e: 63) and thus also protect the form of modern 
differentiation (Luhmann 1974e: 71ff.). 
 
As a social system, law establishes a communication domain on which it performs 
its operational closure. Such operational closure refers to conditions of real 
functioning of legal system and not to a hierarchic or harmonic normative order, 
and refers to the way in which legal communication, which circulates through 
society, stabilizes certain connection capabilities, i.e. structures for the reproduction 
of the system. 
 
 
                                                            
63 “Unter »System« verstehen wir dabei nicht, wie manche Juristen, einen Zusammenhang 
aufeinander abgestimmter Regeln, sondern einen Zusammenhang von faktisch vollzogenen 
Operationen, die als soziale Operationen Kommunikationen sein müssen, was immer sie dann noch 
zusätzlich als Rechtskommunikationen auszeichnet. Das aber heißt: die Ausgangsunterscheidung 
nicht in einer Normen- oder Wertetypologie zu suchen, sondern in der Unterscheidung von System 
und Umwelt.” 
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Structures are necessary for a highly selective interrelation of operations, but law 
becomes its reality not by any stable ideality, but exclusively by those operations 
that produce and reproduce a specific legal meaning. Additionally, we assume that 
these operations have to be always operations of the legal system itself (which can 
be, naturally, observed from outside). This and no other thing implies the thesis of 
operational closure. (Luhmann 1995a: 41)64 
 
Like any event in the social system, operational closure of law is due to historical 
circumstances. This closure is historically based on the positivization of law, that is 
to say, when decisions of legal system gradually cease to operate on the basis of 
assumptions of natural law or of social consensus, when they decisively separate 
from the morality, religion and illegitimate political influences. The positivación of 
law would have occurred in Europe in the nineteenth century (Luhmann 1999c: 
126) and, along with this, legal decisions are not anymore based on wealth, lineage, 
class, political pressures, or morality. 
 
The positivization implies that the validity of law is based on the specification of 
procedures that originated only in decisions produced within the legal system: “The 
concept of positivity suggests an explanation through the concept of decision. 
Positive law would be valid qua decision” (Luhmann 1995a: 38f).65 In the 
positivization of law, as understood by Luhmann, the system specifies its foundation 
on the basis of its own procedures, which are, in turn, decisions. In these decisions, 
which are legal, the legal system affirms its own validity on the basis of the 
 
                                                            
64 “Strukturen sind zur jeweils hochselektiven Verknüpfung von Operationen erforderlich, aber das 
Recht hat seine Realität nicht in irgendeiner stabilen Idealität, sondern ausschließlich in den 
Operationen, die den rechtsspezifischen Sinn produzieren und reproduzieren. Zusätzlich gehen wir 
davon aus, daß dies immer Operationen des Rechtssystems selbst sein müssen (die natürlich auch 
von außen beobachtet werden können). Das und nichts anderes besagt die These operativer 
Schließung.” 
65 “Der Begriff der Positivität legt eine Erläuterung durch den Begriff der Entscheidung nahe. 
Positives Recht gelte qua Entscheidung.” 
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application of its own code and its transformation capabilities.66 Positive law owes 
then paradoxically its stability to its instability, that is to say, to its capacity of 
internal transformation, to its own contingency: “Thus, positive law can be 
characterized by awareness of contingency” (Luhmann 1987: 209).67 
 
This idea of operational closure indirectly attacks the description of the legal system 
of the legal positivism, but unlike other critical positions of the sociology of law, 
Luhmann’s reflection is not a mere criticism to the idea of ‘law in the books’ or 
‘state law,’ aimed to propose an alternative concept of law. Instead of following this 
classic strategy of the sociology of law, he criticizes those theories that see too much 
coherence, order, and hierarchy in the law, and confronts them with the image of 
the law as social system, whose operations are communications and, as such, must 
be faced with their own reproduction and viability. It is the legal system, which is 
seen from another perspective: only one legal system and not two or more opposite 
normative orders. The operational closure of law allows the understanding that a 
legal system has to manage the temporality of its own operations, with the frugality 
of every communication event and with reductions of complexity of the 
environment. There are no guarantees of ideal functioning for law beyond their own 
operations. 
 
Positivization is only one of the specific evolutionary acquisitions of modern law. 
Nevertheless, the operational closure of law, according to Luhmann, must be 
supported by other phenomena, as the binary coding of legal communication 
(Luhmann 1995a: 60), a subject that we address next. 
 
 
 
                                                            
66 En este sentido De Giorgi (1998: 258) ha afirmado que “el derecho positivo es la legalización de la 
transformabilidad del derecho.” 
67 “Positives Recht läßt sich somit durch Kontingenzbewußtsein charakterisieren.” 
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b) Coding and Programming of Law 
 
The positivization of law achieves the sustenance of legal communications by 
operations of the system itself, i.e. legal decisions. This partially allows the 
operational closure of the system. For this closure of the legal system, further 
development is necessary, that is, the binary coding of communication (Luhmann 
1991b: 1427). 
 
The legal system’s ability to code its operations is also an evolutionary acquisition 
(Luhmann 1991b: 1431). Along with law, positivization operations are produced, 
which gradually and selectively distinguish the legal communication based on the 
code legal/non-legal [Recht/Unrecht]. On having closed a code that differentiates the 
legal from the non-legal, the system can guide its operations towards its own 
reproduction, acquire the character of observer of its own observations (on what 
has been decided and on what will be decided), and develop legal forms that allow 
the reproduction of legal norms through other legal norms. 
 
With the existence of a communicational code, it is not indicated that the legal 
system should have preference for the positive side of it, but what is relevant to the 
system is that communication allows the regulation by the code (Luhmann 1995a: 
69). The coding of the system is, simultaneously, a scheme of observation of 
observations and a mechanism for the autopoietic reproduction of the legal system: 
 
The code itself is not a norm. It is merely a structure for a procedure of recognition 
and attribution of social autopoiesis. Whenever there is a reference to legal or non-
legal, such a communication attributes itself to the legal system. (Luhmann 1995a: 
70)68 
 
 
                                                            
68 “Der Code selbst ist keine Norm. Er ist nichts anderes als die Struktur eines Erkennungs- und 
Zuordnungsverfahrens der gesellschaftlichen Autopoiesis. Immer wenn auf Recht bzw. Unrecht 
referiert wird, ordnet sich eine solche Kommunikation dem Rechtssystem zu.” 
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The idea of justice becomes inseparable from the idea of equality before law and 
legal action begins to define events from a moral standpoint as legal or non-legal 
and not as good or bad, right or wrong. The fundaments of legal decisions are self-
validated in a recursive way and thereafter: “Only law itself can say what law is” 
(Luhmann 1995a: 50).69 
 
Since the code does not specify determined contents for its applicability, it is easily 
universalized in all social situations and it also allows law to establish connection 
capabilities between its operations. The way in which the code is applied in every 
case depends on the programming of the legal system. 
 
In general terms, the legal system operates through the combination of two 
decisional programs, which are located differently in relation to the decisions of the 
legal system. It is a question of the “conditional programs” and “goal programs” 
(Luhmann 1995a: 195).70 The conditional programs constitute rational schemes of 
decision making, which indicate stable conditions regarding the consequences of the 
decision, as well as predetermined means and ends. That adopt the form of ‘if 
this/then,’ so they have a high capacity of technification and trivialization. The goal 
programs, on the other hand, have a great flexibility with regard to its decisions and 
adapt themselves to contextual conditions. These goal programs indicate that in the 
selection of means and ends, it is possible to change the means in accordance with 
the ends, which can be also changing.71 
 
 
                                                            
69 “Nur das Recht selbst kann sagen, was Recht ist.” 
70 In its earliest formulation this distinction is based on the model of open systems. See Luhmann 
(1974g). 
71 Parsons speaks of “generalized patterns” when referring to institutions: “Institutions are 
generalized patterns of norms which define categories of prescribed, permitted and prohibited 
behavior in social relationships, for people in interaction with each other as members of their 
society and its various subsystems and groups. They are always conditional patterns in some sense” 
(Parsons 1965c: 177). 
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From the point of view of legal decision – and deciding is precisely what is expected 
from the law - the difference between both decisional programs can also be seen 
like the form jurisprudence/legislation, respectively (Luhmann 1987: 241). From this 
perspective, the legal system is differentiated into center and periphery, having 
jurisprudence, as legal decision, in the center, and in the periphery, legislation. The 
main objection to this distinction is given by that hierarchic traditional conception, 
which argues that: “The judge applies the law obeying the instructions of legislators. 
(…) Courts are understood as executing organs of the legislation and the legal-
methodology as deduction” (Luhmann 1995a: 302).72 Against this position, 
Luhmann argues that only the courts need to decide on all the possible cases that 
are presented before them and which deserve legal attention. Only in the courts 
does the convergence of three key elements for the constitution of law: the need to 
decide, the freedom of interpreting the norm, and the restriction of deciding in a fair 
way, becomes possible. Only the courts transform necessity into freedom. Thus, the 
legal operation is more present in the decisions of the courts than in legislation. 
 
Since the legal decision is in the center, the legislation is in the periphery and opened 
to the environment and its demands. In the periphery, the demands can be 
absorbed, regardless of whether they are legal interests/non- legal interests since there, 
the imperative of decision does not exist. The center operates with a more rigid 
cognitive closure ceremony and in the periphery, the cognitive expectations appear. 
 
This difference between jurisprudence and legislation, allows us to understand the 
programmatic duality of the law: “The legal system us a normatively closed system (…) 
but at the same time is a cognitively open system” (Luhmann 1987: 356f).73 This refers to 
the conditional programs and goal programs, which dominate the center and the 
 
                                                            
72 “Der Richter wendet die Gesetze an, gehorcht den Weisungen des Gesetzgebers (…) Das 
Gericht wird als ausführendes Organ der Gesetzgebung begriffen und die Rechtsmethodik als 
Deduktion.” 
73 “Das Rechtssystem ist ein normativ geschlossenes System (…) Zugleich ist das Rechtssystem ein 
kognitiv offenes System.” 
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periphery of the law respectively. Both programs characterize two types of 
decisions: “programmed decisions” and “programming decisions” (Luhmann 1969: 
5ff; 1999c: 135ff).74  
 
Between these two forces, the legal praxis is located. Between the constant openness 
of the legislation to political demands and the imperative of decision that appears in 
the courts. This internal form of differentiation of center/periphery 
(jurisprudence/legislation) generates this constant tension that determines the 
evolution of law like a constant pressure and resistance to change. 
 
Nevertheless, this relationship of openness to legislation and to the most ‘political’ 
side of the law, brings advantages for the legitimacy of the system. For Luhmann, 
the social legitimization of the law, that is to say the “generalized willingness to accept 
decisions whose content is as yet undetermined, within certain limits of tolerance” (Luhmann 
1983: 28),75 is given in part thanks to this relation with the legislative production. 
The political elections, the parliamentary procedures, and the legal processes are the 
procedural ways with which law obtains its factual legitimacy (Luhmann 1983; 1987: 
264; 1999c: 133). Thanks to these procedures, the law is legitimized and its social 
influence can be generalized. The State is that social system that arises from the 
coupling between politics and law. 
 
The positivization of law and its coding constitute special conditions with which the 
modern law is operationally closed and defines, this way, a specific field for the 
reproduction of its operations. Nevertheless, the social autopoiesis of law, that is to 
say, the ability of the legal system to reproduce itself based on the network of its 
own operations, supposes a function from which the social system is differentiated 
(Luhmann 1995a: 60f.). The law not only has an operational area delimited by its 
 
                                                            
74 “programmierten Entscheidens” “programmierende Entscheidens.” 
75 “generalisierte Bereitschaft, inhaltlich noch unbestimmte Entscheidungen innerhalb gewisser 
Toleranzgrenzen hinzunehmen.” 
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positivación and the capacity of observation of its own operations based on a binary 
coding, but it also possesses a function of widespread relevancy that allows its 
differentiation as social system. 
 
c) The Function of Law and its Symbolic Media 
 
The positivization of the law and its coding, as well as the programming of law and 
its legitimization, appear as distinctive features of the communication system of law. 
Nevertheless, in a functionally differentiated society, it becomes necessary to specify 
the functions performed by a particular social system. On this point there is 
convergence in the whole sociology of law of Luhmann. The legal system performs 
the function to stabilize or guarantee “normative expectations” (Luhmann 1987; 
1989; 1991a; 1995a; 1997a; 1999c; 1999d). 
 
According to Luhmann, the expectations can be characterized in two opposite ways 
regarding acceptance or denial of learning. There are those expectations that suffer a 
change due to disappointments and those that, on the contrary, remain unchanged. 
The first are “cognitive expectations” and the second are “normative expectations” 
(Luhmann 1991a: 437ff; 1995a: 133ff). Cognitive expectations are largely a problem 
of science and normative expectations of law. 
 
This concept of norm moves the concept out of a theory of values and places it 
inside a theory of social time. Thus, the function of law is primarily temporal since it 
seeks handling disappointments of expectations by means of a social system wherein 
function is essentially counterfactual: “Norms do not promise conduct that 
conforms to norms but they protect all those who are expecting it” (Luhmann 
1995a: 135).76 
 
 
                                                            
76 “Die Norm verspricht nicht ein normgemäßes Verhalten, sie schützt aber den, der dies erwartet.” 
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The legal system does not have as a function social integration (as for Durkheim, 
Parsons or Habermas), because not only does it lack the necessary complexity to 
perform this task77 but it is also not capable to ensure the compliance with certain 
behaviors, since this would be impossible from a sociological standpoint and the law 
would also be constantly concerned with its own inefficiency (Luhmann 1995a: 
152). Luhmann puts it as follows: “Contrary to the “moral functionalism” 
assumptions of Durkheim or certain philosophers of law, the primary function of 
law is not the moral integration of society but the intensification of conflict 
possibilities in forms that do not endanger social structures” (Luhmann 1997a: 
468).78 
 
The function of legal system is to stabilize normative expectations, that is to say, 
expectations that behavior complies with the valid law. Law enters into action when 
conflicts appear between normative expectations that demand the attention of a 
particular social system. Regarding conflicts law can be seen as an “immune system” 
(Luhmann 1991a: 509ff.; 1995a: 566ff.)79, since it is characterized by the formation 
of structures to deal early with conflicts and regulate them through procedures. A 
functional paradox of the legal system emerges from this orientation towards 
conflicts, namely that legal system is irreplaceable in its function but simultaneously 
constitutes only a functional alternative. Not all the conflicts have to go through the 
legal system and its procedures; but in its function of treatment of valid normative 
expectations, this one is irreplaceable. 
 
 
                                                            
77 For an overview of this subject, see Cadenas (2006). 
78 “Entgegen den Annahmen eines „moralischen Funktionalismus“ eines Durkheim oder mancher 
Rechtsphilosophen dient das Recht also nicht primär einer moralischen Integration der 
Gesellschaft, sondern der Steigerung von Konfliktmöglichkeiten in Formen, die die sozialen 
Strukturen nicht gefährden.”  
79 For Luhmann protest movements also perform the same social service. See Luhmann (1996: 
1954ff).  
 
 
94 
 
The function of law, this way, points to a social system that tends to stabilize 
expectations in a counterfactual way. It is only possible to claim learning from law, 
as positive learning, that is to say, by means of the very structures of the law. The 
recurrence of the deviation is not a main source of learning for law, but it operates 
as a reinforcement of its operational closure. If behavior evades the law, this system 
is normatively reinforced by means of a disposal to ‘not-learn.’ Criminality statistics 
only inform law that it is necessary to reinforce the normative expectation and not 
to learn that the world goes largely behind the law and, thus, the motivation of the 
normative expectation must be moderated. 
 
This function of law is of universal relevance, although not all normative 
expectations are legal, as well as not all knowledge is scientific. On normative 
expectations, largely religious beliefs, ideologies and images of the world are formed, 
although these do not constitute legal normative expectations. The coding of law 
and its functional specification lean towards the determination of a sphere of 
meaning for the maintenance and reproduction of law. However, legal system 
operations require not only coded rules of identification or the specification of 
procedures by means of which the disappointments are canalized. Legal 
communication is also symbolically generalized. 
 
Not all normative expectations are ipso facto legal. The normative expectations that 
law protects are those that have the symbol of legal “validity” (Luhmann 1995a: 
98ff.) which means that its acceptance is probabilized by the legal system. Legal 
validity points at the capacity of change of the system and the way in which legal 
communication appears in its decisions, that is to say, not any legal communication 
transmits validity but only those related to decisions are possible to apply (Luhmann 
1995a: 107). 
 
Although the concept of validity as symbolically generalized media appears clearly 
only in Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1995a), this symbolic media is part of the 
constellations of media previously identified by Luhmann (1975), although there it is 
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simply called law and appears within the frame of a theory of action as a secondary 
media with respect to power (Luhmann 1975b: 179). 
 
The symbolically generalized communication media constitute a special type of 
media. The communication media have, as a general function, making the 
communication of society probable (Luhmann 1981d: 28). Since communication, in 
its minimal concept, is the result of the coordination of psychic systems - 
operationally closed - decreases the probability that both systems are oriented by a 
shared meaning. Social communication cannot be understood based on the model 
of “transmission,” but according to the model of “emergency” (Luhmann 1995e: 
117), because psychic systems cannot send thoughts through communication, but 
only resort to communication that is outside of them and that operates in an 
independent way. In this sense: “only communication can communicate” (Luhmann 
1995e: 113). 
 
Considering the normal fragility of the communication system, this system must 
face diverse difficulties, which are nevertheless normalized by means of the 
formation of certain structures, such as the media. There would be three most 
significant improbabilities of communication. 
 
First, it is improbable that in a simple situation of communication, ego understands 
what alter wants to communicate, since both systems are operationally closed. The 
improbability of understanding is overcome by means of the formation of 
‘language.’ This medium “uses symbolic generalizations to replace, to represent or to 
put together perceptions and to solve the resulting problems of mutual 
comprehension” (Luhmann 1981d: 28) and this way makes understanding probable. 
 
The second improbability is related to the diffusion of communication beyond the 
simple interactions. Since it is improbable that a communication reach beyond the 
people who interact, the ‘media of diffusion’ emerge, and the first one of them is 
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‘writing.’ By this means, media communication can transcend interactions and 
spread the selections of meaning of communication (Luhmann 1981d: 28). 
 
Finally, the third improbability is related to the success or expected consequence of 
communication. Such success implies that one of the communication parties accept 
the selections of the other as a premise or starting point for his own selections. For 
this improbability, the ‘symbolically generalized communication media’ emerge, 
which generalize selections in a more considerable amplitude than it does 
interaction. They are oriented for generalization, i.e., to a plethora of situations. 
Based on orientations of generalized meaning, these media provide symbolic 
orientations that guide the acceptance of selections and therefore make the success 
of communication probable. Scientific truth, love, power, and money, are examples 
of these media (Luhmann 1975b).80 
 
These three previously mentioned types of media: language, diffusion media, and 
symbolically generalized communication media, constitute mutually supposed 
‘evolutionary acquisitions.’ Writing presupposes the existence of language, as the 
symbolically generalized communication media presuppose the existence of 
diffusion media, especially writing (Luhmann 1997a: 316). 
 
To explain the function of the symbolically generalized communication media, 
Luhmann presents a microsociological reduction of an ideal situation of interaction 
between alter and ego. The variety of possible solutions to the problems of 
acceptance to communication is simplified into four solutions characterized by the 
form action/experience (Luhmann 1975b). The concepts of action and experience – 
which come from the interpretation that Luhmann does of the phenomenology 
 
                                                            
80 In spite of their evident similarities and connections, the differentiation of functional systems and 
the emergence of the symbolically generalized communication media must not be confused, since 
not all the functional systems have these media. 
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earlier and of the action theory of Parsons - are reformulated in Die Gesellschaft der 
Gesellschaft (1997a) within a theory of communication, as communication selections. 
 
It is possible to put the accent of the attribution, either in the information 
(experience) or in the give it-to-know (action). And that is valid for both sides: for 
the one that initiates the communication and for that one who consequently must 
decide on the acceptance or the rejection of communication. If a selection is 
ascribed (no matter by whom) to the system itself, then we are speaking about 
action; if is attributed to its environment, we are speaking about experience. (Luhmann 
1997a: 335)81 
 
In all these cases, it is a question of attributions, internal or external, and applies to 
the selections of communication. The information is perceived as experience, while the 
giving it-to-know [Mitteilung] as action. At the same time, if the selection is attributed to 
the system then it is an action, if instead it is attributed to the environment, then 
experience. Luhmann explains the congruence between its previous actionalists 
concepts and the theory of communication this way. 
 
Table 4 Symbolically Generalized Communication Media: Action and 
Experience 
 
 Ego 
Alter 
 
Experience 
 
Action 
 
Experience 
Ae  Ee 
Truth 
Values 
Ae  Ea 
Love 
 
Action 
Aa  Ee 
Property/Money 
Art 
Aa  Ea 
Power/Law 
 
 
                                                            
81 “Kann der Akzent der Zurechnung entweder auf Information (Erleben) oder auf Mitteilung 
(Handlung) gelegt werden; und dies gilt für beide Seiten: für die, die eine Kommunikation initiiert 
und für die, die daraufhin über (Kommunikation von) Annahme oder Ablehnung zu entscheiden 
hat. Wenn eine Selektion (von wem immer) dem System selbst zugerechnet wird, wollen wir von 
Handlung sprechen, wird sie der Umwelt zugerechnet, von Erleben.” 
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Source: Luhmann (1997a: 336) 
 
The reference problem of the symbolic media ‘law’ is related to the acceptance of a 
selection on by an ego, which demands a respective action by an alter. The acting of 
alter provokes an action of ego. In contrast to truth, which is experienced as mere 
information for alter and ego, power and law demand an action, that is to say a give it-
to-know [Mitteilung] by both systems. 
 
Between this theory of the symbolically generalized communication media as 
attributions of meaning, consolidated in Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997a), and 
the theory of ‘validity’ as symbolically generalized communication media, as it 
appears in Das Recht der der Gesellschaft (1995a), a theoretical gap exist. Nevertheless 
the relations between these two positions can be explained based on two 
interrelated elements. 
 
First, it is clear in this model that normative expectations constitute action 
attributions both for the one who has the expectation and for the one who must 
comply with the expectation. In contrast to cognitive expectations, ego demands alter 
to change its behavior in accordance with a previously determined action scheme. 
 
Second, the attribution of the action by ego and alter is only understood if there is a 
symbolic media, flexible enough to interpret the motives of the action in a 
generalized way and, from it, claim for the correction of the expectation in case of 
disappointment. The validity of legal norms appears here as a central element. 
 
Thus, on the one hand, normative expectation of ego constitutes an action for the 
one who possesses the expectation and against whom compliance is demanded and, 
on the other hand, normative expectations are symbolized in legal validity, since 
they find place inside legal system. 
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Validity constitutes the symbol that represents the unit of the system for the system. 
It is not deduced from a hierarchically superior norm or of latent values, but of the 
proper current operations of the legal system and its internal capacities of linkage. 
The validity of positive law is also contingent validity. It can change according to 
hardly predictable circumstances. Nevertheless, its viability is due precisely to this 
instability. Justice or equality are functionally equivalent symbols to validity, even in 
a system of substantive law (as in the common law) where not previously codified 
objectives are pursued. The consistency of decisions based on previous decisions is 
then based on this validity. 
 
The validity of law constitutes the symbolic media of the system, without excluding 
the use of legal validity by other functional systems, such as the validity of the 
contracts for the economy or the validity of the use of power (Luhmann 1975b; 
1997a). However, from the positivization of law the symbol of validity has value 
only inside the legal system and it is necessary to refer to this when the performance 
of this symbol are required. 
 
2.3.6. Theoretical elements of the regional functional differentiation of law 
 
The theory of functional differentiation of law indicates those aspects that affect the 
system in a universalistic sense. That is, this theory addresses the development of 
systems without considering local or regional specificities. When analyzing the 
differentiation of law in Chile, however, we must explain how we address the 
apparent epistemological obstacle that involves explaining the functional 
differentiation of a social system on a regional level (Luhmann 1997a: 25), and in 
our case, the functional differentiation of a national legal system.  
 
While functional differentiation as a structure of modern society presupposes the 
globalization of functional systems, it does not exclude the formation of regional 
differentiations. In case of law, it assumes neither centralization of decisions, nor the 
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formation of a world State.82 Functional differentiation does not eliminate other 
forms of differentiation as stratification or segmentation and, even in some cases, 
sharpens them or reshapes them in a functional way in the interior of systems (in 
case of the politics, the segmentation in States or in law in the difference between center 
and periphery, jurisprudence/legislation). The diverse constellations of differentiation 
forms are reflected in what has been named “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 
2000, Nassehi 2003a), in which ones particularists accents and special structural 
conditions appear.  
 
If the analysis focuses on the dimensions of meaning we can say that, in the case of 
law, the social dimension and the spatial dimension constitute the most critical 
factors for the explanation of the functional differentiation at the regional level. 
 
The consideration of a possible spatial dimension has always been a controversial 
issue inside system theory. In the original approach of Luhmann this dimension is 
largely absent. The reasons for this absence are not properly explained at a 
theoretical level. For this reason, it is even possible to speculate that it should not be 
due to a theoretical problem but to a mere stated disinterest of Luhmann with regard 
to the space as an aspect of the society. Luhmann himself said this in an interview:  
 
I don’t want to sound categorical and say “I have no interest,” but I’ve always had 
problems with spatial orders. As much as I enjoy being in Brazil and I’m interested 
in its political situation, Brazil as a unit doesn’t interest me at all. Or think about the 
city of Bielefeld, it is not a system. So all spatial or regional units do not interest me 
much. (Niklas Luhmann, In: Hagen 2009: 98)83 
 
                                                            
82 An improbable scenario, according to Albert and Stichweh (2007). 
83 “Ich will nicht apodiktisch ein für allemal „nicht interessieren“ sagen, aber z.B. habe ich immer 
Schwierigkeiten mit räumlichen Ordnungen. So gern ich in Brasilien bin und mich für die 
politischen Verhältnisse dort interessiere, aber Brasilien als Einheit interessiert mich nun wieder 
nicht. Oder nehmen Sie die Stadt Bielefeld, das ist kein System. Also alle räumlichen, 
regionalisierenden Einheiten interessieren mich nicht so sehr.” 
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Stichweh (1998: 344) has pointed out that the omission of the spatial dimension in 
the Luhmann formulation is not explained by clear analytical intentions and that the 
predominance of time over space does not seem theoretically justified. According to 
Stichweh (1998), the idea of a spatial dimension inside the factual or social dimension 
does not solve the problem of this possible dimension. Luhmann only uses the 
concept of space as a medium for the “neurophysiological operation of the brain” for 
the measurement and calculation of the objects (Luhmann 1997b: 179). Space - as 
time - appears like medium and form by means of the distinction place/object (Luhmann 
1997b: 180) and it makes its own invisibility visible by means of the crossing from 
one side to another. 
 
Indeed, it is empirical evidence that not all social systems give the same relevance to 
the spatial distinctions of their communications, and in some cases, these problems 
are derived in organizations; nevertheless the space in modern society can be a 
crucial dimension to understand the differentiation of specific functional systems (cf. 
Kuhm 2000: 334; Stichweh 1998: 347). By means of the distinctions “near/far” and 
“here/there,” space appears in communication (Nassehi 2003: 222) and the central 
problem of this dimension becomes operative in communication and it is used in 
the differentiation. The question is, in short, how space refers to “operational 
limits” of society (Nassehi 2009: 447) and lets a phenomenological dimension of 
space that serves as medium for communication appear. From this distinction, it is 
clear that the problem of the differentiation at spatial level is solved in various ways 
by the functional systems. In the case of law, a usual manner of treating the spatial 
problem is through communication distinctions that point at operational boundaries 
of the system. Semantics as sovereignty, nationality, or jurisdiction84 permits exact 
definitions of spatial limits in the functioning of the system. In this way, and on a 
 
                                                            
84 Parsons tried to relate this idea of “jurisdiction” with a relationship between law and societal 
community, for which the spatial location is very important (cf. Parsons 1965a: 258ff). 
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political level, law is organized under State principles with self-limited powers 
(autonomous) and thus defines its boundaries of organization and application. 
 
In addition to the spatial dimension, the social dimension of meaning is of great 
interest for the differentiation process. It can be observed that, in modern society, it 
is possible for law to connect with politics through these two dimensions of 
meaning. Both law and politics as functional systems are at the factual and temporal 
level separated by its functions, but at spatial and social level, they are coupled. This 
coupling occurs in the spatial delimitation of a territory for the law and in the social 
delimitation of a collective for the politic. Armin Nassehi (2009: 333) has noted out that 
politics “visibilizes a collective” in the social dimension, an idea that emerges from 
the concept of politics of Luhmann. Indeed, Luhmann adopts from Parsons, almost 
without modifications, the symbolic media of the political power, that is to say, the 
media that produces “collectively” binding decisions (Parsons 1963, 1964). The idea 
of ‘collective’ appears almost without discussion in the formulations of Luhmann 
although it has a decisive importance to understand the configuration of politics in 
the social dimension of meaning. It is possible that in the adaptation of Luhmann of 
the symbolically generalized media of power from Parsons, (who had himself 
developed theoretical formulations about the concept of collective) this concept has 
been not further developed. 
 
While at the factual and temporal level there are also couplings (for example in the 
political constitutions or in the rules of administration) in both directions, social and 
spatial, the differentiation of law and politics are visible and they have marked 
empirical effects. Following this perspective, it is necessary to have a complementary 
perspective in which law is considered as a social system factually and temporarily 
mundialized, but also as a social system that demarcates territories and collectives in its 
communications and specific decisions, in order to observe the differentiation of 
law in Chile. 
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For this reason, the problem of regional functional differentiation cannot be 
reduced to a spatial problem only. The regions of the world are, as Japp writes it 
(2007: 186): “units of social communication that refer to region-specific links in the 
context of global functional differentiation and (with different relevance) to 
territoriality.”85 This is why particular importance should be given to the social 
character of the regions and their role in functional differentiation. 
 
In the case of law the “segmentary differentiation” of politics in States is of vital 
importance (Stichweh 1990: 259). This has implications for the development of law, 
which also adopts this form of differentiation. In contrast to science and economy, 
which adopt a wider social and spatial generalization, politics, education, and law are 
segmentarily differentiated in regions (Stichweh 1990: 260). As we have indicated, 
the relation between law and politics results from vital relevance and helps to 
understand the differentiation of the legal system at regional level. This applies not 
only to the Latin-American region, but also to the differentiation of the European 
law. As noted by Stichweh (1991: 381): “The emergence of modern legal systems is 
accomplished through national differentiation of European common law (ius commune).”86  
 
Hereinafter we will try to recompose the differentiation of the Chilean legal system 
from this regional perspective and will try to clarify the particular ways in which this 
process occurs. For this, we must analyze the concepts of “differentiation” and 
“evolution” and then test their applications on the specific regional context of Chile. 
 
 
 
                                                            
85 “Einheiten gesellschaftlicher Kommunikation, die auf regionsspezifische Verknüpfungen im 
Kontext globaler Funktionsdifferenzierung und (mit unterschiedlicher Relevanz) auf Territorialität 
referieren.” 
86 “Diese Entstehung moderner Rechtssysteme vollzieht sich durch nationale Differenzierung des 
europäischen Gemeinrechts (ius commune).” 
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3. SYSTEMIC DIFFERENTIATION  
 
Among the wide range of conceptions on differentiation, the present work has 
chosen the systemic version of the theory of differentiation developed by Niklas 
Luhmann. The substantiation for this approach stems from the fact that the interest 
of the present work is to observe the differentiation of a social system, and in this 
approach such provides the most developed and suitable conceptual tools for such 
analysis. However, various dialogues with other theoretical currents in way of 
enriching the future reflections will be developed in the course of the present text. 
 
In this sense, this work joins an old tradition of sociological studies on system 
differentiation. The theory of differentiation is characterized by a large “theoretical 
family” (Tyrell 1998: 119) whose diversity, coherences, and conflicts are difficult to 
summarize. The concept of differentiation is one of the classic concepts in social 
theory and it has been used for various purposes: to understand the “social 
evolution” from its purely formal aspects (Spencer 1912); to describe the moral 
consequences of the growing “division of labor” in the emerging industrial society 
(Durkheim 2001); to understand the expression of the phenomenon of the 
“individualization” (Simmel 1992); or also the “spheres of value” in the rational 
capitalism (Weber 1922a); up to the “functional specialization” of action systems 
(Parsons 1961a). In all these cases a common diagnosis appears: “the process of 
social modernization as differentiation process is described” (Nassehi 1999: 12). There 
are several problems associated with the differentiation theory since, in spite of its 
stage of development, it is still subject to debates and discussions (cf. Nassehi 1999; 
2004; Schimank 1985; 2000; 2005; Schwinn 2004; Schwinn et al. 2011; Tyrell 1978; 
1998; 2008).  
 
The differentiation concept is present both in the studies on the “factual” [sachlich] 
differentiation of law in Max Weber (1922a: 386ff.), as in the theory of the social 
division of labor “symbolized” in the law (Durkheim 2001), and in the approach of 
Parsons to institutional differentiation of law as a mechanism of social “control” 
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and “integration” (Parsons 1961a; 1962; 1971; 1977). In Luhmann, for his part, the 
law appears like a mechanism for the treatment of normative expectations 
(Luhmann 1995a; 1987). We will delve into each of these theories later. 
 
The systemic tradition refers to system differentiation as a universal process at a 
formal level. This universalism is staring into the analysis of the social organism of 
Spencer (1912) and in the division of labor in Durkheim (2001), as well as in the 
analysis of action systems of Parsons (1961a). It was only in the mid-1960s, with the 
development of the structural-functionalism in the USA by Parsons’ followers, that 
a set of questions concerning to the way of observation of system differentiation 
from a regional perspective opened. These reflections were built around of the 
concept of “modernization” (cf. Parsons 1966; 1971; Eisenstadt 1964; 1974) and in 
this scenario, the theory of system differentiation was opened for the first time to interpretations 
concerning to the nature of differentiation under specific regional conditions. Thanks to this 
opening, not only the emergence of the first reflections on the modernization in 
Latin America but also the debate on how to make politically viable this process was 
made possible (cf. Germani 1969, Cardoso & Faletto 1969). 
 
Since our theoretical reconstruction recognize that the differentiation concept has a 
central role, a theoretical clarification of this concept becomes necessary before 
initiating a discussion on the specific topic of the law regarding the regional 
differentiation in Chile. 
 
3.1. Differentiation and Evolution 
 
The theory of differentiation is located at the core of social systems theory. The way 
system differentiation is addressed varies according to the different development 
phases of the system theory. In the phase of self-referring systems (Luhmann) the 
analysis of the concept of system differentiation is characterized by a – in a certain 
way – cryptic sentence: “[s]ystem differentiation is nothing more than the repetition 
within systems of the difference between system and environment” (Luhmann 
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1991a: 22), i.e., the system differentiation would be an iterative process of 
distinction operations between system and environment within a system. Hence, the 
theory of system differentiation, in Luhmann’s words, would replace the old idea of 
the specialization of “parts” of a system with a differentiation of “systems” 
(Luhmann 1990a: 416ff.). This characterizes the “paradigm change” in “Soziale 
Systeme” (1991a) and is perhaps the most common starting point in understanding 
the problem of social systems differentiation. 
 
Nevertheless, any attempt for a theoretical construction towards a theory of systems 
differentiation under this situation immediately collides with problems of 
understanding from an analytical point of view. How can differentiation process at 
the empirical level in a temporal perspective be understood? Do all communication 
processes entail differentiation? How can the formation of social systems from this 
basic operation be distinguished? Is differentiation slightly different from evolution? 
These questions do not find a simple answer from the elegant theorem of the 
iteration of the distinction system/environment within the system. That is why a 
reconstruction (deconstruction?) of the concept of differentiation of social systems 
is necessary in order to respond to those questions. 
 
Even if one considers that Luhmann’s assertion that before “Soziale Systeme” 
everything previous is just a theoretical “prototype” [null-series] is sufficient (Baecker 
& Stanitzek 1987: 142) and thereon starts the theoretical reflections, it is however 
entirely plausible to argue that the concepts of social system and system 
differentiation remain, in some core aspects, relatively constant in spite of the 
changes that Luhmann system theory has experienced over three decades. Hence, 
system differentiation concept deserves to be studied against the background of its 
own differentiation. Paradoxically, differentiation is akin to recognizing a self-
inclusive process.  
 
The social system concept was initially conceived by Luhmann within the 
framework of a theory of action systems, inspired by Parsons and with a marked 
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influence of the phenomenological concept of meaning. The system concept 
concerns human actions, which in their reciprocal relationship allow distinguishing 
an inside from an outside, and from there, it differentiates a system of an environment. 
The point of interest is a relational problem, as well as the way in which that 
problem evolves and moves to another state. 
 
Here, social system should be understood as a context of meaning from social 
actions, which refer each other and make a frontier from an environment of no-
related actions. (Luhmann 1974b: 115)87 
 
Social systems emerge as a result of the construction of a problem of meaning, derived 
from human actions that have reference to other human actions and can be 
addressed from a functional point of view, i.e., by selecting alternatives (Luhmann 
1974a: 35). Since no person has full access to the world, no one can entirely 
experience it or act upon it in all its dimensions. Therefore, is impossible to reduce 
the world complexity for his/her whole understanding; instead, one must resort to 
actions and experiences of others (Luhmann 1974b: 126). The paradigmatic example 
of this situation is the so-called “double contingency,” that is to say, the mutual and 
daily understanding or uncertainty between two persons, which is solved by 
expectations formations, for instance through a process of “self-selection” 
(Luhmann 1975a: 9f) or “autocatalysis” of selections (Luhmann 1981a: 14f), which 
has its origin and connection capacity only in social systems. 
 
Hence, constitutive problems of social systems can simply be topics to choose from 
in the frugality of an interaction, the membership or non- membership in an 
organization, or the resolution of generalized problems of reference, as an 
acceptance of money, the legitimacy of power, the validity of a normative 
 
                                                            
87 “Unter sozialem System soll hier ein Sinnzusammenhang von sozialen Handlungen verstanden 
werden, die aufeinander verweisen und sich von einer Umwelt nicht dazugehöriger Handlungen 
abgrenzen lassen.” 
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expectation, or the reciprocity of the love, among others. In other words, these are 
problems in interactions, or of organizations, or problems at the level of the 
differentiation of functional systems (Luhmann 1975a). 
 
Since these problems and the pressure to select arise from human actions that are 
related to the actions of others, difficulties relative to the handling of uncertainty 
appear: of allocation, motivation, and of temporality. This situation is summarized 
in the concept of complexity. By function, social systems, says Luhmann, have the 
treatment and reduction of complexity (Luhmann 1974b: 116), both internal and 
external. The concept of complexity includes both the number of possible relations, 
and the potential simultaneity of them in the system. Social systems, as relations 
between actions referred to in specific problems, must choose alternatives and, thus, 
operate selectively and build structures. The environment opens a horizon of 
possible selections that exceeds the current and concrete operations of system 
events. Hence, Luhmann points out that social systems are always less complex than 
their environments (Luhmann 1975a: 9). 
 
System differentiation in itself sends in general terms to the problem of the 
treatment of the complexity. Given the temporal character of the social system 
operations, these can only keep on operating when they are internally differentiated, 
in a certain threshold (Luhmann 1974b: 123). That is, differentiation is triggered as a 
result of this type of problems, for which internal selections have to be settled and 
specific structures have to be stabilized. This way, every new system establishes 
differences and generates specific autonomies. 
 
In short: social systems emerge on the basis of reference problems; they form and 
stabilize structures (i.e. expectations) for reduction of complexity. These systems 
distinguish a world of differentiated meaning, which selectively directs attention to 
new and changing events.  
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The change from a theory of action towards a theory of communication happens 
gradually and is visible both in the works of Parsons and Luhmann. In the former, it 
is observed in the increasing relevance that the theory of the Symbolic Media of 
Exchange acquired, as money and power, which appear as communication media 
(Parsons 1961a: 66ff.; 1966: 20ff.). For Luhmann, the relativization of the concept 
of action first occurs in the postulate that social systems should be treated like 
systems of action only at empirical level (Luhmann 1974a: 39), since they make their 
selections visible this way. In the middle of the 1970s, the importance of 
communication is clearly outlined. 
 
As soon as communication takes place among persons, emerge social systems; since 
with each communication begins a story by interrelated selections differentiated, 
realizing only some of many possibilities. (Luhmann 1975a: 9)88 
 
This transition towards communication as the central element of social systems was 
consolidated along with the adoption of the concept of “autopoiesis” (Luhmann 
1982) and is finally synthesized in “Soziale Systeme” (1991a).89 In this monograph, 
social systems are understood as “self-referential systems:” “there are systems that 
have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate these 
relations from relations with their environment” (Luhmann 1991a: 31). Such 
systems can not only (and in some cases they don’t have another alternative) orient 
their operations towards themselves and determine their own constraints from this, 
 
                                                            
88 “Sobald überhaupt Kommunikation unter Menschen stattfindet, entstehen soziale Systeme; denn 
mit jeder Kommunikation beginnt eine Geschichte, die durch aufeinander bezogene Selektionen 
sich ausdifferenziert, indem sie nur einige von vielen Möglichkeiten realisiert.” 
89 Rudolf Stichweh (2000:7) explains it from his own experience: “I remember well that in the late 
1970s/early 1980s Luhmann repeatedly said in lectures and seminars that he did not yet know how 
to take a major theoretical decision: if one looks for the constitutive elements of social systems, 
which is the best candidate for element status, actions or communications? Some years later in 
Soziale Systeme from 1984, the decision is taken. Systems theory is reformulated as 
communications theory, with the concept of action relegated to a secondary status.”  
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but also produce themselves in an autopoietic way. Social systems not only maintain 
its character as distinction but that character is radicalized as a central aspect of a 
system. A system is, then, a distinction between system and environment. 
 
Despite this reformulation of the theory of social systems as communication theory, 
the concept of action is still present throughout the whole development of the 
theory, albeit with different emphasis, sometimes with important variations, and 
sometimes with scarce changes. An example of this is the analysis of the 
phenomenological problem of attribution between action/experience [handeln/erleben]. 
The analysis of this duality does not suffer major alterations from its initial 
formulation (Luhmann 1981b) up to its appearance in the final synthesis “Die 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft” (1997a: 316ff).90 This occurs parallel to the transition 
from phenomenology towards cybernetics. In this transit, the old notion of 
system/environment based on a phenomenological concept of meaning also 
acquires an additional abstract formalism with the introduction of the calculus of the 
form of George Spencer-Brown (1979) and the ideas of the radical constructivism.  
 
Behind this accumulative character of the theory, so to speak, where changes of 
emphasis and conceptual development take place, lies a core of basal reflections. 
Without claiming to be exhaustive: reflexivity, the observer, system as a difference, 
function, temporalization of social structures, the problem of social order, 
evolution, and differentiation, are permanent topics, which acquire greater depth 
and sophistication over the years. Next we will explore two of these concepts in 
 
                                                            
90 Something similar happens with the concept of “collective” that appears in the description of the 
political system. Luhmann adopts almost unchanged the symbolic media of political power from 
Parsons, i.e. producing “collective binding decisions” (Parsons 1963, 1964). The idea of collective 
discussion appears virtually without discussion in Luhmann formulations, although it has an 
importance that is decisive in understanding the configuration of the politics in the social 
dimension of meaning. It is possible that, in Luhmann’s adaptation of the symbolically generalized 
media of power from Parsons (who had developed theoretical formulations about the concept of 
collective), this concept has stayed without later revision (cf. Luhmann 2002). 
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order to clarify the characteristics of the system differentiation. We refer to the 
concepts of differentiation and evolution. 
 
Although, in his last writings, Luhmann concedes a similar conceptual status to 
differentiation and evolution as part of the study of social change, which appears already 
clearly in his lessons on “Theory of Society” at the early nineties (cf. Luhmann 
2005) and also in the separate chapters covering each concept in “Die Gesellschaft 
der Gesellschaft” (1997a), it is possible to observe, as Stichweh states, that systems 
theory usually faces the problem of social change by means of the “differentiation” 
concept – especially with regard to those changes that take place in the modern 
society – and only secondarily by means of the “evolution” concept (Stichweh 
2007b: 529ff.). This asymmetric situation is a part of a long relation between both 
concepts. Indeed, the concepts of evolution and system differentiation in their 
origins have a relation of interdependence that is relevant to highlight. 
 
In its initial formulation, the concept of system differentiation describes only a part 
of the evolutionary process. In terms of an explanation of social change, system 
differentiation is subordinated to social evolution. We will support that it is possible to 
maintain this distinction in so far as it allows locating system differentiation inside a 
theory of social change with a wider scope and, simultaneously, allows clarifying 
differences between both concepts. This subordination is not largely altered in the 
development of the evolution theory itself, but it remains present, as we shall see 
below. 
 
Evolution, in a systemic perspective, refers to the structural changes arising from 
historical relations of processes of variation, selection, and stabilization (Luhmann 
1976a: 286). Evolution is described as a “specific mechanism of structural change” 
(Luhmann 1981c: 184), which consists on differentiation and reintegration of 
variation, selection and stabilization functions. This means that not all social change 
redounds to an evolutionary change, but only those structural changes that can be 
described as a stabilization of a selected variation. These three functions operationally 
 
 
112 
 
come into play in a circular way, i.e., the distinction between the three moments 
corresponds to an analytical judgment. As Luhmann indicates, the variation 
corresponds to a possible selection inside a social system; such variation can be 
selected and only at that point opens the question of whether and how the system 
stabilizes the selection. 
 
The variation produces, however it operates empirically, a difference, i.e. a 
deviation in contrast to the hitherto usual. This difference forces a selection -for or 
against the innovation. The selection in turn forces, in choosing the new, cascades 
of adjustment or delimitation movements within the system, and when it leaves 
things as they were, it needs confirmations of this operation, because that 
heretofore taken for granted has become contingent. (Luhmann 1997a: 451)91 
 
In its early writings on evolution Luhmann identifies a particular evolutionary 
acquisition for each of these functions. For “variation,” the emergency of 
“language” and with it the possibility to refuse an offer of selection; for “selection,” 
the emergency of “symbolically generalized communication media,” which make the 
success of a selection probable by means of meaning generalizations; and for 
“stabilization,” he identifies the “differentiation of social systems,” since it is only 
after the formation of systems that the reproducibility of successful selections in a 
stabilized structure is made possible (Luhmann 1976a: 286ff; 1981c: 185ff.). This 
specific function of systems differentiation will remain present up to “Die 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft” (1997a) through the implicit description of 
stabilization as a demand of “self-organization” of social systems (Luhmann 1997a: 
427) and through the explicit consideration of stabilization by means of social 
systems differentiation. 
 
                                                            
91 “Die Variation erzeugt, wie immer sie empirisch operiert, eine Differenz, nämlich im Unterschied 
zum bisher Üblichen eine Abweichung. Diese Differenz erzwingt eine Selektion - gegen oder für 
die Innovation. Die Selektion wiederum erzwingt, wenn sie das Neue wählt, Kaskaden von 
Anpassungs- oder Abgrenzungsbewegungen im System, und, wenn sie es beim Alten beläßt, 
Bestätigungen für diese Option, da das vordem Selbstverständliche kontingent geworden ist.” 
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During the later evolution of society, restabilization function moves increasingly to 
partial systems of society, which have to steady themselves in the internal 
environment of society. It is a question, ultimately, of the problem of sustainability 
of systemic differentiation of society. (Luhmann 1997a: 455)92 
 
Connectivity of selections is, by means of system differentiation, made probable. 
System differentiation, thus, is linked as an evolutionary process with a special 
function. In this way, it can be understood that the evolution of partial systems of 
society were made possible only by means of systems differentiation, since it was 
only in this situation the three evolutionary functions (variation, selection, and 
restabilization) are already differentiated (Luhmann 1997a: 557). 
 
System differentiation particularly addresses an evolutionary problem, namely the 
problem of restabilization of evolutionary selections. Nevertheless, this has led us only by the 
path of differentiation of functional systems, which is a particular segment of the 
systems differentiation theory; and, therefore, it becomes necessary to clarify the 
process of differentiation of levels, i.e., differentiation of society in systems of 
interaction, organizations and society. 
 
This systemic differentiation of levels is also part of the process of social evolution. 
 
The socio-cultural evolution can be described as an increasing differentiation of 
levels on which interactions, organizations and social systems are formed. 
Considering firstly the start and end points of this development: In the simplest 
 
                                                            
92 “Im weiteren Verlauf der gesellschaftlichen Evolution verlagert die Restabilisierungsfunktion sich 
dann mehr und mehr auf Teilsysteme der Gesellschaft, die sich in der innergesellschaftlichen 
Umwelt zu bewähren haben. Dann geht es letztlich um das Problem der Haltbarkeit 
gesellschaftlicher Systemdifferenzierung.” 
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archaic social formations, interactions, organizations and society are almost 
identical. (1975a: 13)93 
 
Each of these systems is formed around diverse reference problems. Interactions are 
formed concerning the problem of double contingency that develops in the presence 
of actors (Luhmann 1975a: 10; 1997a: 814). It is about social systems supported 
through performing face-to-face relations and by changes in communication topics. 
 
Society, for his part, corresponds to all possible communications or in the actionalist 
terminology of the early Luhmann, to the “encompassing system of all 
communicational reachable actions” (Luhmann 1975a: 11). Unlike interactions, 
society reference problem is not presence, but the availability of communication at 
the transversal level. Although it includes organizations and interactions, it is a 
system of a different type, which does not serve as a model for the formation of the 
others. Not all social systems are constructed like social system society. Neither 
interactions nor organizations share the wide boundaries of society, but they built 
their own borders of meaning. Differentiation of social systems, as we have seen 
until now, refers to this systemic level. 
 
Organizations, finally, arise around the problem of functional membership to certain 
systems (Luhmann 1975a: 12; 1997a: 829). Organizations problematize membership 
and they maintain themselves by means of autopoietic reproduction of decisions 
(Luhmann 1997a: 830). In contrast to the system of society and interactions, 
organizations do not constitute a universal phenomenon but a special evolutionary 
acquisition (Luhmann 1997a: 827). For this reason, organizations mark a special 
 
                                                            
93 “Man kann die soziokulturelle Evolution beschreiben als zunehmende Differenzierung der 
Ebenen, auf denen sich Interaktionssysteme, Organisationssysteme und Gesellschaftssysteme 
bilden. Betrachten wir zunächst die Anfangs- und Endpunkte dieser Entwicklung: In den 
einfachsten archaischen Gesellschaftsformationen sind Interaktion, Organisation und Gesellschaft 
nahezu identisch” 
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type of differentiation that distinguishes itself from the system of society and of 
interactions, which in turn are present from the earliest forms of differentiation.  
 
We have already drawn up the coordinates in which the differentiation of social 
systems is located; therefore it is possible to build problems in a different level of 
complexity. Having made these clarifications with regard to interactions, 
organizations, and society, the problem of differentiation of functional systems can 
finally be addressed. With regard to this subject, the possibilities of system 
formation are limited, according to Luhmann, to certain “forms of differentiation” 
(1977: 32ff; 1997a: 609ff.), which allow for the way in which the evolution of society 
occurs at level of the coordination and reciprocal observation of their functional 
systems to be described.  
 
3.2. Forms of Differentiation 
 
Unlike the differentiation concept of the old systemic tradition, which goes back 
from Spencer up to Parsons, Luhmann points out that differentiation is not 
intended to meet needs of a system in order to adapt it to an environment, but it 
occurs in a system from its own structural determinations, which – in the case of 
social systems – corresponds to communication as a particular operation (1991a: 
60ff). The concept of function itself can no longer be subordinated to a structure that 
should be maintained thanks to the performance of functions (1974b: 114f). This 
concept does not have a structural determination, but it is based on the comparison 
of causally arranged alternatives with respect to a “reference problem” (Luhmann 
1974c). Consequently, functional differentiation lacks an environmental 
determinism and rather refers to an internal systemic process. Hence, differentiation 
appears as a disjunctive process that tends to generate differences, which are 
reproduced from event to event, from operation to operation. 
 
Society is understood as a communication system, which reproduces itself in an 
autopoietic way, regardless of who or what is attributed as the cause or origin of 
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communication, i.e., “Communications construct, when they reproduce themselves 
autopoietically by recursions, an emerging sui generis reality. Humans cannot 
communicate, only communication can communicate” (Luhmann 1997a: 105).94 
Differentiation occurs at the level of communications and at this level, the 
differentiating character of these operations appears in a dramatic way. This means, 
of course, that the iteration of the difference system/environment inside social 
systems (Luhmann 1991a: 22) takes place only through communication (Luhmann 
1991a: 210). It is by means of communication and concatenation of successive 
communications that differentiations in social systems occur and, simultaneously, a 
combination of dependences and independences.  
 
Therefore one can also describe the differentiation of a system as an increase in 
sensitivity for what has been determined (what is capable of being connected 
internally) and an increase of insensitivity for everything else –that is an increase in 
dependence and independence at once. (Luhmann 1991a: 250)95 
 
Modern society is understood under the primacy of functional differentiation, which 
consists of functional specification of social communication concerning specific 
problems (Luhmann 1997a: 707ff). In terms of dimensions of meaning, functional 
differentiation means, at factual [sachlich] level, the specification of problems of reference 
in autonomous functional systems and the freedom to select solutions in comparison to 
others, in a certain contingent way; at social level, it implies both the emergence of 
symbolically generalized communications media in order to generalize acceptance of 
communicational offers and generalized inclusion in functional systems; at temporal 
 
                                                            
94 “Kommunikationen bilden, wenn autopoietisch durch Rekursionen reproduziert, eine emergente 
Realität sui genesis. Nicht der Mensch kann kommunizieren, nur die Kommunikation kann 
kommunizieren.” 
95 “Deshalb kann man die Ausdifferenzierung eines Systems auch beschreiben als Steigerung der 
Sensibilität für Bestimmtes (intern Anschlußfähiges) und Steigerung der Insensibilität für alles 
übrige –also Steigerung von Abhängigkeit und von Unabhängigkeit zugleich.” 
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level, it implies diversification of temporalities in various social systems and the 
problem of synchronization of these temporalities.  
 
Although differentiation is at the core of communication operations, the thesis of 
an increasing differentiation of systems as central tendency – a common reproach to 
differentiation theory from Spencer up to Parsons –should be discarded, since 
differentiation produces different forms only in certain occasions. For this reason, 
Luhmann argues that the idea of increasing differentiation should be subordinated 
by the thesis of the “change in the forms of differentiation” (Luhmann 1997a: 615), 
which indicates a change at general level. 
 
The concept of form of differentiation refers to two interlaced phenomena. On the one 
hand, it is a question of how different social systems are “coordinated” between 
themselves (Luhmann 1997a: 609) and, secondly, of the way in which partial 
systems observe themselves and other partial systems as partial systems (Luhmann 
1997a: 610). In both cases, it is a problem of the general order of society and of the 
type of relations that are considered fundamental. 
 
There are four96 forms of differentiation that have arisen evolutionarily: 
segmentation, stratification, center/periphery, and functional differentiation. These 
forms of differentiation are based on the combination of two dualities, namely: 
system/environment and equality/inequality (Luhmann 1977:33). Based on these two 
dualities, or forms of two sides (Spencer-Brown 1979), the differentiation theory 
derives these four forms: 
 
 
 
                                                            
96 Luhmann adds a fifth form of differentiation “conform/discrepant (official/non-official, 
formal/informal)” (Luhmann 1991a: 260-261), which however does not develop later. In his early 
works, Luhmann distinguishes only segmentation and functional differentiation, closely following 
Durkheim (Luhmann 1974d: 148ff).  
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Table 5 Forms of Differentiation based on Equality/Inequality 
 
Form of differentiation Equality Inequality 
Segmentary Society Equality inside the 
system 
Inequality to the 
environment (other 
societies) 
Stratified Society Equality in the high 
strata of the system 
Inequality to the low 
strata of the system 
Center/Periphery 
Society 
Equality in the center 
of the system 
Inequality to the 
periphery of the system 
Functional 
Differentiated Society 
Equality of access to 
the social systems 
Inequality among each 
system (functional) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Luhmann (1977) 
 
Segmentary societies are based on the principle of equality, usually focused on 
kinship and lacking a major specialization. Its evolutionary catalysts were wars, 
economic diversification, or internal stratification based on kinship units (Luhmann 
1997a: 657). 
 
Societies differentiated by stratification or center and periphery, for their part, are 
organized by inequality as regulating principle (Luhmann 1997a: 680). The symmetry 
system/environment aligns with equality/inequality, namely that equality is the 
normal situation of communication in a social system (i.e. center or summit of 
society), while inequality prevails in communication with the environment. In this 
society, the problem of distribution and “social justification” of inequality arise.97  
 
A functionally differentiated society is the differentiation form of modern society. In 
this society, communication systems that are responsible to treat problems of 
generalized social relevance emerge. Thus, a political system differentiates itself 
concerning the problem of “collectively binding decisions” (Luhmann 2002), an 
economic system focused on the problem of “scarcity” (Luhmann 1994), a legal 
system with regard to “normative expectations” (Luhmann 1995a), etc. Each 
 
                                                            
97 It is interesting that for Parsons, stratification legitimizes inequality and this left precisely the 
contrary as a problem, i.e., the justification of equality (see Parsons 1977: 327). 
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communication system treats their problems in an autonomous and operationally 
closed way. In a social dimension system, differentiation manifests itself first as a 
differentiation of complementary roles (Luhmann 1976a: 291) and later in the factual 
form from symbolically generalized communications media and codes and programs 
in the system. In the temporal dimension, different temporalities to each different 
system appear. 
 
In this form of differentiation, the duality equality/inequality is treated in society, 
through the consideration of functions of each partial system, as unequal, but of 
equal access. Functional systems have to be, therefore, considered unequal (as long 
as their functions are unequal), but their environments have to be taken into 
account as equals (as social systems) (Luhmann 1977: 36). 
 
Functional differentiation emphasizes therefore, as a form of social differentiation, 
inequality of functional systems. But in this inequality they are equals. This means 
that the entire system waives any requirement of an order of the relationship (for 
example, rank order) between functional systems. (Luhmann 1997a: 746)98 
 
Functional differentiation then becomes the specific form of differentiation of 
modern society, which does not imply the replacement of the other forms, but only 
the loss of their primacy in the form of social differentiation. Stratification, class 
differences, differentiation between center, and periphery are maintained but remain 
in a “secondary” position with regard to functional differentiation (Luhmann 1997a: 
612). In this analysis, it can be observed that system differentiation refers to a change in 
the way of coordinations between systems and their self-observations. At this 
general level, the forms of differentiation are also evolutionary acquisitions, which have 
been structurally stabilized. Between these acquisitions, functional differentiation 
 
                                                            
98 “Als Form gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung betont funktionale Differenzierung mithin die 
Ungleichheit der Funktionssysteme. Aber in dieser Ungleichheit sind sie gleich. Das heißt: das 
Gesamtsystem verzichtet auf jede Vorgabe einer Ordnung (zum Beispiel: Rangordnung) der 
Beziehung zwischen den Funktionssystemen.” 
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appears as the last form of differentiation, but this does not exclude other possible 
forms of differentiation in the future (Luhmann 1997a: 614).  
 
This formal analysis of differentiation can have an empirical turn with the change in 
focus, from the basal equality/inequality situation towards the empirical situation of 
inclusion/exclusion. As it is well known, the inclusion/exclusion concept appears in 
the late theoretical formulations of Luhmann as result of his observations of the 
caste system of India and the favelas in Brasil and, at the same time, of their own 
doubts about the universality of differentiation theory.99 
 
Inclusion/exclusion concept refers, on the one hand, to the form in which 
individuals are considered as “persons” in communication (Luhmann 1995c: 241) 
and, in parallel, refers to the multiple dangers caused by overloading concepts like 
“functional differentiation,” “class society,” or “stratification” in developing regions, 
or where a dual situation of institutional modernization along with a big inequality 
would persist (Luhmann 1995c: 238). 
 
It is possible to say that in the late formulations of Luhmann about forms of 
differentiation, the equality/inequality concept is displaced by the inclusion/exclusion 
concept. It seems to be only a change of terms between equality and inclusion when it 
is stated, with regard to segmentary societies, that inclusion occurs in the segments of 
society (communities of family and residence) or that, in a stratified society, inclusion 
is given through membership to a caste, class, i.e., certain strata, which closes itself 
by means of inclusion/exclusion (using rules of inbreeding) (Luhmann 1995c: 
242ff).  
 
 
                                                            
99 The concept of inclusion was initially formulated by Parsons as part of the processes of social 
change, among which the differentiation, adaptive upgrading, inclusion, and value generalization appear 
(Parsons 1971: 26). Luhmann apparently refers to this concept for the first time in 1976 in the 
context of the theory of evolution (see Luhmann 1976a: 303). 
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Nevertheless, in the special case of functional differentiation, , this transposition 
does not seem equally plausible, as we shall see. 
 
Table 6 Forms of Differentiation based on Inclusion/Exclusion 
 
Form of differentiation Inclusion Exclusion 
Segmentary Society Inclusion inside the 
system 
Exclusion of the 
environment (other 
societies) 
Stratified Society Inclusion in the high 
strata of the system 
Exclusion of the low 
strata of the system 
Center/Periphery 
Society 
Inclusion in the center 
of the system 
Exclusion of the 
periphery of the system 
Functional 
Differentiated Society 
Inclusion in each 
partial system 
Exclusion from each 
partial system 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Luhmann (1995c) 
 
In the form of functional differentiation, the inclusion concept does not seem to 
simply the replacement of equality. Indeed, the postulate concerning “equal access” 
to functional systems (Luhmann 1977:36), does not seem comparable to “total 
inclusion” (Luhmann 1997a: 630), since the theoretical situation of equal access 
corresponds to a structural condition of any functional system (there are no social 
barriers for the use of money, to have political power, to believe in gods, to 
appreciate art, to claim love or to initiate a trial, etc.), which does not mean a total 
inclusion, which implies in turn an effective participation in systems. In other words, an 
abyss is opened between the initial postulate of formal equality of access to 
functional systems and the empirical inclusion in differentiated functional systems. 
Over this abyss in the theory of differentiation, we will stretch a bridge with some 
guidelines to understand functional differentiation in Chile. 
 
This previous assessment about the inclusion/exclusion concept in the forms of 
differentiation does not only constitute a theoretical curiosity or a mere coincidence 
without consequences. This change implies questions on the universality of 
functional differentiation at operational level and is of utmost importance for a 
regional observation of differentiation.  
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If we consider the basic postulate of equality of access to functional systems, then 
universality of functional differentiation as a structural assumption of differentiation 
seems unquestionable. If instead we replace equality by inclusion in functional 
systems, this universality is quite unclear. System theory itself has made these 
questions on universality of functional differentiation visible. Luhmann indicates in 
some of his writings in the 90’s that functional differentiation does not constitute a 
necessary condition of the evolutionary development of society, but this would 
rather be a sort of “European anomaly” (Luhmann 1995a: 586),100 a form of 
differentiation that has emerged only once in Europe and from there spread to the 
rest of the world (Luhmann 1993a: 27): “All in all, it is no wonder that only in Europe 
has occurred the change on social systems towards primacy of functional 
differentiation” (Luhmann 1997a: 683, emphasis supplied).101 
 
In the analysis on the concept of inclusion/inclusion as “supercode” in 
underdeveloped or developing regions (Luhmann 1995c: 260) and in the reflections 
on southern Italy (Luhmann 1995b), this questioning on universality of functional 
differentiation appears clearly. Inclusion/exclusion concept is, in my view, the key 
to give functional differentiation not only a theoretical-formal character but also a 
historical referent, enabling, for example, functional differentiation to be located in 
the horizon that begins in Europe of 18th century, which then spreads to the rest of 
the world and extends up to the present (Luhmann 1997a: 734). 
 
Precisely, these two phenomena, namely the regional character of functional differentiation 
and the diffusion of forms of differentiation, allow the contextualization of the reflection 
about the differentiation of legal system in Chile, which not only deals with an 
analysis of the emergence of a functional system in a universal sense, but is also 
 
                                                            
100“europäische Anomalie” 
101 “Alles in allem ist es also kein Wunder, daß sich nur in Europa die Umstellung des 
Gesellschaftssystems auf einen Primat funktionaler Differenzierung ereignet hat.” 
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devoted to the study of extra-European regional forms of differentiation. This allows 
the mentioning of, within the context of the discussion on “multiple modernities” 
(Eisenstadt 2000, Nassehi 2003), a peripheral modernity, which has structural 
differences from central European modernity. 
 
Up to this point, we have elucidated the central elements of our analysis, i.e., the 
theoretical foundations of the systemic approach, the difference between evolution 
and differentiation, and the connection points to theories of differentiation with 
regional emphasis. We will return next to the issue of regional functional 
differentiation in Chile, in the regional context of Latin America.  
 
3.3. Functional Differentiation in Chile  
 
Latin-American sociology was constructed, concerning the reflection of modern 
society like a foreign imposition. In this region, modernity acquires a surname, it is a 
“Latin-American modernity” (Larraín 1997; Mascareño 2010) or a “peripheral 
modernity” (Robles 2005; Neves 1992; Brunner 2001; Sarlo 1988),102 usually 
expressing discomfort (Martin Barbero 2003). This position is ancient in Latin-
American sociology and virtually covers the entire discipline. In thick terms, it refers 
to the constitution of the modernity in the countries of the region by means of 
diffusion processes from Europe and the United States. In various sociological 
trends, this idea is not only a part of a diagnosis of modernization at comparative 
level, but also a criticism of the way in which this modernization process has been 
planned and conducted. For the Dependence Theory inspired in Marx, for example, the 
condition of periphery came due to economic subordination of Latin-American 
countries to European or North American capitalist centers (Cardoso & Faletto 
1969).103 A similar thesis relative to this problematic status of periphery can be 
 
                                                            
102 Supported by Luhmann himself, see the introduction made by Luhmann to the book of Neves 
(1992). 
103 A thesis that is certainly parallel to that of “world system” of Wallerstein (1974). 
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founded in Functionalist (Germani 1969) and Culturalist analyses (Brunner 2001). In 
all of these diagnoses, Latin America appears in a situation of backwardness or 
shortcoming, in an asymmetric structure of modernization worldwide. Systems 
theory in Chile also adopts this position, but with some reservations. 
 
To answer the question on the possibility of identifying a set of phases inside the 
evolution of law, we must have clarity about the sociological diagnosis that serves as 
context. As the ideal types of law of Weber (1922a), which correspond historically 
to the types of domination, we must make an effort to understand the 
correspondences between certain “forms of differentiation.” For it, we will review 
four perspectives that are outlined like the main ones. 
 
a) Modernization as Politicization and Monetisation 
 
The monograph “Politicization and monetisation in Latin America,” published 
originally in 1994 (2012), presents the ideas of the sociologists Carlos Cousiño and 
Eduardo Valenzuela, which are counted within the first systemic analyses on the 
conditions of modernity in Latin-American region. For these authors, system theory 
provides an explanatory model for the latest modernization wave in Chile, which 
would be guided by a growing influence of economy in society. In general terms, 
rupture processes with traditional order characterize the arrival of modernity. On a 
global scale, the first rupture occurs with the religious wars in Europe and concludes 
with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the War of Thirty Years (Cousiño & 
Valenzuela 2012: 31), the second rupture is the experience of misery of the working 
classes in the 19th century (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 53). The experience of the 
European war of extermination would have resulted in a reflexivization of social 
relations, i.e., the consciousness of the existence of social ties that were previously 
“pre-reflexive,” These ties are characterized by “presence:” 
 
To account for experiential dimension contained in this form of sociability, we 
propose the concept of “presence.” The term alludes to a form of social relation 
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based on co-presentiality, in a being-together. In addition, it wants to rescue the 
dimension of “presence” that catholic world places in Eucharistic celebration, and 
that is the foundation of “communion” between God and men and among men 
themselves. The core of “presence” is the person as an experience that requires 
neither has a fundament. In this regard, the world of presence is the ambience of a 
pre-reflexive experience, where the given thing is not a fundamented thing. 
Experiences such as love, family, religion, friendship and sociability [comensalidad], 
for us are privileged examples of this realm. (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 19-20) 
 
In the opinion of these authors, the advent of modernity breaks this type of ties in 
two different ways: through reflexivization processes of social relations, which follow 
a discursive logic – in allusion to Habermas (1982a; 1982b) – and through 
differentiation processes of autonomous social systems – in allusion to Luhmann 
(1991a). Both discursive rationalization and systemic differentiation would 
unsuccessfully attempt to recompose or replace pre-reflexive social ties. Cousiño 
and Valenzuela thus attempt to build a model of social integration in three levels: pre-
reflexive (presence), reflexive (consciousness), and systemic (communication) 
(Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 210ff.). This model can be characterized as an attempt 
to introduce a deeper level of integration to the two-level model developed by 
Lockwood (1964) and later by Habermas (1982a; 1982b; 1994). In addition to 
systemic integration and social integration, there would exist a type of so-called 
“cultural” integration based on pre-reflexive (pre-discursive) and pre-systemic 
relations (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 210ff). 
 
In Latin America, and particularly in Chile, these three integration levels would have 
taken shape in three differentiation forms. The institution of a rural Hacienda, as a 
model of traditional society, which founded a pre-reflexive type of tie between the 
Señor and the servant, is located as a starting substrate. Together with processes of 
urban development of early 20th century and migration of peasants to the cities, a 
transposition of social organization of the Hacienda to the cities occurs, which takes 
the form of political populism. For Cousiño and Valenzuela, populism artificially 
reproduces a pre-reflexive paternity relation between a populist leader and his 
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servants (workers of the Haciendas and their families arrived in the city and are 
impoverished in their peripheries). The populist leader establishes confidence 
relations with his followers and rewards their allegiance by recreating a “presence” 
relation type. The final fall of populisms is caused by its politics of spending, which 
later becomes inflation and, consequently, crisis. 
 
Populist leader substitutes the Patrón [Boss], and solves the question of absenteeism 
that defines the problem of popular transit of country to city. The ability of 
populist leader consists in to perform itself in the mode of presence. It is true that 
the leader speaks and its charisma is often a charisma of the word: the leader is 
placed really in an order of magnitude that requires the use of the word. But 
populism is not discursively validated. Populism does with the word the same that it 
does with money: sins by excess. Excess of words –that we commonly call 
demagogy and think is a peculiar feature of populism– invalidates discourse, 
likewise money excess –that we call inflation– depreciates currency. The word, as 
the money, lacks value when there is overabundance of it. (Cousiño & Valenzuela 
2012: 167) 
 
After its crisis, populism model is replaced by a reflexivization of broken social ties 
through a Politicization process, which occurs strongly in the 1970s and covers a wide 
social spectrum. Politicization would be the first manifestation of modernity in 
Chile. This would be a conscientization process and a reflexive creation of social 
ties, which does not attempt to rescue a pre-reflexive tie, but build them by means 
of reflection. An example of this process of politicization would be the development 
movement driven by the ECLAC in the region and in Chile, which contained in its 
program not only a substitution of the “economy of spending” typical of the 
populist regime with a “economy of work,” but also a definition of social classes 
and their consciousness to prepare “a program of constitution of a reflexive social 
tie” (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 145). In this context of politicization, social 
sciences, which reinforce politicization process and react to the emergence of urban 
misery (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 70ff), arise. As politicization dominated as a 
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modernizing strategy, a reflection on social relations by means of semantics of social 
classes, work, and political freedom took place.  
 
While the crisis of populism occurs due to its own inability to stop economic 
splurge and wastage of the politics based on presence, politicization is abruptly 
terminated by its incapability to process conflicts of a polarized country between 
right and left radical political positions. The coup d’état that occurred in Chile in 1973 
marked the end of modernization as politicization. The government of the self-
designated military “Junta” dissolved the National Congress and punished their 
political opponents with exile, torture, and death. Partly instigated by Chilean 
political and economic elites and middle classes, as well as by an anti-communist 
policy of the United States, the military government, which remained in power for 
17 years, gave a draft modernization of the country. 
 
Modernization as Monetization begins in this period and is characterized by Cousiño 
and Valenzuela by differentiation of an autonomous economic system: “When we talk 
about monetization, as the currently followed way of modernization in Latin 
America, we understand that process as a result and consequence of the 
differentiation of economic subsystem” (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 116).  
 
To understand the differentiation of economic system, these authors examine the 
theory of differentiation of Luhmann. According to them, system theory would 
allow the understanding of how economy closes itself in an autonomous way and 
lead a modernization process differently from the reflexive model of politicization. 
Monetization, they argue, differs radically from politicization, as long as it does not 
try to rebuild pre-reflexive ties, but only to maintain an autonomous social order 
through coordinations. Differentiation of the economy would bring, as a result, “the 
increasing inability of societies to be thought of as totality, i.e., to establish 
reflexively the social tie.” (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 121). This occurs mainly 
since differentiation of economy is made at the expenses of its political 
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dependencies, and, once it is disembedded from reflexive mechanisms of politics, 
any attempt to reflexivize the social tie disappears. 
 
In contrast to populism, based on pre-reflexive presence, and politicization, based 
on reflexive conscientization, monetization has developed more effective 
mechanisms to deal with its crisis. Indeed, according to Cousiño and Valenzuela, 
differentiation of economic system not only stays current, but also has extended 
itself into the realm of politics. Once military regime left the power in 1990, after a 
democratic plebiscite, differentiation of political system occurred. 
 
Return to democracy has not been return of politics, in the sense in which we have 
referred to it. (...) Return to democracy is identified, therefore, less with the 
reconstruction of the principle of citizenship than with the formation of the 
political system. (Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012: 157) 
 
This change in politics would be a consequence of differentiation of economy from 
politics, to which politics reacts by becoming independent from economy. This 
systematization of the politics is based on the increasing capacity of self-observation of 
politics without taking into account economy as relevant environment, but rather 
public opinion. After economy becomes autonomous, politics cannot yet be 
represented therein and must resort to its own political means for this.  
 
This self-referential of politics does not imply any kind of solipsism: simply occurs 
that politics begins to observe itself from politics, i.e. politics observes and 
processes only political communications. Politics can observe everything, including 
labor unions, but politically. Systematized politics isn’t thematic closed, but 
operationally. Labor problems are relevant only insofar as they are capable of 
observation and political processing problems. Public opinion is the medium that 
allows this class of outsourcing of politics. (Cousiño and Valenzuela 2012: 183) 
 
For Cousiño and Valenzuela, both processes, differentiation of an economic system 
and systematization of politics, are a part of a same transformation, which has a 
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political face, as well as an economic one. In both cases, it is a question of a systemic 
functional differentiation, which represents a change in the social structure as a whole. 
 
From a systemic perspective, distinctions as “system/world of life” are certainly 
largely covered (in what place but in the society would be located a “world of life”?) 
(cf. Cadenas 2006), and the existence of pre-reflexive ties are also difficult to sustain 
beyond a self-conviction in a non-communicable realm, which in turn is possible to 
communicate (how, if not, can its social character be discussed?). More interesting is 
perhaps a reflection on the regional character of functional differentiation. In the analysis of 
Cousiño and Valenzuela, differentiation of politics and economy occurs at regional 
level although its dynamics obey universal principles of differentiation. For this 
reason, it is plausible to deepen the analysis, since they indicate exactly the 
possibility to establish not only parallels in forms of differentiation and of social 
integration, but also indicate specific differentiation processes of functional systems, 
something that is of great interest for the present work.  
 
b) Concentric and Polycentric Functional Differentiation  
 
Aldo Mascareño closely follows the systemic aspects of the thesis of Cousiño and 
Valenzuela, specifically in regards to monetization and systematization of politics, 
although this author observes from an exclusively systemic perspective. For him, the 
form of systemic functional differentiation in Latin America is characterized by a 
concentric order, opposite to a polycentric (or acentric) order, typical of European 
functional differentiation: 
 
Contrary to European societies, whose functional differentiation process resulted in 
a pattern of social organization of polycentric type, where social systems operate 
decentrally in an autonomous way although connected, establishing communicating 
bridges that allow them a coordinated functioning, Latin-American societies have 
been characterized by being structured around a dominant system. Thereby, the 
autonomous development of every sphere became dependent on the central 
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system, and couplings became in dedifferentiation processes that hindered the 
deployment of functional specializations. (Mascareño 2003a: 9) 
 
According to Mascareño, in the concentrically oriented social order, functional 
systems appear with diverse autonomy grades, since certain differentiated systems 
block the self-reference of differentiating systems (Mascareño 2003a). Systems that 
have occupied this central position have historically been politics and, towards the 
end of the 20th century, economy (Mascareño 2000). This is an idea closely related 
to the ideas on politicization and monetization of Cousiño and Valenzuela. 
 
Concentric differentiation would correspond to a structural variant of functional 
differentiation, which is characterized by arranging the specificity of social 
subsystems under a hierarchy. Paradoxically, it is not a type of differentiation of 
centre and periphery, but of a particular type of functional differentiation, though in 
conditions of peripheral modernity.  
 
To support this argument from an operational point of view, Mascareño recurs to 
mathematics of diffuse distinctions or “fuzzy logic” of the mathematician Lotfi A. 
Zadeh (1988), to indicate the existence of distinctions of “imperfect continence,” 
which he opposes to distinctions of “perfect continence” indicated by George 
Spencer-Brown (1979), which serve in turn as basis for the late Luhmann theory. 
“Fuzzy logic” would be in Zadeh’s words: 
 
In more specific terms, what is central about fuzzy logic is that, unlike classical 
logical systems, it aims at modeling the imprecise modes of reasoning that play an 
essential role in the remarkable human ability to make rational decisions in an 
environment of uncertainty and imprecision. This ability depends, in turn, on our 
ability to infer an approximate answer to a question based on a store of knowledge 
that is inexact, incomplete, or not totally reliable. (Zadeh 1988: 83) 
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These fuzzy distinctions would be the base for operations of functional systems in 
Latin America, which have been historically affected by periodic dedifferentiation104 
processes that produce in these an irregular operation. Concentric functional 
differentiation of the Latin-American region would have the feature of provoking 
this type of arranging, where self-reference and autopoiesis operate with fuzzy 
distinctions. A central system intervenes functional systems in its selections, 
producing centrifugal communications towards it and applying its distinction 
schemes in the symbolic media or functional communications of each subsystem. 
 
Concentric order additionally produces inability in functional systems to draw self-
referential distinctions and to reduce complexity of its environments. The 
consequence of this structural problem is, in the opinion of Mascareño, a denial of 
or blindness to the complexity of environment, which unleashes a complexity crisis for 
the central system, i.e., “the inability of a totality to process the consequences of the 
deployment of its own processes of entanglement, densification and 
consecuenciality” (Mascareño 2000: 196). When this type of crisis occurs in the 
central system, due its centrifugal characteristics, the crisis casts to the rest of 
intervened systems, which reproduce the crisis in other systems, forming a network 
of incompetence. This network operates with ignorance as dominant communication 
and reproduces the concentric structure, unable to process its externalities, not even 
the increasing complexity of its relevant environments.  
 
Systemic dedifferentiation problem, that Mascareño indicates, may be largely due to what 
in system theory is known by the name of integration. Systemic integration is defined 
differently from sociological tradition: “We want to understand integration as 
 
                                                            
104 The dedifferentiation concept was object of an important debate in the 1980s thanks to the neo-
functionalist revival in North American. Frank J. Lechner, for example, applies the concept with 
regard to “fundamentalism” (Lechner 1990: 88ff), while Gary Rhoades treats “dedifferentiation” as 
a return to a “status quo” in the process of differentiation (Rhoades 1990: 192). In Germany, Karin 
Knorr-Cetina mainly took the discussion regarding the problem of “dedifferentiation” in a direction 
against Luhmann (Knorr-Cetina 1992). 
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nothing else than reduction of freedom degrees of subsystems” (Luhmann 1997a: 
603).105 Social systems are integrated when, due to their recursive structural 
relations, important limitations take place in their internal operations. A systemic 
order that propitiates the entire integration under distinctions of one of its 
functional systems has to handle large amounts of exclusion, due to their inclusion 
criteria.  
 
Although Mascareño’s thesis indicates certainty various empirical elements that are 
very useful to understand regional functional differentiation – some of which we 
will use later – the main theoretical problem of his proposal lies in their deep 
epistemological foundations. In a simplified way, we might say: the adoption of fuzzy 
logic strategy fails to understand the real operation of social systems, but only 
describes certain semantic contents. Operationally speaking, a fuzzy distinction 
cannot be constituted in a diffuse way if one wants to distinguish it (to distinguish!) 
from a not-fuzzy distinction (as in Spencer-Brown). The consequence of this 
vagueness is that the concept of dedifferentiation – that seemingly must be described 
by means of fuzzy distinctions – remains theoretically adrift, although it has a great 
explanatory value to understand institutional irregularities. 
 
For Mascareño, the legal system has been subject to the same dedifferentiation 
processes than the rest of functional systems. 
 
That is to say, in spite of political dedifferentiation operations in much of the 19th 
and 20th century, law focused on the development of its role and won in reflexivity 
during that time, slowly –it can be undoubtedly said– but it does it, as it is 
demonstrated at present by the reform of criminal procedure and the demands of 
autonomy of the judicial. Nevertheless, in certain historical periods law seems to be 
totally dispensable, especially when legal order is suspended by states of emergency 
or when its changes takes place through facticity of power (military coups, civil 
 
                                                            
105 “wollen wir unter Integration nichts anderes verstehen als die Reduktion der Freiheitsgrade von 
Teilsysteme.” 
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authoritarianism). In such cases, power is observed as a functional equivalent of 
legal validity, dissolving dissent in a factual expression of power without procedural 
validity claim. (Mascareño 2004: 81) 
 
According to this author, a differentiation of law undoubtedly occurs, although this 
process is mediated by periodic dedifferentiation episodes motivated largely by 
politics. Differentiation of legal system, this way, would be characterized by periods 
of increased autonomy and reflexivity interrupted by dedifferentiation episodes. 
 
Following this thesis, it can be understood that towards the end of the 20th century 
and coinciding with the process of monetization indicated by Cousiño and 
Valenzuela (2012), the legal system would have suffered its last great 
dedifferentiation process, due to actions of the military government. In that period, 
while courts did not suspend their actions, they were largely politically biased and 
operated with great indifference to denunciations of human rights violations.  
  
In later works, Mascareño added to his theory of concentric functional 
differentiation and dedifferentiation, the influence of reciprocity networks based on 
not-proceduralized inclusion (and exclusion) mechanisms:  
 
This way, it is possible to talk in Latin America of a combination of functional 
differentiation and its respective media with networks of stratification and 
reciprocity that operate based on mechanisms of violence, corruption and coercion 
that dedifferentiate formal procedures of functionally differentiated institutions and 
constitute a region concentrated on political communications with strong semantic 
associations (‘cultural’ if wanted) for this propose. (Mascareño 2010: 91f) 
 
These networks of stratification and reciprocity would fulfill “the function to 
achieve inclusion in the performance of functionally differentiated institutions” 
(Mascareño 2010: 94). Means, which achieve this unproceduralized inclusion, would 
fundamentally be violence, corruption, and coercion. With the incorporation of the 
idea of networks of reciprocity, Mascareño complements its analysis of functional 
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differentiation in Chile and in Latin America, following closely Luhmanns’ analysis 
on peripheral regions of modernity. It should be recalled that, according to 
Luhmann, networks of inclusion and exclusion an important influence across 
functional differentiation have in these regions, and they can even overlap it 
(Luhmann 1995b; 2008b: 235ff). Mascareño puts a major emphasis on this negative 
character of the networks, emphasizing that they are mechanisms that 
“dedifferentiate” formal procedures of functional systems, like democratic politics, 
by means of violence, corruption, coercion, etc. (Mascareño 2010: 103). In short, 
Chilean and Latin American modernity is described by Mascareño as a concentric 
functional differentiation with the influence of inclusion/exclusion networks. 
 
The concept of inclusion/exclusion is, so to speak, transversal to systemic theories 
of functional differentiation in Chile. This relates to the importance that this 
concept had for understanding the form of regional functional differentiation. As 
we saw, this concept is present in the latter works of Mascareño, but also in the 
theory of Chilean functional differentiation of Fernando Robles (2005). 
 
c) Peripheral Modernity: Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
For Robles, Chilean and Latin-American modernity is characterized by a particular 
constellation of inclusions and exclusions which differ from the European matrix. 
Also, Robles maintains that it is not possible to speak about a dominant condition 
of either functional differentiation or stratification, but rather to come up with a 
combination of various differentiation forms. Nevertheless, he argues – closely to 
Luhmann (1995b; 1995c) and to Mascareño (2010)– that inclusion/exclusion 
predominates as a principle of differentiation. 
 
In peripheral societies, the abyss between inclusion and exclusion assumes the 
primary function of social differentiation and it is the axial principle of peripheral societies, 
which means that a part of population is excluded from functional systems or that 
access of some of them it is possible (for example, to political system through 
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voting exercise, but not to education), but not to others systems that might 
endanger exclusion mechanisms. (Robles 2005: 46)  
 
Robles compares central modernity societies and peripheral societies based on 
inclusion/exclusion and its consequences in the formation of individual life projects. 
Following the ideas of Ulrich Beck (1986), central modernity would be characterized 
by “individualization” processes, while peripheral modernity of countries, like Chile, 
would be characterized by “individuation” processes. While in the first case, it is a 
question of identity formation projects in an assisted and institutionally regulated 
manner, by means of solid support-structures – like for example a Welfare State –, 
in case of individuation, individuals build their biographies in a helpless and 
deregulated manner, which appears in situations such as precarious employments or 
subcontracting, gender discrimination or others (Robles 2005: 33).  
 
These two manners of individuality construction can be summarized, so postulates 
Robles, into two formulas: “make what you want with your life” in case of 
individualization of central modernity and “sort it out as best you can” in 
individuation of peripheral modernity (Robles 2005: 44). One of the consequences 
of this second way of identity construction is the maintenance and reproduction of 
family solidarity and of confidence networks. Unlike societies of central modernity 
where the pursuit for the “other” is a result of an autonomous decision, in 
peripheral modernity, the pursuit of social relations is not an alternative but an 
imperative to achieve daily subsistence. Robles recognizes that individuation 
situations, as for example an unemployed person who cannot have access to an 
allowance or has an inadequate one, illegal immigrants, or those who live on streets 
in big cities (Robles 205: 50), also appear in regions of central modernity. However, 
it is not a dominant situation as in peripheral modernity. 
 
To understand how inclusion and exclusion in countries of peripheral modernity, as 
in Chile, are structured, Robles proposes to distinguish between two types of 
inclusions/exclusions: primary and secondary. In the first case it is a question of 
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inclusion/exclusion of services from differentiated functional systems, while the latter 
refers to inclusion/exclusion of network-organized interaction systems:  “networks of 
favors, of sale of advantages, of exchange of influences, of parasitic activities, which 
basic resource is to know someone who-should-know-someone and that exchange 
of favors and actions should impose face-to-face relations” (Robles 2005: 47). 
 
Based on this distinction Robles formulates a matrix of inclusions and exclusions 
which would characterize regions of peripheral modernity as Chile, and in which 
four types of inclusions and exclusions appear: 1) inclusion in inclusion: characterized 
by full participation in functional systems and in interactional social networks of 
confidence and reciprocity. This inclusion appears in countries of peripheral 
modernity, mainly in higher strata of society; 2) exclusion in inclusion: which refers to 
inclusion in functional systems, but exclusion of interactional social networks of 
confidence and reciprocity. Here, hedonism as an individual orientation appears, 
which leads to typical anomic situations of the first world as loneliness; 3) exclusion in 
inclusion: characterizes exclusion of services of functional systems, but inclusion in 
interactional social networks of confidence and reciprocity. This is the dominant 
type in countries of peripheral modernity; finally 4) exclusion in exclusion is the 
extreme situation of exclusion of the two levels, which not only would be 
theoretically necessary but empirically possible (Robles 2005: 48ff.). It is possible to 
appreciate the abovementioned types in the following table. 
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Table 7 Typologies of Inclusion/Exclusion 
 
 I. Inclusion in  
inclusion 
II. Exclusion in 
inclusion 
III. Inclusion 
in exclusion 
IV. Exclusion 
in  
exclusion 
Primary 
Exclusion 
No No Yes Yes 
Secundary 
Exclusion 
No Yes No Yes 
Social 
Integration 
High Low High High 
Risk of 
Uncertainty 
(exclusion) 
Low High/Low High High 
Construction 
of Identity 
Individualization 
“make what you 
want with your life” 
Individualization 
“make what you 
want with your life” 
Individuation 
“sort it out as best 
you can” 
Individuation 
“sort it out as best 
you can” 
 
Source: Robles (2005: 50) 
 
Robles points out that obviously “individuation,” typical of peripheral modernity, 
appears in most cases in the dimension of “inclusion in exclusion,” i.e., in exclusion 
of functional systems, but inclusion in interactional social networks of confidence 
and reciprocity. This situation assumes the emergence of differentiated functional 
systems, but also, simultaneously, the presence of interactional social networks of 
confidence and reciprocity, which operate parallel to them. Particularly, he does not 
deny system differentiation, but that this does not have a primacy in the 
differentiation of society.106 
 
In synthesis, what Robles argues is the structuring character of inclusion and 
exclusion in the social differentiation in Chile and, simultaneously, the way in which 
a constellation of inclusion and exclusions occurs. In contrast to Cousiño and 
Valenzuela and also Mascareño, who opt for a structural diagnosis that directly 
indicates the character of functional differentiation in Chile, Robles points to 
 
                                                            
106 In the case of Brazil, Marcelo Neves also questioned the primacy of functional differentiation, 
although he emphasizes the problem of complexity (see Neves 1992). 
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individual conditions, which the individuals have to deal with in the process of 
formation of their identities and biographies. Nevertheless, despite not inquiring 
directly in diagnosis of functional differentiation, Robles emphasizes the presence of 
functional systems in the form of inclusion and exclusion in Chile, and also the way 
in which individuals are located in the context of these systems. In this sense, it is a 
systemic reflection of Chilean modernity under functional differentiation. 
 
For Robles, and to a lesser extent for Mascareño, the concourse of interactional 
social networks of confidence and reciprocity constitutes a central aspect in the 
diagnosis of modernity in Chile, namely as alternative mechanisms to inclusion in 
functional systems. Although for Cousiño and Valenzuela, these networks are 
understood as not being suitable for systemic analysis – given its pre-reflexive 
character – but nevertheless its presence can be noted as characteristic element of 
Chilean modernity.  
 
d) Functional Differentiation and Trust  
 
In a close relation to the three former versions of systemic analysis, Darío 
Rodríguez (2007) highlights some cultural elements that underlie functional 
differentiation in Chile. For him, a functional differentiation has occurred in Chile, 
which is mainly encompassed with the world society. 
 
Confidence in institutions or in the functional systems on the other hand, is a 
matter of fact in Chile. Chileans are disciplined people who firmly believe in 
authority, science, education, law, economy, etc. (…) Chile’s functional 
differentiation allowed the easy integration of all its national functional systems into 
the corresponding functional systems of world society. (Rodríguez 2007: 215) 
 
Rodríguez claims – following a Luhmann’s distinction between “Confidence” and 
“Trust” (Luhmann 1988a) – that functional differentiation in Chile has occurred 
without altering an old cultural pattern. Chilean culture, argues, rests rather on 
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confidence that in trust (Rodríguez 2007: 210). The fundamental difference between 
both patterns is that trust is structured concerning the calculation of risk while 
confidence refers to the denial of danger.107 As Rodríguez indicates: “Confidence occurs 
when an individual believes that his –or her- expectations will not be disappointed. 
(…) Trust refers to risk and must be assumed as such” (Rodríguez 2007: 212). 
 
The reasons by which Chilean culture is structured concerning this principle are due 
to the importance of family institution. Family is supported rather on confidence 
relations and Chilean culture would be founded in a family representation. 
Emphasizing in what Robles called “inclusion in inclusion,” i.e. the form of 
inclusion in higher strata of society, Rodriguez points out: 
 
Cultures which are based on family don’t need too much trust because they rest on 
confidence more than on trust. In Chile »everybody knows everybody«. Only two 
universities and no more than ten private schools provide fifty percent of the chief 
executives for both private and public enterprises. This data implies that the 
familiar world includes all the meaningful people, and that being unfamiliar means 
being dangerous. (Rodríguez 2007: 213) 
 
One of the consequences of this cultural pattern based on family is that functional 
differentiation in Chile has to deal with a problem of complexity, since personal and 
familiar confidence reduces the possibilities of relation in an increasingly differentiated 
society. For Rodríguez, while Chile was country distant and isolated from global 
dynamics, the absence of trust and predilection for confidence in social relations were 
not an obstacle. In a world society, in whom Chile is inserted, maintenance of the 
 
                                                            
107 Matías Dewey has shown a similar although inverse situation in the analysis of functional 
differentiation in Argentina. According to him, a “mistrust” predominates that country, especially 
toward institutions. Instead of following the procedures that institutions dictate, in Argentina one 
would decide on the basis of certain conferred distrust to an institutional history marked by 
corruption and a generalized disappointment with respect to authorities. See Dewey (2012). 
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old familiar order is not enough, but a different cultural base is needed, namely one 
oriented to trust and not to confidence. 
 
In short, for Rodríguez, the transit towards a full functional differentiation “has only 
partly happened in Chile” (Rodríguez 2007: 215), so although the increasing system 
differentiation is testified, a cultural substratum that is largely stagnant in an already 
different social structure persists.   
 
e) Functional differentiation in Chile: Summary 
 
After having reviewed the ideas of Cousiño and Valenzuela, of Mascareño, Robles 
and Rodríguez, some common elements in all systemic analyses on functional 
differentiation in Chile can be regarded. 
 
In a synthetic way, the authors’ proposals can be summarized as follows: 
 
Table 8 Functional Differentiation in Chile: Summary 
 
 Cousiño and 
Valenzuela 
Mascareño Robles Rodríguez 
Previous 
condition 
Traditional 
Order 
Social 
Networks of 
Reciprocity 
Social Networks 
of Inclusion 
Family 
Relationships 
Chilean 
Modernity 
Politicization Concentric 
Functional 
Differentiation: 
Politics 
Individuation 
(Peripheral 
Modernity) 
Functional 
Differentiation 
based on 
Confidence 
 Functional 
Differentiation 
of Economics 
and Politics 
(Monetisation) 
Concentric 
Functional 
Differentiation: 
Economy 
Central 
Modernity  
European and 
American 
Modernity 
Polycentric 
Functional 
Differentiation 
Individualization 
(Central 
Modernity) 
Functional 
Differentiation 
based on Trust 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Cousiño y Valenzuela (2012), Mascareño (2010), 
Robles (2005), Rodríguez (2007). 
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A recurring theme in these descriptions is the marked institutional or organizational 
character that would have functional differentiation. For Cousiño and Valenzuela, 
functional differentiation appears with a clear organizational accent, their analyses 
largely refer to the State as an actor of a functional differentiation process (Cousiño 
& Valenzuela 2012: 70ff.). Mascareño for his part insists on the relevancy of 
“procedures” as functional equivalents to inclusion via social networks and rescues 
the concept of “institution” for these purposes (Mascareño 2010: 87ff.). The idea of 
individualization/individuation of Robles seems to point also to an institutional 
dichotomy, namely: “Neoliberal State/Welfare State,” implicitly alluding to 
modernization processes initiated in the 1980s in Chile and in Latin America 
(Robles 2005: 41). Rodríguez is much more direct in his allusion to institutions as a 
synonym for functional differentiation (Rodríguez 2007: 215). In all cases, 
functional differentiation is largely seen as a process of differentiation of institutions 
or certain organizations. Although organizations have an important role in modern 
society, a reduction of functional differentiation to its organizational aspects leaves 
aside much of the universalistic character of system differentiation.  
 
Another omnipresent aspect in all these analyses, and which covers a fundamental 
relevance for the theory of differentiation in Chile, is the persistence of a social 
dimension underlying factual functional differentiation (Nassehi 2009: 401). This social 
dimension is present, as in the denial of the universalistic character of functional 
differentiation by Cousiño and Valenzuela, as well as in the importance that 
Mascareño and Robles give to interactional social networks of confidence and 
reciprocity, and also in the role that Rodríguez sees in a family-like metaphor of an 
extended social structure of confidence. This social dimension of differentiation is seen 
like a regional aspect of peripheral modernity in Chile, which should not be 
sidestepped in the diagnosis of Chilean functional differentiation. An element that 
emerges from the foregoing and that crosses all systemic analyses is the absence of a 
mechanism of relation between social differentiation and factual differentiation of 
systems. Both, the pre-reflexive, the networks of solidarity and reciprocity or 
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cultural patterns, do not seem to have relevant relations with functional 
differentiation of systems. That is to say, together with differentiation of functional 
systems, there would be a decoupling process of a social dimension that would 
operate in an indifferent way from systemic operations. Functional differentiation 
appears, in this way, as a process that affects only a certain level of society and below 
or beside of it appear networks that somehow escape to this process.  
 
In this widespread diagnosis of a Chilean functional differentiation characterized by 
certain structural conditions, such as politicization and monetization, concentric 
functional differentiation, individuation, or the importance of family, have been 
scarce analyses about the role that law plays in functional differentiation in Chile. 
On this subject, it is necessary to identify some relevant characteristics. 
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4. THE EVOLUTION OF LAW IN CHILE: EVOLUTIONARY 
ACQUISITIONS AND FORMS OF DIFFERENTIATION 
 
Our research is supported by the assumption that it is possible to distinguish a 
functionally differentiated legal system in Chile. From this assumption, we have 
hypothesized that functional differentiation of the Chilean legal system consists of 
an evolutionary process initiated with the conquest and colonization of Spain over the 
territory in the sixteenth century, and the development thereof is characterized both 
by changes in the form of differentiation of Chilean society and by the emergence of a 
number of specific legal evolutionary acquisitions. The following reflections are 
intended to delve into this hypothesis. For this we have chosen the path of the 
historical and evolutionary explanations from the perspective of the theory of social 
systems. 
 
The explanation of the differentiation of the Chilean legal system will be developed 
following three lines of research: 
 
- In a first line we will develop the evolutionary strategy of identifying specific 
functions and evolutionary acquisitions. We will investigate the origins of the 
Chilean legal system and try to relate this change processes with the analysis 
of other processes of social differentiation that serve as background thereto, 
as well as the problems and conflicts that go through this process. 
- The second task of our research will be the reconstruction of evolutionary 
stages in the differentiation of the Chilean law. In this context we discuss 
how legal system is structured according to certain forms of differentiation. We 
will use the evolutionary criteria to try to reconstruct the stages of 
development of the Chilean law. 
- Finally we will deal with a number of current tendencies of the differentiation 
of law in Chile according to what was previously studied. We will base the 
discussion of these tendencies on an analysis of the dimensions of meaning, 
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specially considering the regional aspects of the differentiation of the legal 
system. 
 
4.1. Evolutionary acquisitions in the evolution of Chilean law 
 
When trying the reconstruction of a legal system as the Chilean variety, it is 
necessary to have a particular element that characterizes its history and later 
developments in mind. Chilean law comes largely from Spanish law, which was 
gradually imposed in the Chilean territory in the process of colonization that began 
in the mid-sixteenth century and was accompanied by successive wars and conflicts. 
 
The evolution of Chilean law can be described according to the model of “allopatric 
speciation” (Wortmann 20120) or “reproductive isolation” (Wortmann 2007), 
although some precisions must be done, as noted above. According to Wortmann 
(2012: 381) allopatric speciation may be described as follows: 
 
In the beginning, (1) a population of certain forms settles in a given environment. 
That population gets (2) divided into two separated populations by the formation of 
certain barriers. Once that happens, these populations face different environmental 
conditions and might (3) diverge in their evolutionary trajectories, for example, by the 
process of natural selection. Finally, (4) evolution gives rise to isolative mechanisms 
that prevent the once-united populations from melding again, after the barriers 
disappear that disconnected them. Once all of these steps have been completed, 
speciation (or, in sociological terms, differentiation) has occurred and has given rise 
to a higher level of diversity. 
 
The concept of ‘population’ is one of the biggest problems of this theory. If this 
approach is followed, as mentioned above, a paradigm of whole/parts emerges, which 
is hardly reconcilable with a theory of social systems based on meaning. 
Nonetheless, we can say that this type of understanding considers very relevant 
empirical aspects for the evolution of Chilean law. 
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Following the recommendations of Stichweh (1990: 259) for national legal systems, 
the Chilean law can be understood as a “segmentation” of the world system of law. 
In this sense, its evolution, from the perspective of the ‘allopatric speciation,’ is 
characterized at first by the separation of a sphere of meaning, which is settled in a 
territorially bounded law. Considering the history of Chilean law, it is clear that its 
development is due to disposals emanating from Spain during the epoch of 
formation and development of the State in the mid-sixteenth century. Unlike other 
types of legal development, the Chilean case is characterized by a colonial origin, 
which gives form to differentiated legal institutions and unlike the analysis of the 
world law, in this particular case of national law, the external influence in law plays a 
very relevant role. To this, the geographical isolation of Chile with regard to the 
metropolis of Spain and the low development of own legal customs must be added. 
 
There is agreement among historians on the fact that the Chilean legal order is 
established for the first time with the arrival of the Spanish conquest to Chile in the 
sixteenth century (Bravo Lira 1986, 1996; Eyzaguirre 2004, 2006; Góngora 1951, 
1981; Villalobos 2011). On this, there is nevertheless a polemic philosophical and 
anthropological character relative to the law of the indigenous people at the arrival 
of the Spaniards. There is, however, no evidence that shows that the law of the 
aboriginals permeated significantly into the law of the conquerors, although of 
course its customs had an impact on the conquerors (Eyzaguirre 2006: 19). The 
Chilean law, as well as the State, was erected independently of the institutions and 
customs of the aboriginal population. 
 
4.1.1. Legal organizations and roles 
 
The organizations of the Chilean law are one of its first evolutionary acquisitions. The first 
Chilean legal organization was the cabildo (council). This arises along with the 
foundation of Chile in 1541 and it was in this instance that the first authorities in the 
new territory were appointed. This was a representative organ of the new colonists 
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and Santiago was established for the first time as the capital in the same day of its 
foundation. 
 
The origins of the Judicature are confused with those of the nationality. In March 
1541, before a month of the foundation of Santiago, the oldest city of Chile, the 
first ordinary courts were instituted: the mayors of the nascent population, bearers 
of the real pole of the justice. (Bravo Lira 1996: 32) 
The cabildo had multiple administrative and economic functions, from the care of the 
public works and common goods, up to the organization of small militias or the 
announcement of the time by means of serenos (night dews) (Campos Harriet 1956: 
64). The cabildo had the administration of justice in its territory and the application 
of the Spanish laws among its functions: “In every city a cabildo is established which 
is integrated, among others, by two mayors. These mayors are ordinary judges of 
first instance inside the city” (Bravo Lira 1986: 86). This organization model was 
designed in Spain and its application was ordained to the colonies along with the 
foundation of the cities. The authority of the cabildos came from Spanish laws, 
specifically from the functions and powers conferred by the so-called 
“capitulations” to the conquerors, which, however, should establish a special figure 
for the administration of justice by means of the cabildos and its mayors. Along with 
the capitulations was a set of “instructions” (Eyzaguirre 2006: 132) that specifically 
pointed to the political and religious obligations of the conquerors. 
 
(The) capitulation of conquest and discovery is a bilateral contract, by which the 
entrepreneur, future discoverer, pact with the Spanish crown. It is a written 
document. By the capitulations mutual obligations and laws are contracted. Thus, 
the entrepreneur, the conqueror, has the faculties to discover, colonize, distribute 
lands and plots, erect forts, provide charges and public offices, govern the 
uncovered region, found cities, towns, rivers. (…) It can be said that they were the 
bridge over which the Spanish institutions and customs passed to America. 
(Campos Harriet 1956: 56). 
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The cabildos constitute one of the most stable legal organizations in the evolution of 
Chilean law, since the Chilean legal tradition is inaugurated with them in the 
sixteenth century, and by these means, three centuries later or in the nineteenth 
century, independence from Spain was declared. But legal life was not only limited 
to the cabildos. While the organization of the justice at this time is “confusing,” as 
Campos Harriet noted (1956: 66), the same author points out that three general 
levels can be distinguished: a first instance justice administered by the mayors or 
governors, a second instance justice by the Real Hearing of Chile, and finally the 
superior justice of the Council of the Indies residing in Spain. 
 
Any assumption regarding a supposed equality of the colonists in front of the cabildo 
should be dismissed. Although these were guided by the principle of the ‘common 
good’, they were also an expression of the power of the local aristocracy (Villalobos 
2011: 68). This aristocracy was formed by the legal-economic figure of the 
encomiendas, which distinguished between those who owned lands granted by the 
crown from the rest, who were called simply “inhabitants.” Those who were 
receiving real incomes from Peru, were holders of “pensions placed on the 
encomiendas of other neighbors,” “spears and muskets” paid by the king, men of war, 
landowners, big traders, and also artisans and minor shopkeepers (Góngora 1951: 
181). This principle of stratification is also applied in the form center/periphery since 
the colonization presupposed the centralization of the administrative functions 
(including justice) in the foundation of “cities” (Góngora 1951: 69; 1975). 
 
The cabildo establishes the first roles and legal responsibilities and thus begins the 
legal development of Chile. This has a high importance because Chilean law first 
appears as a result of an organization with defined roles. Therefore, the Chilean law 
is, from its origin, structured in organizations. This has caught the attention of legal 
historians, specially the ancientness and stability of the legal organization, which 
would have been a mainstay of the formation of the State of Chile (Bravo Lira 1996: 
20ff.). Indeed, the changes of the organization of Chilean law shows changes to be 
rather cumulative and of transference of functions. The biggest change occurs at the 
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beginnings of the nineteenth century, along with the independence from Spain, with 
the suspension of the Real Spanish Hearing as the supreme court of the territory 
and the beginning of the development of Chilean judicial organizations. This 
autonomous process continues during the nineteenth century and at the end of this 
century, there are administrative acts relative to the courts and to the administration 
of justice (Campos Harriet 1956: 562; Eyzaguirre 2004: 152ff.). During the twentieth 
century a higher specialization of courts happens, together with the dictation of new 
acts relative to commerce, mining, work, etc. (Eyzaguirre 2006: 207ff). 
 
The early foundation in 1738 of the first Chilean university, the University of San 
Felipe, was the first step in the formation of Chilean lawyers. Law, medicine, 
philosophy, theology, Latin, and mathematics were taught. Distributed in four 
faculties, the university conferred the degree of doctor in theology, jurisprudence 
and canons (licensed), in medicine and mathematics, but “it was primarily a School 
of Law” (Campos Harriet 1956: 47f.). That is, the organizational development of 
Chilean law can be observed not only in the regular functioning of its courts, but 
also in activities of the universities, which began in the eighteenth century and had 
an additional impulse with the creation of the University of Chile in the late 
nineteenth century. 
 
As previously noted, Chilean law does not arise spontaneously and based on 
customs, but is established by the Spanish colonial power before the aboriginals. 
Chilean law is, this way, a law embedded in organizations and within them it finds 
its niche and reproductive capacity. In this period of the evolution of Chilean law, 
there is no “living law” in the sense of Ehrlich (1989: 409ff.), since the decisions, the 
operative and binding law, were in the hands of organizations of law. 
 
4.1.2. The Subjective Rights 
 
The Spanish law in force in Chile in the sixteenth century in spite of its stratified 
character had in its origin a principle that can be considered as an evolutionary 
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acquisition of the modern Chilean law. It is the universalist concept of subjective rights. 
This institution is particularly important because, throughout the period of influence 
of Spanish law, it enters in contradiction to the local social structures and allows the 
anticipation of other later developments, such as the first constitutionalist attempts 
of the nineteenth century. 
 
The figure of subjective rights comes from the evolution of the Spanish law itself, 
especially influenced by Castilian law of the ninth century (Eyzaguirre 2006: 76). 
This universalist element of law meant to provide freedom to the American 
aboriginals, as well as to establish obligations for them. 
 
Although the inhabitants of the occupied territories might have become slaves, in 
accordance with the principles of the Common Law, the Catholic Monarchs 
recognized early the freedom of the natives. (…) In the Meeting of 1512 celebrated 
in Burgos a protective Ordinance of the Indians was issued. (Eyzaguirre 2006: 138) 
 
Along with this legal protection of the Indians, there was a systematical practice of 
abuses that were promptly denounced by the priest Bartolomé de las Casas (1552). 
Due to this situation of effective inequality, the legal problem seemed to be solved 
by giving a special legal status to the Indians, which were considered to be “relative 
incapable and, as such, subject to protection” (Ezyzaguirre 2006: 183). Nevertheless, 
the laws from Spain repeatedly insisted on the freedom of the Indians and its 
subjection as subordinates to the kings of Spain, which brought innumerable 
problems of the application of these laws in the colonies (Villalobos 2011: 70). Laws 
concerning the system of work of the Indians, by means of which tribute to the king 
was paid, such as the Rate of Santillán of 1561 or the Rate of Gamboa of 1580, always 
found opposition on the part of the colonists and slavery often became a common 
practice (Hanisch Espíndola 1991). 
  
The contradictions of this principle of equality of rights, with the effective practice 
of abuses in the treatment of the Indians by the conquerors, are well-known and 
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documented. We shall not dwell on these contradictions but rather on the effective 
consequences for the differentiation of the Chilean legal system. Suffice to say, the 
universalist principle of the subjective rights, according to which not only the 
colonists but also the aboriginal population had inherent personal freedoms, enters 
in contradiction with the existing social structures of its epoch, because it was a pre-
adaptive evolutionary acquisition inside a highly stratified society. That is, it is precisely 
this temporal contradiction that allows us to speak of an evolutionary phenomenon 
of this type, while it refers only to communicative conditions that they later use to 
make possible linkages with other structural developments. 
 
From our perspective, the main achievement of subjective rights is the symbolic 
generalization of normative expectations of the legal communication in all dimensions of 
meaning, but especially in the social plane. At this level, where the generalization is 
clearer, normative expectations can be attributed to the whole collective as defined 
by the law for its application. Thus, normative expectation can be kept available for 
any conflict that opposes rights of persons as identified by the system. At temporal 
level, subjective rights allow the stability of normative expectations for the future, 
which are available in a future that is not yet accurately distinguished. At the factual 
level, the generalization appears at a level of operations that point at contents of 
normative expectations recognized by the system, in spite of it still not operating in 
a differentiated way. From a spatial dimension, this generalization identifies a 
territory from which it gives validity to its dispositions. This universalization of the 
subjective rights has also been studied by Luhmann (1995; 1999e) in the context of 
the functional differentiation of law. Nevertheless in our analysis these rights are 
related to the symbolic generalization, which later allows the differentiation of a 
national legal system. 
 
It is interesting to emphasize that the subjective rights, in the context of the 
evolution of Chilean law, constitute a principle of universalization of normative 
expectations, something that does not happen in the same way in other functional 
communications. The religious, political, and economic inclusion, are largely crossed 
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by the social stratification of their epoch. This is expressed in that the lower strata 
and the periphery could only have the role of “public” in these communications and 
not that of “performer” (Luhmann 1992: 626). For religion, all are God’s children 
but not everyone can belong to the religious strata or explain the dogmas; politics 
recognizes all individuals as subjects to the crown, but only the aristocracy can make 
binding decisions; the economic activities are required for all the strata (even the 
encomenderos have to manage their lands), but not all can receive or execute payments 
(Luhmann 1994). In the field of law, however, it is possible to maintain normative 
expectations, although empirically it is more probable that conflicts resolution will 
be guided for social interests (of the high strata). This makes it clear that the figure 
of subjective rights does not allow an encouragement of unfounded optimisms, but 
rather enables a higher reflexivity in the system concerning the validity of law. 
 
Spanish law was in force in Chile for more than three centuries in which the crown 
was incessantly faced with the armed resistance of the Indians in southern Chile: the 
Mapuche. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Spanish law remains to be a reference 
for the national law and its abandonment occurs rather gradually. The declaration of 
the independence of Chile in 1810 marks a milestone in the history of Chile but it 
did not mean, as pointed in the historiography, an immediate separation of the 
Spanish law.108 This separation was somewhat gradual throughout the nineteenth 
century. While Spain maintained control over the territory of Chile, the legal 
institutions of the Chilean law did not distinguish between political and legal 
functions (Campos Harriet 1956: 57). 
 
Cabildos and hearings were both political and legal institutions. By the end of the 
eighteenth century the Spanish government of the Bourbons had already established 
a set of measures of centralization of its colonial administration. Along with the 
intervention of the crown in the cabildos (Eyzaguirre 2004: 42ff.), the encomiendas and 
 
                                                            
108 For a comprehensive study on this situation in the field of criminal law, from the independence 
until the twentieth century, see Matus (2012: 3-173). 
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the personal service were abolished and, thus, the idea of the Indian as a legally 
incapable was also abolished. This is the situation during the early nineteenth 
century, when under the political sign of the independence movements and the 
drafting of the first constitutions, the relationship between law and politics is, for 
the first time, problematized. 
 
4.1.3. The Constitutions 
 
The first Chilean constitutions had, as a main feature, the attempt to resolve the 
political problem of the national ‘sovereignty,’ which was ambiguously understood: 
located between the recognition to the king of Spain and the delimitation of a 
national territory. This is evident at least from the first provisional constitutional 
regulation of 1811 and it was only in the constitution of 1822 that the ambiguity 
relative to the sovereignty seems to be partially cleared (according to article 1 of the 
constitution of 1822, sovereignty resides in the Chilean nation), along with a major 
sophistication in issues of nationality, citizenship, and individual freedoms (Campos 
Harriet 1956: 440ff). The common problem that these constitutions try to solve is 
mainly the kind of political organization that the government of Chile has. 
Meanwhile, the validity of the Spanish is not assumed as a problem. 
 
Both the first and brief provisional constitutional regulation of 1811 and the second 
and most extensive of 1812 recognize the sovereignty of the king of Spain. Still, the 
second constitutional regulation of 1812 introduces a principle of ambiguity about 
colonial sovereignty (article 5), established individual rights (article 24), and 
freedoms of the press (article 23). The third constitutional regulation of 1814 
focuses again, like the regulation of 1811, on administrative functions and its 
greatest achievement is the definition of the figure of the “Supreme Director” 
whose “faculties are vast and unlimited” (article 2). According to Campos Harriet 
(1956: 428), this latter regulation represented “a regression in the constitutional 
evolution” since it indicated few advances in terms of political laws and freedoms, 
and reinstated colonial customs. 
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Something similar happened with the constitution of 1818, which, in spite of 
indicating personal freedoms (Title I, article 1) and a principle of Habeas Corpus 
(Title I, article 3), the powers granted to the Supreme Director were considered 
“dictatorial” (Galdames 1925: 505). Although this constitution provided specific 
judicial functions for the courts, it indicated the need to ask the Senate, in certain 
cases, to provide solution in cases of conflict with the current system of government 
(Title V, article 2). That is, the courts should consider “goal programs” (Luhmann 
1987) in their options, according to the current political situation. 
 
Later, both the “moralist” political constitution of 1823 – which lasted only “a few 
months” (Eyzaguirre 2004: 74) - as the federal acts of 1926 and the “liberal” 
constitution of 1828 essentially share the problem of the political organization. In all 
these cases, in spite of their diversity, the problem was solved using the formula of 
the “constitutional State” (Palm 2005: 172ff). From a comparative point of view, 
this period can be seen as an evolutionary stage of variations concerning the legal 
problem of the constitutional form to adopt. An oversupply of constitutional 
possibilities is produced and a pressure for selectivity gradually grows. This phase of 
constitutional variations becomes juridically stable in 1833, with the enactment of the 
constitution of the same year, and which stayed in force for more than ninety years. 
 
The constitution of 1833 is, from this point in time, an evolutionary acquisition with 
long-term consequences.109 This constitution also marks the beginning of the political 
stabilization of Chile, which will not suffer important institutional ruptures for over 
sixty years. The constitutions are mechanisms of a structural coupling between the 
legal system and the political system, and thus have effects on both systems: “The 
novelty of the constitutional concept of the 18th Century is that the Constitution 
provides a legal solution to the problem of self-reference of political system and at the 
 
                                                            
109 In the traditional historiography the name of Diego Portales is immediately mentioned. See 
Gongora (1981). 
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same time a political solution to the problem of self-reference of the legal system” 
(Luhmann 1990b: 202).110 This implies that the constitutions already suppose a 
differentiation between law and politics, and react to this differentiation (Luhmann 
1990b: 179f.). This can be argued in the Chilean case only by accepting a set of 
nuances, for example, that while the constitution observes this distinction, since it 
defines differentiated functions for the judiciary and for the other political powers, it 
is only in some cases that it is established with relative clarity the autonomy of the 
law. Also, during this process that we have called ‘variations,’ most of the 
constitutions contemplate the use of “extraordinary faculties” of the political power 
and a possible “suspension of some articles of the constitution” in favor of that 
power (Palma 2005: 183), which was modified only by the end of the nineteenth 
century in the framework of the constitution promulgated in 1833 (Campos Harriet 
1956: 479ff). 
 
The constitution of 1833 is only the first stabilization of the constitutionalism, but 
this means neither its greatest perfection nor a better situation. By far, the 
constitution of 1833 stayed in force for nearly a century, surviving the civil war of 
1891, and represented the increasing differentiation of Chilean politics. In the context of 
this constitution, the Chilean political power was organized, i.e., the “republic” 
(Campos Harriet 1956: 473ff.). The figure of the “president” as center of the power 
is also consolidated and his limits and attributions are defined (Bravo Lira 1996: 
30ff).111 In this period, the Chilean political parties emerge, which some historians as 
Eyzaguirre (2004: 117ff) attribute to the so-called “question of the sacristan,” a 
problem of jurisdiction between the Catholic Church and the State. 
 
                                                            
110 “Die Neuheit des Verfassungskonzepts des 18. Jahrhunderts liegt darin, daß die Verfassung eine 
rechtliche Lösung des Selbstreferenzproblems des politischen Systems und zugleich eine politische 
Lösung des Selbstreferenzproblems des Rechtssystems ermöglicht.” 
111 Alberto Edwards (1945: 271) indicates, as an element of institutional stabilization of Chile, the 
aristocratic resistance to the monarchy - the “frond” -, where “constitutions had little or nothing to 
do.” But Edwards does not refer to the political system, but rather to the vague concept of 
“institutions”. 
 
 
155 
 
 
As noted by Bravo Lira (1996: 44), the ‘parliament’ is a political institution that only 
appears in the nineteenth century in Chile, while the figure of the ‘president’ is 
much older and dates back to the judicial presidents of the colonial period. The 
constitution of 1833 defined broad attributions to this power and by the end of the 
nineteenth century, this power should be limited through liberal constitutional 
reforms.112 The contemporary sociology of law has also criticized this excessive 
“presidentialist” character that stems from this tradition and the loss of legislative 
functions of the parliament, which “no longer exercised legislative power but in the 
shade, under the dependence of another power, the Executive” (Cordero 2002: 
511). For some authors, this “centralist” and also “ritualistic” character – in an 
obviously negative sense - is a general feature of the Latin-American legal systems 
(Witker and Nataren 2010: 13, Binder 2007: 14ff). 
 
Chilean law received important stimuli during this period of constitutionalization. 
The Spanish law was losing legal validity by the enactment of the so called 
“Marianan acts” in 1924 and the successive codifications of Chilean laws initiated in 
1855 with the civil code, and followed by the commercial code in 1867, the mining 
code in 1874, and other enactments by the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.113 Nevertheless, this process has contradictions. All the constitutions, from 
1833 until 1980, considered “exceptional” measures, as those indicated in the 
constitution of 1833. The constitution of 1925 reserved diverse powers to the 
presidentsin according to exceptional situations (Palma 2004: 40) and the 
constitution promulgated during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in 1980 and 
its idea of a “protected democracy” continued this tradition (Palm 2004: 96).114  
 
                                                            
112 Some historians as Villalobos (2011: 139) see here even the origin of the Chilean institutions, in 
the “perfect order” of the liberal governments of the late nineteenth century. 
113 At length in Campos Harriet (1956: 537ff) and Eyzaguirre (2006: 207ff). 
114 Based on the case of Brazil, Marcelo Neves (1992: 61) has pointed out that the Latin-American 
constitutions should be considered a mere weak “symbolic power” in front of the real political 
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The constitutional stability initiated in 1833 constituted however an extremely 
important structural element for the evolution of Chilean law. While this process 
further supported the differentiation of politics, the legal side of the State and the 
possible limitations of its power are distinguished in every case. The form of the 
“Constitutional State” (Palm 2005: 218) or “the legalistic rule of law” (Bravo Lira 
1996: 204) strengthened the procedural character of the law and its most relevant 
institutions and also produced a factual stabilization of contents regarding the valid 
law. This way, a set of structural supports is constituted, and it is by means of this 
support that a political power based on valid law is constituted to be increasingly 
independent from Spanish law. 
 
During the twentieth century there was a sustained development of the Chilean 
judiciary and national laws. The constitution of 1925 indicated a tendency of 
secularization of the State that had already begun in the late nineteenth century, by 
means of the law of secular cemeteries of 1883, the acts of civil marriage and civil 
registration office of 1884, and finally the elimination of the state jurisdiction over 
the catholic church (the called “patronage”) and the suppression of an official 
religion for the State. Constitutionalists like Palma (2004: 20ff.) argue that after the 
reforms made to the constitution of 1833: “the constitution of 1925 is only a 
reform: we are not in the presence of a revolutionary phenomenon, a case of 
discontinuity or constitutional rupture,” because it maintains much of the 
nineteenth century order. One of the achievements of the constitutionalist and 
codification movements of the nineteenth century was, from a semantic point of 
view, the extension of the legalism115 that goes back to colonial times. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
power. The reflection of Neves is, nevertheless, exaggerated in diverse points, since he seems to 
overestimate the functions of the constitutions. See also Neves (2004). 
115 We will return to this subject later in the context of the discussion on “legal culture.” 
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Along with the figure of the subjective rights and the development of the constitutions, 
there is a third evolutionary acquisition of vital importance for the evolution of law 
in Chile and it is possible to argue that it gives a definitive impulse to the 
differentiation of Chilean law. We refer to the reaction of the Chilean law in the late 
twentieth century to the human rights violations that took place during the 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet judged in the nineties by the democratic 
governments. This has to do with two interrelated elements: the importance that the 
international law acquires and the autonomization of the Chilean courts against 
political pressures. 
 
4.1.4. The “Permanent Kidnapping” in Human Rights 
 
The emergence of the human rights issue in Chilean law is a long-standing subject. 
It can be argued that throughout the twentieth century, a particular development of 
the semantics of equality in Chile is produced. In the early twentieth century, along 
with the flourishing mining and industrial development of the country, a set of 
demands arises under the called “social question” (Osrrego Luco 2000), which 
described a number of social problems arising due to the migration of workers, the 
misery, the poor nutrition, the promiscuousness, problems of healthiness (such as 
the high infant mortality) and low income. From a legal standpoint, the “social 
question” meant a shift from the universalist principle of subjective rights for the 
law, since inequality now appears as a problem that must be compensated by means 
of rights. In this regard, various acts were enacted to protect the population in 
poverty situations and the political parties were differentiated concerning this 
problem (Eyzaguirre 2004: 182ff). 
 
In the 70’s of the twentieth century and during the Cold War came the military coup 
led by the generals of the army, the air force and the navy, with the support of 
Chile’s economic elites and the government of the United States of North America. 
The purpose of the coup was to overthrow the socialist government of President 
Salvador Allende, after an acute economic crisis. Certainly, it is not the first coup 
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d’état in the history of Chile, but this caused the systematic persecution, torture, and 
murder of opponents of the regime.116 These crimes were only judged after the 
state’s return to democracy as influenced by international pressure. 
 
Human rights coexist with the structural situation of modern society, i.e., functional 
differentiation. From this perspective, it must be emphasized that human rights are 
a product of the evolution of society and its characteristics meet the structural 
situation that society experiences. On this matter, Luhmann (1974e: 23ff.) argues 
that human rights have the function to protect and stabilize the functional 
differentiation. This definition should not be interpreted through the prism of the 
classic criticism to the system theory as a theory of social stability, but through the 
interdependence of social systems in a functionally differentiated environment. The 
main characteristic of human rights in modern society is to transform the basis of 
law, from the objective rights (based on the social order) that characterized stratified 
societies; to subjective rights, which consider the individual as a whole, regardless of 
its social position. 
 
Through this change, human rights are structured around functional differentiation, 
based on “fundamental freedoms” and “rights of equality” (Verschraegen 2002: 
268ff). The fundamental freedoms give the person rights of “communicative self-
presentation” (right to life, physical integrity and freedom of movement; articles 3, 
4, 5, and 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights) that are based on “the 
presence, posture and expression of the body” (Luhmmann 1974e: 79), that is to 
say, on basic conditions that allow communication. The rights of equality, 
meanwhile, allow a selective indifference, that is to say, that inequality should be 
established only by inclusion processes of functional systems and not by an 
ascription of the person to a social group, area, or class situation. 
 
 
                                                            
116 See Loveman and Lira (2000). 
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With this, human rights communication exceeds the scope of the national legal 
system and goes beyond the idea of these rights as a protection of the individual 
from politics –as a self-limitation of the political system. This is why human rights 
goes beyond the law of States and rather refer more directly to world society, since 
they represent a wider problem than the ones referred to the administration in a 
territory; they relate to the conditions of the communication in general. The subject 
of human rights in Chile is related by both international law and its recognition in 
legal doctrine. 
 
The main initiators on the subject of human rights in Chile were international 
courts, especially the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the 
mediation instance before to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Chile 
ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on August 21, 
1990, only including crimes later than March 11, 1990. The court nevertheless 
admitted older cases. By the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the 
number of cases relative to Chile that were reviewed by this international court 
increased. In them we can see, the international discomfort to the Chilean legal 
system and the explanations given by the State of Chile to the demands presented in 
the court.117 
 
In virtually all the cases presented before the IACHR, three arguments are 
established on behalf of the Chilean government that will be reiterative in its 
position on the commission for more than a decade: 1) the maintenance of the 
independence of the judiciary, this is, what indicates the valid law in constitutional 
and administrative matters; 2) the political non-interference in judicial decisions, not 
directly due to dispositions of formal law, but for “respect” to judicial decisions, an 
ethical dimension in the semantics of the separation of State powers; and 3) the 
expectation of future modifications to law, that is to say, projects of law that try to 
modify a legal situation that cannot be transformed without this procedure.  
 
                                                            
117 See www.cidh.oas.org.  
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This type of arguments is repeated and the explanations attend to formal questions 
of every case and not aimed to refute the substantive demonstrations presented.118 
This occurs in cases of various kinds, as case 11.863, of 1998, which denounces the 
figure of the Designated and Lifetime Senators, case 11.725 of 1999 concerning the 
murder of the Spanish diplomat Carmelo Soria, and case 11.803 of 1998 relative to 
the censorship of the film “the Last Temptation of Christ.” It can be pointed out 
that these three arguments of the government on the topic of the human rights 
summarize the dimensions of meaning: the factual dimension on the argument 
relative to the written norm that establishes the separation of the powers, the social 
dimension on the argument of institutional respect and the political will to maintain 
the autonomy of the legal system, and the temporal dimension on the argument of 
the valid law and the expectation of transformation of this through legislation. All of 
them present an image of the State from the argumentation of the government, 
which tries to establish that the law has not been violated but, above all, that legal 
decisions are respected. 
 
The legal norm, which constantly blocked all the attempts of judging in Chilean 
courts cases of human rights violations, was the Decree Law 2.191 of 1978 called 
“Amnesty Law.” This law, enacted in 1978 during the military dictatorship – and 
still in force- establishes a pardon for crimes happened between 1970 and 1974. Its 
first article states, “Amnesty be granted to all the persons that, as perpetrators, 
accomplices or aiders, had incurred in criminal acts, during the situation of the State 
of Siege, ranging from September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978, just in case that 
they are not currently processed or condemned.” This law was invoked by the State 
of Chile against the demands before the IACHR in case 11.725 of 1999 on the 
murder of the Spanish diplomat Carmelo Soria and in case 11.771 of 2001 on the 
murder of Samuel Catalán Lincoleo. 
 
                                                            
118 An exception to this rule is the case 12.142 of 2000 on the “Libro Negro de la Justicia Chilena,” 
wherein the government argues against the facts and evidence presented. 
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This may be seen in various ways. On the one hand, the international law 
dispositions are accepted by the State but they would not have effective validity due 
mainly to the aforementioned decree. This appears, then, as a relic of the political 
supremacy on legal validity that recognizes the system itself. In substantive terms, it 
is possible to observe that the (political) “territorialization” of the law (i.e., 
sovereignty) dominates as a principle of legal legitimacy over the proper legal 
communications, which point towards recognizing the proper decisions of law. In 
other words, the law (as a world system) points to the (legal) validity, while 
sovereignty as principle of state law would point to the (political) legitimacy. 
 
Focusing on the topic of human rights from national legal jurisprudence, we draw 
our attention to decisions of the courts involving Decree Law 2.191 of 1978 
(Amnesty Law). This law bestowed no jurisdiction to the courts to judge murders 
that happened in the military coups of 1973 until the year 1978. In 1994, Chilean 
courts resolved, in the first instance, to apply sentences for three members of the 
intelligence organ of the dictatorship called DICOMCAR (Direction of 
Communications of Carabineers) for the crime of three communist professionals in 
1985. The sentence constituted the first occasion in which condemnations were 
applied by a case of human rights violation in Chile. A year later, after an extensive 
judicial process, the retired Army General Manuel Contreras and the Brigadier in 
active service of the same entity, Pedro Espinoza, were condemned to seven and six 
years of prison, respectively,  
 
The amnesty law will be losing its force by the end of the twentieth century by 
means of legal resources. The legal concept that appears as an improbable 
achievement in the evolution of Chilean law, and therefore constitutes an evolutionary 
acquisition, is the legal argument of the permanent kidnapping, which allowed binding 
communication in the valid law for the legal system. This figure, it might be said, 
constitutes an important event in the evolution of law: a surprising communication 
that is selected and stabilized in the system. This figure was applied on several 
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occasions and appeared as an interpretation of law that allowed the pursuit of 
respective responsibilities for crimes. In 1998, the Chilean Supreme Court refused to 
apply, for the first time in a case of human rights violations, the amnesty law. The 
figure of the permanent kidnapping indicated that if the body of a victim does not 
appear, it is presumed to be a crime of kidnapping and continues to be so. 
Therefore amnesty should not be applied because the investigation is not yet 
exhausted. 
 
Between the historical reasons of this shift, the most frequently cited one is the 
detention of the dictator Augusto Pinochet in London in 1998. In January of that 
year, the Supreme Court decided to reopen the case of the murder of twelve 
opponents of the Pinochet dictatorship called “Operation Albania,” annulling the 
previously dictated sentence by the military courts, which ordered the dismissal of 
the process. That same year, the Court of Appeals reopened the case of the murder 
of the union leader Tucapel Jimenez and the Supreme Court later reopened another 
case called “Caravan of the Death,” accepting again the thesis that permanent 
kidnapping  is imprescriptible when the person kidnapped or the body of this 
person is not returned, released, or recovered. Therefore it cannot be amnestied.” 
With this sentence, the Supreme Court considers that the amnesty law does not 
prevent from investigating kidnappings and disappearances that happened after 
September 11, 1973. International treaties are also considered to have precedence 
over the amnesty law. 
 
In a sentence issued in 2004 relative to the kidnapping and disappearance in 1975 of 
the militant Miguel Ángel Sandoval, the importance of the international law and the 
figure of the “permanent kidnapping” are indicated. Paragraph 76, letter C, states: 
“That, in view of the above, and having the mentioned kidnapping crime the 
character of permanent, on prolonging it in the time, there does not proceed, in this 
case, the application of the mentioned Law of Amnesty, since this refers to crimes 
completed in the period of time that points, this is, between September 11, 1973 
and March 10, 1978; nor the prescription of the criminal action, since the illicit 
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action has not stopped from its consequences for the victim, which is still missing.” 
The sentence argues that presuming the death of the victim involves violating 
constitutional norms of a correct process. 
 
Permanent kidnapping as an argument is interesting because it shows the 
operational closure of law with regard to “common sense” and the political 
pressures. According to common sense, because of the time elapsed and the 
indications that the victim may have been murdered, a kidnapping is unlikely. Still, 
the law does not recognize this “reasonable” argument based on common sense, but 
instead seeks for a “valid” argument. The law can be operatively closed regarding 
“common sense” and communicate solely from legal validity. The argument states 
that “crime continues to be committed” so it does not apply either the amnesty law 
or the prescription of the crime. The victim “keeps on suffering the consequences” 
of the crime, so that by the legal system the illicit keeps on being perpetrated. The 
system decides that there exist “well-founded suspicions” about the kidnapping of 
the victim; therefore, there is a crime. Instead of abandoning the case, due to the 
absence of the body of the victim, it is preferred to follow the “presumption” of 
another crime, in this case: the aggravated kidnapping. The pressure of decision for 
the courts provoke that these have to decide before all the cases (Luhmann 1995a: 
303). 
 
Common sense indicates that in a situation of dictatorship and human rights 
violations, it is more probable and reasonable to consider that the victim has died. 
Nevertheless, the legal decision is supported on arguments of legal validity that are 
surprising with regard to the dogmatic tradition in legal interpretation, but not 
contradictory. The figure of the permanent kidnapping illustrates then how the legal 
system can decide without taking into consideration extra-legal criteria but only the 
possibilities that legal communication provides. This goes along with the 
differentiation of the legal system and its operational closure, since the systemic 
guarantees of communication, carried by the human rights, are safeguarded by the 
legal system, beyond acts inherited from the dictatorial regime that impede the flow 
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of a legal process to decide on these issues. This is relevant given that the autonomy 
of the legal system does not only involve the operational closure and cognitive 
openness, but also allows the observance of the legal system, as a system that 
administers justice, from an external point of view. This means, as legal doctrine 
(representing an internal version of the complexity of the law), justice appears as the 
relation between its internal operations and its environment. As we have seen in 
previous chapters, the dogmatic function is the self-presentation of the decisional 
coherence of a system’s internal unit, while justice is a reflection of the internal 
operations of the law as just or unjust, for society. 
 
From this figure, the legal system only recognizes its internal decision criteria and 
abrogates an interpretation of the political world. Following this principle, the 
Chilean legal system crosses a threshold in its differentiation with the use of its own 
medium –legal validity - for its autopoietic reproduction. Thus, from internal 
arrangements, it was possible to block the capacity of connection of the amnesty law 
and, this way, it was possible that the growing allegations of human rights violations 
could have a procedural treatment within the legal system. Along with constituting 
an evolutionary acquisition, the figure of the permanent kidnapping also constitutes 
a reduction of complexity of the environment by means of treatable forms within 
the system. 
 
Up to this point, we have confronted – following the evolutionary perspective of 
Luhmann (1995a) - a handful of evolutionary acquisitions that have occurred in the 
evolution of Chilean law. From them it is possible to identify thresholds in the 
evolution of the Chilean law, from the organizational totalization of the law in its 
origin, also the legal universalism of the subjective rights, the constitutional order as 
element of its differentiation and the reaction to human rights by means of the 
figure of permanent kidnapping. We have dwelt especially on the last one since it is the 
most recent and speaks about an operational closure of the legal system, although it 
does not make the previous acquisitions disappear. All these acquisitions involve 
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managing the complexity of the environment through legal forms that become 
stable in time.  
 
The explanation of the evolutionary acquisitions has always served as background to 
the problem of the social structures appropriate to their emergence. If subjective 
rights are defined as an evolutionary acquisition, it is because the structural situation 
of Chilean society in the sixteenth century does not have a specific correlation for 
these rights. Chile   was primarily a stratified society; therefore the universal 
subjective rights present characteristics that will have a greater relational density only 
during later periods. The same occurs with the first judicial organizations, which 
implies that a degree of bureaucratization was hardly attainable in the mid-sixteenth 
century. Constitutions are very advanced evolutionary acquisitions in a political 
situation characterized by instability, which is attested in a dozen of these 
regulations enacted in the mid-nineteenth century. Finally, the figure of permanent 
kidnapping is also highly improbable in the context of a legal system that assumes a 
politically complex and legally underdeveloped problem, using formulas for the 
treatment of such complexity produced only within the legal system, in its 
operational closure. 
 
So far we have dealt with the evolutionary acquisitions of Chilean law. We will refer 
in the following section to the “forms of differentiation” in the evolution of law in 
Chile. For this, we will use structural sociological analyses. 
 
4.2. Forms of Differentiation of Law in Chile 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, the line that seems to dominate the 
sociological diagnoses on the emergence of modernity in Chile indicate that this is 
established only in the middle of the twentieth century, mainly due to the crises of 
massification of urban poverty in the early part of this century and the subsequent 
ascent of the middle strata (Godoy 2000: 325ff.). The agrarian economic 
organization that was prevailing as stratification factor since the sixteenth century 
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(Morandé 1987; Medina 2000) is now faced with demands for reform on the 
distribution of land and also produced the first systematical attempts of 
industrialization. 
 
The main problem that arises from this idea is the fact that Chilean law mends to 
the epoch of the Spanish conquest and its transformations, as we have previously 
noted, gradually occur. Although it is only towards the end of the twentieth century 
that we can speak of a functionally differentiated law, law as a social system 
performing a function undoubtedly has a much greater antiquity. Leaving the 
analysis of the structural conditions prior to modernity under the figure of 
“tradition,” “networks” or “familiarity” then seems to dissolve the status of law as a 
functional system. But, is this possible? 
 
The question we must address now is: to what kind of social system does the 
Chilean law correspond before the emergence of modernity in Chile? If we follow 
the analysis of Weber (1922a) concerning the types of law, Chilean law is, from its 
beginnings, “modern” as it is based on legal authority (even if it comes from the 
natural law of kings) and not of charisma, tradition, or materiality. This leads to 
significant problems of interpretation, since it supposes only a political order and 
not the proper character of the system of law. A different panorama appears when 
the law is analyzed as a system based on restitutive norms (Durkheim 2001) coming 
from industrial development, because in that place only the late industrial 
development of Chile in mid-twentieth century – or at best cases, in its beginnings - 
could one speak of a “modern” law. 
 
From the perspective of systems theory, it is possible to observe that the 
specification of a functional problem for law is given from the time of the conquest. 
As Bravo Lira notes (1996: 26ff), the Spanish law of the conquest has, as a function, 
the treatment of the justice in its colonies and that justice consisted in normative 
expectations. Also, the figure of subjective rights is present since the arrival of the 
Spanish law as well as organizations for the administration of justice. 
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In the colony and amid a fierce and unwavering stratification, in politics unfolds an 
incipient functional differentiation similar to the Spanish hegemonic center. Within 
the State of the political system, the Council of the Indies (1524) had the most 
formal relevancy. The delegation of royal power was strictly hierarchical: Viceroys, 
Governors, Magistrates. The Real Hearing was the summit of the legal system. 
(Robles 2006: 249) 
 
The constitutions of the nineteenth century, in fact, only change the names of the 
former colonial administration of justice and perfect aspects of it. Throughout this 
century, national legal norms would be gradually developing. Based on these criteria, 
legal system would be a highly differentiated system in contrast to that in the 
eighteenth century. 
 
The historiography is right in diagnosing specific developments of Chilean law from 
an institutional standpoint, but it lacks a sociological perspective that allows the 
observance not only of the self-reference of law, but also of its hetero-reference. 
The various periodizations of historiography, therefore, do not correspond hundred 
percent to the evolution of law from the perspective that we have adopted. 
 
Next, we will try to trace the lines of an evolution of the law, together with the 
evolution of Chilean society. For this, we will use the distinction of “forms of 
differentiation” of Luhmann (1977, 1997a). 
 
4.2.1. The Law of the Stratified Society, and of Center and Periphery 
 
The first period extends from the foundation of Chile in the sixteenth century to the 
early twentieth century. In this period, a law that combines elements of the stratified 
society with the gradual advances towards a functional differentiation towards mid-
nineteenth century appears. Unlike the analysis of Robles (2006), we support that it 
is not possible to argue that it is a mere “stratified colonial society,” but in this 
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period, advances concerning the functional differentiation of systems surface. That 
is, it is not a question of pure types in the forms of differentiation, but rather of a 
framework that considers both the advances of functional differentiation, and the 
stratificatory order. 
 
The law in this epoch is permeated both by social stratification and by social 
stratification spatial distinctions of center and periphery. From the mid-sixteenth 
century, the Cabildos were, as we have previously noted, the most important legal 
and political institution of the colonial social order. The Cabildos clearly 
distinguished the “main neighbors” in their membership rules (Eyzaguirre 2004: 
27ff), which then corresponded to the summit of the stratified structure at this 
epoch. The main neighbors were, at the beginning, Spanish encomenderos, but later 
bureaucrats and others administrative roles are also included. The Cabildo, thus, 
diffusely defined the capacity of certain persons and families in making legal decisions 
concerning the community. 
 
Nevertheless, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were spaces for 
social mobility, due to the scarcity of aristocratic lineages and the semi-functional 
nature of the conquest, in which a partial social mobility could happen based on 
royal honors, prestige and economic activities (De Ramón 2000). 
 
Nevertheless, by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the stratification 
sharpens and is reflected in the law. The “Royal Pragmatics on marriage of the 
family children” dictated by King Carlos III of Spain in 1776, prohibited marriage 
without parental consent. This led to the so-called “trials of dissent” (Vial Correa 
2000). These trials were referred, in the core, to the ability of families to oppose to 
the marriage of their children when they considered that the future spouse was not 
worthy of the family and caused a prejudice to them. Ethnic prejudices abounded in 
those trials, as a possible African ancestry of the candidate (Vial Correa 2000: 72), 
but also the so-called unworthy jobs, such as mechanical in nature (Vial Correa 
2000: 73). 
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These trials show an attempt for maintaining the stratification by means of exogamy 
prohibitions. In a biological sense, this blockade of the freedom to choose spouses 
corresponds precisely to a principle of differentiation, as it is a rule that prohibits 
the reproduction between different social strata (Wortmann 2007: 108). 
  
Besides this social stratification, there was a spatial stratification. The law was a matter 
not only affected by the social position of persons and families, but also by the 
spatial location in cities as centers versus rural peripheries. 
 
In the Indies, by contrast, the land was more jurisdictionally “empty.” At the level 
of ordinary justice and administration, the authority of the king had been delegated 
to the cities, which were the fundamental nuclei of settlement and institutional 
organization. (Góngora 1975: 422) 
 
The institutional history of Chile is essentially urban, which certainly does not mean 
that the social structure is always due to urban spaces. Nevertheless the law was 
concentrated in the cities, while the lands lacked jurisdiction, except for the 
authorities of the “towns of Indians” (Góngora 1975: 422). The cities were the 
center from which justice administered and dispensed. The law was thus 
differentiated in centers and peripheries with scarce contacts. The legal activity was 
developed in the centers and only in the middle of the seventeenth century did a 
shift in this situation happen, although at a level far form the central administration 
of the cities. 
 
Until the mid-seventeenth century, the Chilean economy was based on mining. The 
high social status of the encomenderos came precisely from the use of indigenous labor 
force for mining, with which they paid taxes to the crown. Mining is losing 
importance in the late seventeenth century with the growth of agriculture, with the 
help of the increasing demand for wheat from Peru. Due to the concentration of 
land in rural areas and the formation of an economic unit different from the mining 
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production, a new differentiated social order is established in rural areas, namely, the 
hacienda. 
 
On the hacienda, there is a wealth of historical and sociological studies (cf. Cousiño 
& Valenzuela 2012; Morandé 1987; Medina 2000; MacBride 2000; Góngora 1975; 
Bauer 1971). All these emphasize its character as a main economic institution until 
the mid-eighteenth century. The haciendas included large farms and cattle areas, 
which belonged to a family. The hacienda had its own stratification, as noted by 
Godoy (2000: 57). 
 
The highest status symbol is here the landowner and its family that concentrate 
wealth, power and prestige in their vast domains and their influence reaches the 
city. (…) They are followed by the employees of confidence: butlers, housekeepers 
or administrators; to greater social distance there are located the white or half-caste 
inquilinos [tenant farmers], from which the domestic service is recruited. The free 
farmhands constitute the last stratum of the hacienda. 
 
In contrast to the big properties of other Latin-American countries, the Chilean 
hacienda was not intensively exploited. Its labor force was not based on African 
slavery, but on work remunerated in goods, land rights, or money. This type of 
labor work gave rise to the spontaneous legal institution of the inquilinage. The 
inquilinos, usually impoverished half-caste or Spaniards, were the dominant labor 
force in the hacienda. By means of a verbal contract, the landowner agreed to lease a 
portion of land in peripheral areas to the inquilino. This lease was paid by the 
performance of certain functions, such as surveillance, administration, or workforce. 
 
The inquilinage was a type of contract celebrated without the incumbency of the urban 
legal order, and it established a set of duties and rights for the parties. That is, a set 
of normative expectations, which had, however, a binding validity only in the socially 
separated context of the social structure of the hacienda and which was judged 
asymmetrically by the landowner. It was, in fact, a law of the hacienda, which 
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allowed the order of property and work, through regulations based on the stratified 
nature of the hacienda. 
 
This division between center/periphery also had differentiation tendencies in other 
functional systems as correlations and, depending on the functional point of view, it 
is possible to observe an oscillation between center and periphery. From an 
economic point of view the haciendas were the production center and the source of 
wealth. The wealth of the haciendas was such, both in the rural and in urban areas, 
and was a source of status in both sides of the form. The problems of the hacienda, 
from this perspective, were largely concentrated in the political and legal systems. 
Although the hacienda was a relatively autonomous social order, the increasing 
differentiation of the national State from these power centers constituted a problem 
for urban administration. From the point of view of the law, the “confidence” from 
which the legal relations were constituted in the hacienda (cf. Cousiño & Valenzuela 
2012; Morandé 1987; Rodríguez 2007) was unable to densify in the urban 
bureaucratic structures. The verbal contracts between inquilinos and landowners were 
only binding in the stratified order of the hacienda. 
 
In the Chilean stratified society, we therefore find a dual legal system with different 
development grades. On the one hand, a highly bureaucratized and proceduralized 
urban law, which, although it had incipient universalist pretensions, was permeated 
by the prejudices of its time; and, on the other hand, a rural law, based on the validity 
of the stratified social structure of the hacienda, had scarce organizational 
development. Both systems had little to do with each other. While in the cities, 
courts were organized, procedures were dictated and new legal developments took 
place, the hacienda law referred primarily to the binding capacity of the contract, to 
the resolution of specific conflicts and occasionally to the contact with the urban 
administration through the police. Although both systems solved the problem of the 
maintenance of normative expectations, their hetero-orientation was very different. 
While urban law was gradually constructed along with the political system, the law 
of the hacienda has a purpose that primarily facilitates economic activity. 
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During all this period, this double movement of the Chilean law, between the social 
distinctions originated by the principles of stratified differentiation and the dynamics 
of differentiation between center and periphery, can be observed. The element that 
allows the identification of a threshold between this type of law and the following 
form of differentiation is precisely the weakening, not of the stratified order by 
itself, but of the dissolution of the form center/periphery. The duality of urban and 
rural legal systems will continue until the decline of the economic activity of the 
hacienda. With the decline of the hacienda, the barriers for the reproduction 
between urban and rural legal communications are diluted. This occurs due to a 
number of factors that must be carefully analyzed. 
 
4.2.2. The Politicized Law of the Functionally Differentiated Society with 
Class Structure  
  
The concept of “functionally differentiated society with class structure” 
corresponds, as Luhmann points out (1985: 139), to a transition stage between the 
stratification and the functional differentiation, which expresses the stratification 
from certain special conditions. 
 
The concept of class society corresponds to a “semantic of self-description of 
society” (Luhmann 1985: 129) based on the problem of the absence of a central 
instance to regulate the multidimensionality of the distribution and that generated, 
from this, social equality and inequality. In historical terms, this self-description 
coincides with the change in the form of differentiation, from the primacy of 
stratification to functional differentiation (Luhmann, 1985: 129). The class concept, 
thereby, reflectively refers to how individuals are distributed in unequal classes, i.e., 
unequal distributions. In other words, the class concept refers to the “distribution of 
distribution” (Luhmann, 1985: 128) and its amplitude exceeds the merely 
economical. What is different about this stratification expression lies in the way in 
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which classes are configured and how these adhere to different logics from these 
dominants in pre-modern stratified society. 
 
The class concept, although it refers to a manifestation of stratification, has some 
specific characteristics. First of all, the ‘functionally differentiated society with class 
structure’ regulates the problem of the distribution in a different way from stratified 
society. While in stratification, unequal communication is regulated through 
interaction (that is to say, through the ‘presence’ in the communication), in the 
functionally differentiated society with class structure, the inequality and the 
distribution cannot be treated at this level:  
 
Social classes are therefore strata, i.e. groups which, considering a difference 
between better and worse, must renounce to regulate the interaction. (Luhmann, 1985: 
131)119 
 
With such ‘renounce to regulate the interaction,’ inequality is universalized and is 
generalized beyond the presence of the speakers. Then the problem of how to 
justify an unequal distribution in a society of equals, opposite a stratified society, 
where the problematic was reversed, arises i.e., it had to justify an equal distribution 
in a society of unequals. 
 
The stratified society is, meanwhile, a society of presences, which appear steadily in 
interactions. With the shift to functional differentiation, the requirement of referral 
to presence disappears and the problems that were earlier treated at interactional 
level can be moved in an abstract way towards functional systems and organizations. 
For this reason, societies structured in social classes allow major freedom that 
stratified societies, since individual roles allow for vertical mobilities and horizontal 
diversities, which are prohibited or have diverse obstacles in stratified societies. The 
 
                                                            
119 “Soziale Klassen sind demnach Schichten, also Gruppierungen im Hinblick auf eine Differenz von 
besser und slechter, die darauf verzichten müβen, Interaktion zu regulieren.” 
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social inequality in the functionally differentiated society with class structure is 
reproduced by means of systemic mechanisms and not by means of familiar or 
stratified ascriptions. 
 
According to Luhmann (1985: 145), the systemic mechanisms around which social 
classes would form are fundamentally three, namely: money, career, and 
prominence, which structure, in turn, three social classes: the economic, the 
organizational, and the prominent. The classes depend on parasite specific systemic 
mechanisms. After payments in money were introduced as symbolically generalized 
communication medium, the rich class depends on them to maintain its inequality 
position; once organized in chains of decisions, political power must resort to 
procedures and legal resistances to physical violence to preserve the domination; 
and the prominent class can only maintain its status based on the complex network 
of communications that maintains them as a theme in the communication. The 
semantics of the classes, in the interim, are only possible in a functionally 
differentiated society, where classes have no function and where the inequality in the 
distribution itself may only appear transverse to the society, while this specifies 
functions of a partial way. 
 
This form of differentiation emerges in Chile along with the loss of centrality of the 
hacienda. The social stratification in this period experiences a significant shift due to 
the change in the form center/periphery. It does not exactly cause a radical change 
in social stratification, but centers and peripheries are repositioned. If, in the 
previous period, the hacienda was the core of organization, now it is the city. 
 
In the mid-nineteenth century, a number of institutional changes that had structural 
consequences for Chilean society happened. The independence from Spain in 1810 
was followed by an eight years’ war that concluded with the withdrawal of the 
Spanish troops. After this experience, the first attempts of organization of the 
Chilean State occur. In 1811, the abolition of slavery is decreed and in 1813, the 
same occurs with the titles of nobility. The greatest social mobility came, 
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nevertheless, by changes in economic activities. The economic activity of the 
hacienda declined mainly due to its lack of productivity, which by the end of the 
nineteenth century was no longer able to meet the domestic demand (Godoy 2000: 
225). The center of economic activity shifted to mining and with it begins the first 
great migrations to the cities and to mining centers of northern Chile. Along with 
this, the commerce and banking activities developed. 
 
By the late nineteenth century, the problems of misery in the cities, which gives way 
to the “social question,” (Orrego Luco 2000) and to the first strike of workers in 
1890, exacerbate. The semantics that accompanies the historical and sociological 
diagnoses of this period is the so-called “moral crisis” (Recabarren 2000, Mac Iver 
2000, Jacobet 2000), which denounced the loss of unity and social integration of the 
country. 
 
Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century, changes in social stratification are 
produced, which no longer had the marked presential nature of the hacienda.120 For 
this reason, it is more appropriate to speak of ‘social classes’ and not of ‘strata.’ 
Owners of mining companies, banks, and other businessmen are now the privileged 
classes. Alliances occur between these groups and the former landowners, although 
the latter gradually lost their power, while wealth and ostentation takes a specifically 
urban shape: “The landowners tend to move away from the land to settle in 
Santiago or in Europe, living of the incomes provided by its administrators and 
tenants” (Godoy 2000: 171), which produces a gap in the face-to-face relations 
between them and the inquilinos, thus weakening the social structure of the 
hacienda (cf. Cousiño & Valenzuela 2012; Morandé 1987). 
 
The new social classes are not yet regulated, as rural strata, by relations of 
confidence based on interactions, but by the functional ties of private enterprises or 
 
                                                            
120 In the sense of “sociability” of Cousiño and Valenzuela (2012) and also in the sense of 
“interaction systems” noted by Luhmann (1975a). 
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the State administration. These changes contributed to the development of the 
Chilean legal system. After the independence of the country, diverse constitutional 
essays appear and a number of acts that tend to organize the State and its 
institutions are issued, as well as financial and commercial activity. In 1860, the 
banking law is enacted and in 1865, the commercial code; in 1883, the law of secular 
cemeteries; in 1884, the law of civil marriage and the civil registry office is created 
for that purpose; in 1855, the civil code is issued; and in 1881, the organic law of 
courts (cf. Eyzaguirre 2004: 126ff.). 
 
The old urban/rural duality of law begins to disappear due to a major functional 
specialization of urban law. Indeed, the social structure of colonial stratification 
suffers little changes with the independence (Veliz 2000: 221) and at administrative 
level there was no significant revolution, but rather a gradual change. The main shift 
in the law of the functionally differentiated society with class structure is the 
increasing problematization of the internal inequality.   
 
Lacking the legal validity provided by the authoritarianism of the landowner, urban 
law can only resort to the procedural validity of the state bureaucracy (Luhmann 
1983) and since the law lacks elements to treat the new inequality that arose by the 
mining and commercial heyday, the problems ended in deep political crises and 
explosions of violence. In the early twentieth century, the situation has become 
more acute. The strike of the dockworkers in Valparaiso in 1903, the strike in 
Antofagasta in 1906, and the massacre at the Santa Maria school in Iquique in 1907 
are the result of a policy of violent repression against the lower classes of miners, 
workers, and wage earners. The legal and political systems were unable to address 
the problems of the lower classes. In a certain way, the disdain of the politics of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century for the lower classes was an attempt for 
closing the structure of classes – in the absence of a rule of closing through kinship 
relations, as in the seventeenth century - by means of a rule of exclusion: the 
exclusion of the lower classes of political participation, economic well-being, and 
access to the justice.  
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The situation is clear, however, as regards the economic system. From the mid-
nineteenth century until the early twentieth century, the pulperías, in which workers 
exchanged products by means of special coins received along with its salary, were 
established in saltpeter mining in northern Chile. These special coins only had value 
in the mining industry and only for the purposes stipulated by this industry, without 
being able to be replaced by money. That is, an organizational barrier interferes with 
money payments, which was intended not only to further enrich the owners of the 
mines where the pulperías were operated, but it also had, as a purpose, the partial 
exclusion of the workers on the circulation of money. 
 
The formation of social classes came under the wing of these exclusions, which 
took shape primarily as economic classes and secondly as organizational classes. The 
gradual introduction and generalization of money in the cities had, as a 
consequence, the growth of an economic class different from the agrarian structure, 
which was rather dedicated to speculation and financial capitalism (Godoy 2000: 
170). In the other side the impoverished and marginal masses, which survived in 
conditions of misery and neglect, remained in the cities. Inclusion, in this case, was 
regulated by access to money. 
 
With regard to organizational classes mediated by careers, a gradual advance of this 
class is primarily produced by the growth of the public administration and the 
industries, which, in the twentieth century, will give rise to the so-called ‘middle 
classes’ and they, in turn, produce a change in the structure of political parties 
(Pregger-Roman 1983: 39). As noted by Góngora (1981: 58), it was not a bourgeois 
class but a class “of university professionals and bureaucrats, or of provincials 
owners.” 
 
How does the law react to this change in the principles of differentiation? Only 
from its contact with politics does the law react to the sharpening of class conflicts. 
The constitution of 1925 is undoubtedly the biggest change in this regard, but also 
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worth mentioning is the so-called “social” and labor acts from the early twentieth 
century, as the act of working rooms of 1906, the act of industrial accidents of 1916, 
the labor code of 1931 among others (cf. Palma 2005: 348ff). The feature that 
characterizes the law in this period is a politicized law, which is located in the 
transition between a stratified law and marked by the duality center and periphery, 
and an urban law centered on the State and its administration, which is increasingly 
responsible for the problems in the political system. This excessive 
instrumentalization of the law by politics for much of the twentieth century has 
been characterized by Mascareño (2004) as “dedifferentiation” between law and 
politics, and as “politicization” by Cousiño and Valenzuela (2012). 
 
Whereas the politicized law of functionally differentiated society with class structure 
was in force, the problems of inclusion and exclusion in law were regulated mainly 
by means of political guidelines. The political affiliation and affinity increases or 
decreases the probability of compliance of normative expectations, whether with 
regard to goods produced and distributed by the State or by the repression of the 
State against its enemies (Mascareño 2010). The form inclusion and exclusion are 
not closed with regard to the form hacienda/city as in the stratified law, but by 
means of the form ally/enemy that comes from the political over-coding of the law. 
This over-coding develops gradually with the political patronage systems of the 
twentieth century and enters a crisis in the 70’s due to the “politicization” of society 
(Cousiño and Valenzuela 2012) and the “crisis of complexity” produced by the coup 
d’état in 1973 (Mascareño 2003b). The military dictatorship imposes in turn the 
logic of a politicized law expressed in denials of justice against the human rights 
violations. 
 
Until the late twentieth century, it can be argued that a politicized law tributary of a 
functionally differentiated society with class structure predominates in Chile. 
Nevertheless, as we will show, it is not a change in the principle of differentiation of 
classes (which has not yet been totally overcome) what, by the end of the twentieth 
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century, causes a change in the form of differentiation of the law, but the relations 
between law and politics. 
 
4.2.3. The Functional Differentiation of Law 
 
Since the mid-twentieth century and specially by the end of that century, a number 
of conditions that allow a functionally differentiated legal system converge. This 
occurs along with the differentiation of other functional systems.121 As noted by 
Cousiño and Valenzuela (2012), during this period politics and economy 
differentiates and, as noted by Robles (2006), the situation is similar in education, 
health, and mass media. 
 
It is through the separation between law and politics that a legal system is 
established as a functionally differentiated system, which in the Chilean case was 
achieved by means of the resolution of the conflict with human rights through 
appeals to international law. We analyzed this situation previously in the context of 
the evolutionary acquisitions of law. 
 
While the denial of justice survived, politically influenced until the late twentieth 
century in cases of human rights violations, the boundaries of inclusion in law were 
influenced by politics. The dissolution of this difference allows the crossing of the 
threshold from the mere institutionalization of law towards its differentiation, as an 
operationally closed functional system. Based on this, law can have real pretensions 
of inclusion of the entire politically delimited collective delimited within its 
jurisdiction, without considering more than the legal criteria. At this point, its 
autonomy and operational closure are problematized. 
 
 
                                                            
121 On the contrary, Marcelo Neves (2012) had recently noted that in Latin America there would be 
no primacy of functional differentiation. His thesis on the importance of corruption is, however, 
exaggerated. 
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Being a problem usually treated in the science of law and marginally seen by the 
sociology of law, it is necessary to add some thoughts on this. The discussion 
concerning the autonomy of the law in Chile is old. This discussion focuses on a 
traditional vision of the autonomy, or rather of independence, according to which, it is 
necessary to encourage this aspect in judges and lawyers (Luhmann 1995a: 63). The 
relevance of the concept of autonomy to describe the modern legal system is due to 
the specification of the law as a social system with capacity to distinguish and 
operate in a unitary way (Luhmann 1995th: 62). The autonomy appears as a result of 
the operational closure of the legal system. 
 
Unlike the usual understanding of autonomy, we distinguish strictly between 
questions of causal dependence or independence (which can be judged by an 
observer in any or other way, depending on its selection of causes and effects) and 
questions of reference that always involves the system as observer. (Luhmann 
1995a: 77)  
 
These issues of ‘dependence’ or ‘independence’ refer to the indication of the system 
or to its environment as a point of observation, that is: self-reference or hetero-
reference. It should be noted that the autonomy of a system means that this 
operates as a unit and has ‘self-limitation,’ which in turn means that operational 
closure is a determinant of this situation and not its cause (Luhmann 1995a: 63). 
These problems of dependence or independence can be treated in at least two ways: 
from the function (operation) and from the coding (observation), respectively. In 
this sense, the self-reference – from the perspective of the system - refers to the 
self-limited maintenance of the normative expectations in spite of its 
disappointment, while the hetero-reference refers to the self-limited possibilities of 
learning of the system, i.e. doctrinaire or legislative learning. This produces the 
operational closure and cognitive openness of law (Luhmann 1995a: 77; 1987: 356f). 
 
The autonomy of the system refers, in short, to the conditions under which legal 
procedures are properly limited from their own operational closure. A system is not 
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autonomous when it operates in a state of autarky, but when the system is 
determined by its own structures (operational closure) and its influence limits are 
self-determined. The problems of autonomy in the system happen when these limits 
are somewhat altered, jeopardizing not only the structure decision of the system but 
also its legitimization, as the generalization of expectations about its procedures is 
affected. 
 
This autonomy of law does not mean, of course, the triumph of functional 
differentiation over stratification. As noted by Robles (2006), and we agree with his 
diagnosis, the Chilean functional differentiation has not completely overcome its 
class structure, in spite having functionally differentiated systems as economics or 
politics. The law seems to belatedly react to these differentiations and only from the 
interference of the international human rights law is it geared towards the universal 
inclusion as principle. For this same reason, the full validity of human rights by the 
end of the twentieth century characterizes the functional differentiation of law and 
thereby shows its openness to the law of world society. 
  
In the case of Chile, the differentiation of various social spheres has increased, from 
a modernization process whose tendency, although it has been of economic-liberal 
character, has separately plausibilized the differentiation of other social systems. The 
differentiation of autonomous social systems is a direct expression of the 
modernization process in Chile and its effects extend not only to the State, as an 
institutional axis, and to economics, but also to other communications, as for 
instance communications on sport, religion, education, environment, etc. The 
expansion of the communications via electronic social networks has increased these 
differentiations, making more complex politics, family, etc. All these phenomena 
show the tendency to differentiation of communications on specific problems of 
reference. 
 
The differentiation between law and politics was not achieved, as in the formal 
diagnosis of Luhmann (1990b: 179f) by means of constitutions only, which began in 
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the nineteenth century. Constitutions were rather a pre-adaptive advance on further 
differentiation. Indeed, in 1980, during the period of repression of the military 
dictatorship a new constitution was issued, which is in force until today, in spite of 
the deep political changes of the country. This constitution has rather had, in a 
certain way, a “symbolic power” (Neves 1992) and has been, in various aspects, an 
obstacle for the differentiation and diversification of politics and law. For this 
motive, it is not possible to identify constitutionalism as a source of differentiation 
between law and politics, but this occurs rather in the center of the legal system, that 
is, in the decisions of the courts. 
 
In summary we can indicate that the change in the form of differentiation towards 
functional differentiation involves a change in the principle of legal inclusion.  
 
In a stratified society the problem of inclusion and exclusion comes from privileges 
of strata. In a society with the form center/periphery this problem is based on the 
duality between a highly bureaucratized urban law and a rural law based on relations 
of confidence between the landowner and its dependents.  
 
Meanwhile, in the functionally differentiated society with class structure, the 
politicization of law permeates this inclusion and the law tries to re-introduce, by 
means of “social laws” and other types of acts, the disadvantaged social classes. 
Nevertheless, the political patronage and its influence in the decisions of the law 
make it difficult to see a universalist principle of inclusion in the system.  
 
Only with the rupture of the impunity for human rights violations and its 
prosecution in courts does the law demarcate a boundary with regard to politics and 
its influences. From there, the problem of the law is managing its own procedures 
and the counterfactual use of legal arguments as the figure of the “permanent 
kidnapping” that we have discussed previously. 
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Table 9 Forms of Differentiation in Chile, Law and Evolutionary 
Acquisitions 
 
Form of 
Differentiation 
Types of law  Inclusion/Exclusion Evolutionary 
Acquisitions 
Stratified society 
and of center/ 
periphery 
Stratified and 
dual law 
(urban/rural) 
Strata privileges and 
residence  
Subjective 
rights, 
Bureaucracies 
Functionally 
differentiated 
society with class 
structure 
Politicized law Economic functions 
and political patronage  
Constitutions 
Functionally 
differentiated 
society 
Functionally 
differentiated 
law 
Legal procedures and 
principles  
Human rights 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
While it is somewhat artificial to place the types of law parallel to evolutionary 
acquisitions, since they rather constitute intermediate thresholds, it is possible to 
indicate that the main evolutionary acquisitions of the stratified and dual law 
corresponds to its early structuring in organizations and under the principle of 
subjective rights. These two acquisitions allowed a further development of the legal 
bureaucracy and the expansion of the inclusion in the law. We have seen, however, 
that both acquisitions were limited in scope. The rural law never achieved stabilized 
organizations within the haciendas, and subjective rights functioned only as an 
abstract principle of inclusion. 
 
In a society functionally differentiated with class structure, constitutions are those 
that present an advance with regard to the differentiation between law and politics. 
By means of these constitutions, a differentiation between politics and society is 
achieved, and from them, the organization of the State is made possible. 
Nevertheless, the law remains tied to political caprices and the constitution only 
gives form to structures in its political side, considering law as a mere administration 
of justice. 
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The figure of permanent kidnapping, that allows the prosecution of human rights 
violations, is located in the transit from the politicized law and the functionally 
differentiated law. From this, the legal system is capable of treating political 
complexity through legal procedures. The closure of the system with regard to 
politics is produced and the autonomy of the law is problematized. 
 
A functionally differentiated law is not a “better” law, in the sense of an advance, 
progress or perfection of a system. The functional differentiation of law has, as a 
result for the system, the challenge of dealing with its own complexity, without 
being able to resort to politics as support for its operations. This means a release of 
the political structures, but simultaneously, the deployment of new complexities. 
This new law has to deal now with self-created problems that made the system more 
complex in its own operations. New problems and paradoxes are created. Before we 
discuss subsequent tendencies, problems, and contemporary paradoxes of Chilean 
law deals, we must briefly review the remarks of the Chilean sociology of law 
concerning the concept of legal culture. Why had the Chilean sociology of law only 
paid attention to the “culture of law” and not to its structural changes? 
 
4.3. Excursus on the semantics of the Chilean sociology of law: the legal 
culture 
 
The Chilean sociology of law was established around the concept of “legal culture.” 
By means of the legal culture concept, sociology of law, juridical sciences, and 
philosophy of law, work together in order to problematize the unit of a national or 
regional legal system and search for distinctive elements. Legal culture, thus, has 
been a conceptual contribution of social sciences – or rather an adaptation of the 
concept of culture of sociology and cultural anthropology. The particular reasons 
for which legal culture has been one of the favorite concepts of Chilean sociologist 
are not entirely clear; nevertheless it turns out to be evident that the use of this 
concept has deeply permeated the reflection of legal system in Chile. 
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The most cited Book on the concept of legal culture corresponds to the studies of 
Lawrence Friedman, who defines the concept as one of the components of legal 
system. Specifically, he refers to:  
 
Values and attitudes which bind the system together, and which determine the place 
of the legal system in the culture of the society as a whole. [...] It is the legal culture, 
that is, the network of values and attitudes relating to law, which determines when 
and why and where people turn to law or government, or turn away. (Friedman 
1969: 34).  
 
Later Friedman placed this specific concept on the external side of legal culture, since 
he differentiates between an internal legal culture and an external one, with regard to 
participation in procedures and juridical functions: “[t]he external legal culture is the 
legal culture of the general population; the internal legal culture is the legal culture of 
those members of society who perform specialized legal tasks” (Friedman 1975: 
223). This dual conception of legal culture has been very important as praxis of 
observation of the legal system in Latin America and Chile in particular, where the 
concept has a long tradition of interpretations.  
 
For instance, to Agustín Squella – one of the most influential expert in these issues 
–, it must be clearly differentiated between an internal and external legal culture as a 
general starting point: “beliefs, ideals, traditions, ways of feeling, ways of thinking” 
constitute a legal culture (Squella 2000: 661), an opinion shared by Valle (2001: 
87ff). Some critics have argued that this concept must be replaced by a less 
pretentious version or by a broader category such as ethos (Peña 1992; Barahona 
2010). Others critics argue that the concept would be like “a ubiquitous Procrustean 
bed” (Alfaro 2002: 341-342), i.e., a category that most of the time forces the facts in 
an arbitrary and artificial way. However, these critics occupy a marginal position. 
 
In general terms, it can be argued that the concept of legal culture in Chile has been 
mostly used as a self-description of the unit of legal system. By means of this concept, 
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national legal system is made visible as a comparable unit. This concept of legal culture 
is confronted with the old notion of “juridical system” (Raz 1986).122 Thus, legal 
culture allows problematizing permanence or structural change in legal system, 
without direct references to specific regulatory bodies or to political or economic 
systems. The concept demands only a clear distinction between self-reference and 
hetero-reference of the unit. 
 
For authors like Edmundo Fuenzalida, a legal system can be viewed as a cultural 
unit. For him, social changes occur when they are able to change social normative 
patterns. An abrupt and non-consensual change in normative patterns affects 
society as a whole. The coup d’état of 1973 in Chile is an example of an abrupt 
normative change, which causes a rupture in the legal culture:  
 
For this reason, when the commanders in chief of the Armed forces and 
Carabineers gave the coup d’état of September 11th of 1973, a crisis took place, not 
only of the democratic institutions, but also of the legal culture built around it and of 
the behavior of many jurists who had contributed to its development. (Fuenzalida 
2003: 203, emphasis supplied.) 
 
For Fuenzalida, the coup d’état in Chile marks a rupture with a long juridical tradition, 
which has been very difficult to recompose. For this author, before 1973 an external 
legal culture of opaqueness with regard to institutional legal system, i.e. law inspired 
fear but also respect to legal institutions, and an internal legal culture of “adherence” 
and “obedience” to law dominated in Chile (Fuenzalida 2002: 328). This situation 
drastically changed with the occurrence of the coup d’état. After that, an external legal 
culture of loss of “respect” and “confidence” towards law appeared (Fuenzalida 
2002: 329-330; 2002: 226), and in the last years, an external legal culture of 
 
                                                            
122 It is possible to hypothesize that the abandonment of this conception is due partly to the 
complete reformulation of the concept of juridical system from the sociology of law of Niklas 
Luhmann, who conceives this system as a of global scope and of supranational-state character 
(Luhmann 1995a; 2008a). 
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consumerism, where “the justice is like another good of those that one acquires on 
market” existed (Fuenzalida 2002: 334). With regard to internal legal culture, 
Fuenzalida points out that after the return to democracy, there have been positive 
changes such as the creation of the “judicial academy” (Fuenzalida 2003: 219) and 
the entry into force of the “criminal procedural reform” (Fuenzalida 2003: 226). 
 
Other experts like Aldo Valle share the idea of Squella and Fuenzalida that the 
distinction of internal and external legal culture is a key factor to properly describe 
this unit of analysis. For him, legal culture primarily regards “convictions” or 
“beliefs.” 
 
Legal culture, which can be internal or external, generically, designates the subjective 
domain of the juridical system, i.e. juridical-normative convictions of subjects that 
intervene in processes of systematization, creation, declaration, application and 
execution of law in a given social community or the beliefs that about law and 
justice any member of the community has, although he does not intervene in any 
juridical activity. (Valle 2001: 88-89) 
 
Among these beliefs and convictions, one of the most significant is that concerning 
the importance that has legalism, or adherence to positive law, for internal legal 
culture in Chile: 
 
The aforementioned legalism and exegetical method is not an exclusive 
characteristic of judges, but of diverse actors and operators of the law in Chile. 
Lawyers, academicians, legislators, officials of the administration, district attorneys 
and comptrollers, take part of the same conception. (Valle 2001: 102) 
 
The characteristics of the Chilean legal culture would be characterized by some 
additional elements such as: beliefs in a “higher wisdom” of the law, the idea of 
“obedience” (vs. criticism) to law on judges, and a conception of law as a “static, 
specific and reduced” order (Valle 2001: 103ff.). All this has as a corollary a 
“professional” legal culture in terms of qualification and legitimacy of its operators 
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and, simultaneously, “traditional” in terms of their interpretations and 
transformations (Valle 2001: 108). 
 
Other authors also share the diagnoses of Fuenzalida and Valle with respect to the 
legalism of the Chilean internal legal culture. For Orrego, for example, this feature is 
a part of an ancient positivist tradition of interpretation of law, which is kept in 
force as it hardly contains questionable premises, such as the separation of powers 
of the State or demands for moral, religious, and political autonomy of the judges 
(Orrego 2002: 462ff.). Other authors, such as Toro argues, in turn, that legalism is a 
legacy of national independence movements:  
 
The historical context that preceded and succeeded to political independence of 
Chile is a determinant point of heading to define which has been the configuration 
of its juridical way of thinking. On the one hand, American colonies shared the 
enlightened ideology of French Revolution. Thus, the postulate of the omnipotence 
of law, sublime instrument of the reason to materialize the desire of justice and 
security sought by all peoples, was acquired by Chile and by other Latin-American 
countries. (Toro 2002: 495) 
 
This legalism increased until it definitively concluded in the codifications of the 19th 
century, which reinforce this first impulse in national legal culture (Toro 2002: 496). 
For Barahona, this legalism is the result of a mixture of Spanish and French 
influences, as reflected in the scholastic thought and in the canon law, and which 
was passed as part of the national law (Barahona 2010: 429-430) and was later 
reinforced by the codifications of Andrés Bello and still later, in the 20th century, by 
German positivism – mainly of Kelsen – in the pyramidal conception of the 
institutional system (Barahona 2010: 436). 
 
Legalism has been seen, on the other hand, as a cultural obstacle to development 
and legal change. Authors, like Manson, point out that this element is rather a factor 
of deviation from law and more than a virtue, since “legalism it is not synonymous 
of literalism.’ But in Chile many juridical operators pay an excessive cult to the letter 
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of the law, betraying its sense” (Manson 2002: 355). Others support that this 
legalistic culture turns out to be a problem for the deployment of materially oriented 
new legal methods, like alternative conflict resolution systems (Gómez 2002), or due 
to its orientation a set of relevant legal matters left unregulated (García Huidobro 
2002). It has also been criticized as the excessive presidential character derived from 
this tradition, as well as the loss of legislative functions of the parliament, which 
“does not already exercise the legislature but is the shade under dependence on 
another power, namely the Executive” (Cordero 2002: 511). For some authors, this 
“centralist” and also “ritualistic” – in an obviously negative sense – character is a 
general feature of the Latin-American legal systems (Witker & Nataren 2010: 13; 
Binder 2007: 14ff).  
 
On the external Chilean legal culture, there are fewer consensuses, mainly because 
researches on legal culture in Chile have not successfully held a dialogue with other 
social sciences nor have they done such in a very superficial manner. This situation 
is not exclusive of Chilean sociology of law. Diagnostics of external legal culture in 
Brazil, for example, are particularly diffuse in analyses of possible “contradictions” 
between both sides of legal culture (Botelho 2003: 189-190). Other diagnoses on the 
external legal culture in Latin America tend to emphasize only the negative side of 
such culture. An example of this is in the diagnosis on “disobedience” and 
“evasion” of law as aspects of the external legal culture in Mexico (López-Ayllón 
2003: 515ff), which is also present in Argentina (Bergoglio 2003: 38ff.), “distrust” as 
key element in legal culture of Venezuela (Pérez-Perdomo 2003: 711-712), or 
“corruption” as internal and external element in Colombia that is common to a big 
portion of Latin America (Uprimiy et al. 2003). While these elements point to 
obvious situations that actually affect the functioning of Latin-American legal 
systems, in these diagnoses in negation to external legal culture, a deeper analysis on 
external culture of national legal systems is lacking. Legal culture not presents only a 
conceptual weakness, but also there exist problems of distinction that deserve to be 
more accurately defined between effective internal and external factors. 
 
 
 
190 
 
In global terms, we find that the concept of legal culture in Chile has been seen, 
following the tradition of Friedman (1969; 1975), as a primarily ideational aspect or, 
using that old anthropological nomenclature, “emic” (Pike 1967; Harris 1976). The 
concept of legal culture as values, beliefs, ideals, convictions, or traditions, precisely seek to 
emphasize that culture builds an abstract unit, whose simplified character allows 
delimiting a state-national or regional legal systems.123 This way, the concept can maintain 
its comparative character –defended for Nelken (2010) and Cotterrell (1997) – and 
emphasize distinctive aspects of each unit, but it has not been able to account for 
the reasons of its maintenance or for significant relations that it could have with 
society or individuals.124 The insistence of sociology of law on the legal culture 
concept has certainly allowed a relative openness to consider relations of legal 
system with its social environment. Nevertheless, this openness has been given 
without a clear definition of the social system of law, which can only be elucidated by a 
clear analysis on the differentiation of that system, as we have previously made. 
 
 
 
                                                            
123 Only in recent years has the supranational character of legal cultures been discussed. See in this 
regard Gessner (2010). 
124 This type of problems also gave much of the traditional difficulties of the anthropological 
concept of culture. Once the concept left its emphasis as merely a description of the 19th century 
and was used to characterize the genesis and maintenance of social order, a dispute not only with 
the sociological concept of society, which only founds a way out in the disciplinary (and secondarily 
conceptual) armistice of Kroeber and Parsons (1958), but also with regard to the scope of the 
concept in structural and temporal terms, opened. 
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5. CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES ON THE DIFFERENTIATION 
OF LAW IN CHILE: HYPOTHESIS FOR A RESEARCH PROGRAM 
 
The law in Chile has been affected in recent years by deep transformations of 
formal and procedural character. These transformations have also been present in 
most of the countries of the region and have been accompanied by other 
modernization processes. Reforms and changes of diverse type have happened in 
the last decades. In the context of an investigation like this one, it is necessary to 
discuss all these changes within a particular theoretical and evolutionary overview. 
Since we don’t have sufficient precedents to speak about “evolutionary acquisitions” 
or changes in the “form of differentiation,” it seems appropriate to simply speak 
about “tendencies” in the differentiation of law, that is to say, movements which 
persistence is accentuated in the last years. We speak, in any case, of present 
tendencies and not of future projections. 
 
The sociological analysis of law in Chile has had a comparative accent, i.e. cultural 
(Luhmann, 1999h: 47 y ss),125 which has been marked, as previously noted, as the 
concept of legal culture. At the level of systemic analysis, the discussions of 
functional differentiation in Chile also use a comparative approach, especially with 
regard to more developed regions of the world (Mascareño 2010; Robles 2005; 
Rodríguez 2007). While these approaches correctly addresses fundamental problems 
in the form of functional differentiation and the emergency of multiple and specific 
modernities, we have not only dealt with these structural aspects, but also with 
boundary demarcation problems and self-limitation at spatial and social level. It is 
exactly there, where the differentiation of the system ceases to be a purely 
organizational problem (of the administration of law), and the practical and 
empirical character of the law of society is accentuated. 
 
                                                            
125 If we follow the approach of Luhmann on comparative observations, it could be noted that this 
type of cultural descriptions corresponds to cultural descriptions, since they emphasize similarities and 
differences between world regions. 
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Although we are aware that they are still tentative approaches, we will discuss the 
dimensions of meaning identified by Luhmann (1991a: 114ff) current tendencies of 
the differentiation of law in Chile, in order to emphasize not only the complexity of 
its differentiation, but also its different problems of reference, self-referential 
semantics, and even paradoxes. These reflections are therefore, only a number of 
hypotheses whose subsequent development can only be outlined here. 
 
We will proceed with our analysis distinguishing structural tendencies, problems of 
reference, semantics, and also tentative paradoxes. It is necessary to clarify two of 
these elements. When we refer to “problems of reference” we directly refer to the 
functional scheme, which, although it maintains a relatively stable core in different 
functional systems, has variations depending on the perspective adopted for its 
observation. When, on the other hand, we refer to semantics, we continue the use 
that Luhmann (1993a: 7) makes of this concept, especially as a way of historical-
cultural observation and that refers to generalized and available meaning as 
communication (Luhmann 1993a: 19). A parallel for the distinction between social 
and semantic structure, as noted by Luhmann, is (although re-formulated) the 
distinction between social system and cultural system of Parsons (Luhmann 1993a: 16). 
Based on these axioms, we will try a characterization of the current tendencies of 
differentiation of Chilean law. 
 
5.1. Autonomy 
 
In the factual dimension, we identify a tendency in the differentiation of the law in 
Chile in the last years that is directly related to the most visible consequence of the 
operational closure, that is to say, the tendency towards autonomy, whose 
development was limited during the dictatorship of Pinochet and recaptured as a 
project during the democratic governments that followed (Ruiz Tagle 2003). 
Processes of distinction that use legal communication are developed, and they 
gradually point out that, within the scope of legal communication, everything 
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relevant to law cannot only be the subject of legal decision, but also that the criteria 
by which these distinctions are develop are the criteria defined by the legal system 
itself (Mascareño 2004). 
 
The problem of the revealed reference is the maintenance of operative boundaries of the 
system, that is to say, the problem of the maintenance of its operational closure. At 
semantic level, the development of the differentiation of the law goes along with 
semantics, which highlight the need for independence of the law, which is then 
emphasized by diverse professionals and legal experts (Cadenas 2008). The tendency 
towards a major autonomy of law in Chile has been reinforced in the last years by 
the human rights trials and denunciations of corruption (Skaar 2003). 
  
This increasing autonomy has brought with it a strong specialization of law and an 
orientation towards its own procedures. This has led not only to an increasing 
procedural specification, but also to the autonomy of the law in its decisions, which 
have become more and more dependent on experts’ knowledge from various fields. 
This phenomenon has been marked most in the demands experts’ from medical and 
scientific disciplines in the new criminal process (Ritz et 2005; Riffo 2004) and in 
requests of mediation and diagnosis in the new family courts. This way, the 
semantics of the independence of the decisions have its counterpart in the dependence on 
external knowledge, without which the legal decisions may be very questionable. 
 
This phenomenon has become particularly relevant in the case of the above-
mentioned reforms and has emerged not only as the problem of scientific authority 
in legal procedures, but also as the problem of the grade of autonomy of law in 
matters that are gaining their own autonomy and sophistication. This gives form to 
a paradoxical situation of dependent independence, because, although the semantics of 
independence is still very present, the legal decisions are increasingly affected with 
substantive aspects of the cases and their specificities. 
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5.2. Acceleration 
 
At temporal level, law also has suffered transformations in its most decisive 
functional aspect, which is the treatment of normative expectations. That is, the 
differentiation of law also implies a differentiation of norms and these are located in 
the temporal dimension of meaning (Luhmann 1995a: 124ff). The reforms 
implemented in Chile in recent years have largely attacked this factor, though within 
an organizational context, and have been comparatively successful in the Latin-
American region (Azócar & Undurraga 2005; Witker & Nataren 2010). Within a 
strategy of the modernization of law, the acceleration of the time in its processes has 
become a central aspect and an element and indicator of efficiency, which acts as a 
dominant semantic (Santibáñez 2000).126 
 
The decisions inside the legal system now have stricter execution times, since time is 
considered a limited resource. The temporal horizon of law in these cases is restricted, 
while normative production significantly increases. This would lead to a new 
problem of reference in this plane, i.e., the problem of the congruence of decisions in a 
context of transformations. Deciding quickly leads to problems of compatibility 
between past and future decisions. The system has to face the problem of a constant 
request of decisions, in front of the necessity of maintaining a dogmatic unity. 
 
This gives rise to a paradox that we might call desynchronizated acceleration. While the 
reduction of time in legal processes has been identified as an efficiency factor, this 
acceleration brings synchronization problems at normative level. Time itself 
involves the paradox that this only exists in time, and its observation has to consider 
it in every distinction (Nassehi 2008: 223ff.). This paradox can only be eliminated 
through the displacement of the problem towards other dimensions, for example, 
towards the factual dimension through memory (Luhmann 1999h). At comparative 
 
                                                            
126 Luhmann (1993a: 38f) also indicates that acceleration is a tendency of differentiation. On 
acceleration as an element of modernization, see Rosa (2003: 27ff). 
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level, the legal system is immersed in the situation of the “simultaneity of the non-
simultaneous” (Nassehi 1994: 53), because what happens in its environment is 
simultaneous but inaccessible, as a simultaneous operation in the time. The 
consequence of these paradoxes is expressed in law and its acceleration and 
synchronization problems. The operations are accelerated in its procedures but the 
normative congruence of its decisions (as problem of reference) is tested in every 
event. 
 
This has been manifested in discomfort in public opinion, for example, as the 
problem of the “revolving door” of court procedures, according to which, at penal 
level there is acceleration in the processes but, simultaneously, impunity in the 
sanctions (Duce 2005). The desynchronization problem of law is sharpened, since 
the efficiency criterion is purely administrative and does not point to either social or 
factual conditions of law, but purely to a “mechanical” or merely chronologically 
indicator of the time (Luhmann 1976b: 137f). The problem of efficiency as a semantic 
of law is that the temporal conception of efficiency uses exactly a mechanical function 
of time, as an administrable resource, and does not consider a phenomenological127 
conception of the temporality of the legal system. This desynchronization of the 
times in the law has, as a consequence, that at the level of the efficiency of the 
system, indicating a future that, operationally, “cannot begin” (Luhmann 1976b). 
 
5.3. Internationalization 
 
In its spatial background, the law in Chile has been internationalized along with the 
processes of penetration of competitions of international law (Mereminskaya & 
Mascareño 2006) and the globalization of legal regimes (Teubner 2002). In the 
various internal levels of organization of law, the spatial references become visible in 
the light of diverse legal competitions or legal collisions. What, at one time, could be 
decided under the context of the empire of sovereignty, is now a subject of 
 
                                                            
127 See Luhmann (1976b) and Nassehi (1994, 2008) on this phenomenological conception of time. 
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controversies and disputes. Now, how law can be distinguished from a spatial 
background and how specific competitions are determinate through decisions are 
problematized. For this reason the problem of reference in this dimension is the 
operation capacity on jurisdictional boundaries, since the spatial background of law has 
been altered.  
 
As previously noted, the spatial dimension is a key element in the differentiation of 
law since, in contrast to other functional systems as science or economics, this 
recognizes a special relevance for the problem of the borders, where law can operate 
in a structurally coherent manner. Although in the scientific system, a globalization 
of knowledge and theories can be seen, and also in the economic system a 
deterritorialization of economic operations through the use of the medium money, 
both systems consider spatial aspects as relevant. Economy is still related to 
concepts, as property and science distinguishes, in spite of its globalization, between 
centers and peripheries of scientific production. The semantic correspondent for the 
internationalization of law is the globalization and its consequences for the 
functioning of the system (Gessner 2010; Günther 2003).  
 
Latin America is not exempt from problems, since the role played by international 
law in national legislation is mostly secondary and controversial, alongside the 
increasing supranational role played by the law (López-Ayllón 2010: 141ff.). Gessner 
(2010: 115), for example, mentions nine aspects in which a ‘globalized legal culture’ 
overcomes the national regimes: 1) international law, regional law (for example, 
EU), national law (applied in accordance with private international law); 2) the rules 
of the regimes, the networks, soft law, lex mercatoria, the commercial customs; 3) 
international standars  (for example, the ISO), the norms of the ILO; 4) the self-
obligations of companies for the achievement of global regulatory objectives; 5) the 
judgments of international or supranational courts:  International Court of Justice, 
European Court of Justice, WTO; 6) the international arbitral courts in matters of 
international law or private law; 7) the adjudicative practice of international, regional 
executive organs (EU, NAFTA, etc.), in the context of cross-border administrative 
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activities; 8) the legal practice of companies, law firms, associations, and NGO, 
regarding global law; and 9) the practice, awareness, and acceptance of law for civil 
society in relation to global law. 
 
The paradox of this internationalization process of law in Chile is in what we should 
call a fragmented integration. In this context, although the tendency of law in Chile, like 
other national systems, is towards a normative convergence (Gessner 2010: 99), a 
process of fragmentation of autonomous legal regimes can simultaneously be 
observed. At spatial level, the borders are expanded and they become 
simultaneously more tenuous, but on the contrary, once these legal regimes are 
integrated, they are fragmented in increasingly autonomous spheres from the 
national law. This paradox is the result of the spatial differentiation of law in Chile, 
along with that of a factual convergence of normative contents, which makes these 
spatial differences gain in particularism and allows factual references gain in 
universalism. The spatial boundaries remain relevant for the formation of national 
law, but this relevance now constitutes a problem of reference for the operations of 
law, which has for its result the differentiation of law, which cannot be understood 
only as the empire of state sovereignty or as a mere supranational legal pluralism. 
Although this situation had its most clear beginning during the trials on human 
rights violations, it now spreads to various fields as the environmental, economic, 
and sports problems (Mereminskaya & Mascareño 2005). 
 
5.4. Juridification 
 
Finally, in the social dimension of meaning, we want to emphasize that following an 
expression of Habermas, the changes in the law in recent years have resulted 
(1982b) in a growing juridification of lifeworlds of persons, and with them new 
spaces of legal inclusion have been opened, such as family regulations (Casas et al. 
2006), environmental problems (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev 1999), and religious, 
educational or ethical ties (Bascuñán 2004). In this dimension – which expresses the 
relations between alter and ego in the communication -, law gradually penetrates and 
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does so in ways that permeate people’s daily life. The problem of reference at this 
level is competence over the social relations of diverse nature. 
 
These effects can be visualized both at the level of civil and penal regulations, i.e., 
both in the relationships that persons have with each other as in their relations with 
the State.128 The differentiation of the system at the social level has even caused 
recent social movements in in Chile to have a marked accent on juridification, either 
to reject or propose new legal norms, such as various educational movements of the 
last decades (Bellei et al. 2010). In all these cases, the semantic indicator is the 
inclusion in the law, but these processes have paradoxical consequences. 
 
The growing juridification of social relations seems to bring with it a paradox that 
could be described as one of exclusive inclusions. As noted above, the problem of 
inclusion and exclusion refers to how persons are considered in terms of their 
participation in social systems (Luhmann 1995c). There exist two sides in this form: 
inclusion indicates the attribution to persons for its participation in social systems, 
while exclusion indicates the side of the form in which persons are not considered 
by social systems. This form has been usually used to indicate the problems of 
modern society, preferably on the side of exclusion (Robles 2005, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the problems of participation of persons also occur – and strongly, at 
that - on the side of inclusion. 
 
As noted by Nassehi (2002: 134), inclusion means participation, but not necessarily 
“successful participation,” since an over-indebted or sick person, or one undergoing 
criminal justice proceedings is also included in a functional system. These exclusive 
inclusions, in the case of law, are expressed phenomenally in terms of the high rate of 
prison population in Chile, which make up one of the highest rates in Latin America 
(Walmsley 2009) and the high level of indebtedness of Chilean households (Cox et 
 
                                                            
128 In this context of juridification, an interesting study on the person's ability to make decisions, 
from a medical and legal standpoint, is in Bórquez, et al. (2007). 
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al. 2006; Banco Central de Chile 2010), liability to legal prosecution, among other 
phenomena. In any case, this type of inclusions that are regulated by the legal system 
produces exclusions in diverse social ambiences, such as economic marginalization 
or the loss of civil rights. Interestingly, inclusions and exclusions are produced along 
with the differentiation of law, and in both sides of the form, paradoxes emerge 
(inclusive exclusions, for example, in the case of the prison population). This aspect is 
not always emphasized by the sociology of exclusion, whose focus is rather on the 
side of exclusion. 
 
In general terms we can see these tendencies in the following table: 
 
Table 10 Tendencies of Differentiation of Law in Chile in the dimensions of 
meaning 
 
 
Dimensions of meaning 
Factual Temporal Spatial Social 
Tendencies  Autonomy Acceleration  
Internationaliz
ation 
Juridification 
Problems of 
reference  
Maintenance 
of operative 
boundaries 
Congruence of 
decisions 
Operation 
capacity on 
jurisdictional 
boundaries 
Competence 
over social 
relations 
Self-referential 
semantics  
Independence Efficiency Globalization Inclusion 
Paradoxes 
Dependent 
independence 
Desynchronized 
acceleration  
Fragmented 
integration  
Excluding 
inclusions  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In all the aforementioned levels, the paradoxes can be displaced in various ways. 
The exclusive inclusion can be transferred as a problem to other systems (for example, 
to the financial system through economic measures, to the education like temporal 
utopia of a future equality or to the family as functional alternative for 
rehabilitation). The dependent independence can be considered as a virtuous condition 
for the development of knowledge in the law (and put the accent on other blind 
spots, such as on the quality of the information). The desynchronized acceleration can be 
a problem to be solved in the future (!) and the fragmented integration can be seen as a 
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problem of jurisdictions (and not of contents). In any case, the paradoxes of 
differentiation are diverse and remain latent, since problems allow the operations of 
functional systems. 
 
In the multidimensional analysis shown above, we have presented some hypotheses 
on tendencies of the differentiation of law in Chile in recent decades. We 
highlighted tendencies on differentiation, its problems of reference, semantics, and 
paradoxes that are associated with these processes. For the constitution of new lines 
of research, a brief comparison with other Latin-American legal systems becomes 
necessary, apart from the analysis of the plausibility of the hypotheses that we have 
outlined for the case of Chile. 
 
5.5. Tendencies on the differentiation of law in Latin America: Comparisons 
 
First, we would like to point out some aspects that are relevant for the extension of 
these reflections to other regions. In Latin America, the conditions of the national 
legal systems are quite uneven. While the entire region certainly shares a strong 
continental legal tradition, the differences in the development of every national legal 
regime are highly variable. In spite of this – and following an ancient sociological 
custom -, it is possible to indicate similar structural elements between these national 
legal systems, although the temporality and causalities are indeed dissimilar. 
 
The aspect where, possibly, a common tendency in the region can be observed more 
sharply is the tendency towards autonomy. Only in Colombia can it be noted that 
from 1957, its legal system has an apparent autonomy, although this was a work of 
the military junta of that epoch, and, with highs and lows, has been reactivated in 
the eighties (Uprimy et al. 2003: 242). On the other hand, the country has lived, 
between 1949 and 1991 - more than thirty-two years - under a situation of martial 
legality. Nevertheless, it was not the problem of autonomy or the excessive use of 
the ‘states of emergency’ that motivated the reforms in Colombia, but the problems 
of corruption and drug trafficking. The corruption that swept the system, which was 
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derived from “fixed point” democracy, are identified also as the cause of the legal 
reforms in Venezuela in the nineties (Pérez Perdomo 2003: 713). 
 
The constitutional reforms of 1994 in Mexico were also aimed to increase judicial 
independence (Báez Silva 2010: 224). In Brazil, it can be said that the Constitution 
of 1988, which was strongly oriented towards human rights and citizen 
participation, supported this general tendency as well (Botelho 2003: 128ff). Finally, 
in Argentina, with the creation of the Council of the Judiciary by the Constitution of 
1994, there was also a reinforcement of this tendency (Bergoglio 2003: 52f.). We 
already saw how this problem is developed in Chile. The semantics are also similar, 
since autonomy is usually treated as a problem of ‘judicial independence.’ 
 
The tendency towards the acceleration in decisions and the problems of congruence 
can be seen in all the national legal systems that have experimented reforms in 
recent years. It is necessary to indicate that only in terms of procedural reforms 
from 1991 Argentina, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Venezuela, Chile, 
Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Colombia, 
Peru, Mexico, Brazil, and Panama had experienced reforms in their legal systems 
(Witker & Nataren 2010: 6). In this regard, it is significant that in all these cases, the 
orientation of the reforms – in their organizational level - had the temporal 
orientation as a main element, and, regarding this, its effectiveness have been 
measured. 
 
At the social level, the juridification of social relations has been observed also in 
Mexico since the nineties with regard to the increasing interference of law in the 
lives of people (López Ayllón & Fix-Fierro 2003: 503ff). Similar situations have 
been analyzed in Brazil in the context of the constitution of 1988, which encourages 
citizen participation (Botelho 2003: 144ff), and, in Colombia, through the paradox 
of an increasing visibility and social relevance of law, along with a generalized 
disinterest (Uprimy 2003: 231ff). In any case, the institutional changes in the law 
have partly encouraged this increasing social relevance. This has also caused 
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increasing social demands of justice. It is necessary to emphasize that legal 
institutions in Latin America have a low reputation and more than one third of the 
population believes that it is justified to ignore these legal institutions if necessary 
(Latinobarómetro 2010). In this context, the tendency towards a major juridification 
in the region can be seen in a less pessimistic way. 
 
Finally, with regard to the internationalization, the law in Latin America has been 
gradually opened to international law. This tendency is observed in the entire region. 
We must emphasize that the relations between national and international law are 
diverse; in Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, their constitutions establish, 
explicitly or implicitly, the supremacy of constitutional law over international law. In 
Peru, article 101 of its Constitution states that “the international treaties celebrated 
by Peru with other States are part of national law. In case of conflict between a 
treaty and a law, the first one prevails.” This situation is similar in Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, and Honduras. In Peru and in Chile, constitutions grant a quasi-
constitutional status to international norms on human rights matters (López-Ayllón 
2010: 141f). 
 
The openness to international law has been largely favored by economic 
globalization and the expansion of international relations. This phenomenon is 
relatively new in the region. In Mexico, for example, it has observed in the nineties, 
that since until the late eighties at least, this country was rather closed to 
international law (López Ayllón & Fix-Fierro 2003: 582). A similar situation occurs 
in other countries of the region. In addition to this relationship between 
national/international law, spontaneous legal regimes emerge (Teubner 2002, 2005), 
which appear in a “hybrid” way (Gessner 2010: 99) between national and 
international law, as commercial, technical or sports norms (Mereminskaya & 
Mascareño 2006), along with human rights (Skaar 2003). In all these 
transformations, internationalization and a greater tolerance, so to say, to an 
increasing normative plurality can be seen. 
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In general terms, it can be argued that the hypotheses that we have raised as 
tendencies on the differentiation of law in Chile can be examined to a great extent in 
other national legal systems of the region. This way, the regional dynamics of the 
differentiation of legal system can be studied. The evolution of Chilean law is, 
however, different from that of other national legal systems. The early evolutionary 
acquisitions and the relative constitutional stability are elements that are not present 
in other countries. 
 
Our theoretical and evolutionary trip has tried to show the main elements that 
characterized this development and made the emergence of a functionally 
differentiated law in Chile possible. What only remains for us to do are to 
summarize our way and indicate the main results of our study. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of our study was to analyze the evolution of Chilean law under the 
hypothesis that Chilean law is a functionally differentiated social system that owes 
its level of current development to a set of evolutionary acquisitions and to a 
process of change in its structures, which we have characterized by the concept of 
forms of differentiation. At the beginning of this research, we considered a set of 
questions and problems around which we organize our analyses. We will briefly 
summarize each of them and then indicate some general considerations, indications, 
and recommendations for further researches. 
 
Our first questions were: What are the fundamental aspects of a sociological observation of the 
law and how does the sociology of law allow the differentiation of social systems at the regional level 
to be understood? Concerning this question, we made a theoretical trip around the 
sociology of law, its history, and main currents. In this analysis, we dealt in detail 
with the systemic sociology of law of Niklas Luhmann as the starting point for the 
analysis proposed in this study. From this approach, we pointed out that the 
possibilities for a regional observation of law through a systemic perspective are 
made possible when the analysis focuses on the social and the spatial dimensions of 
meaning. We indicated then that law and politics are functionally differentiated at 
factual and temporal level, but at spatial and social level they are coupled. We 
characterized this coupling as a spatial delimitation of a territory for law and the social 
delimitation of a collective for politics. Based on this theoretical element we pointed out 
that this allows for an understanding of the study of the national law as a regionally 
differentiated functional system, plus the segmentary differentiation of politics in 
States. 
 
Our second research questions were:  Which elements characterize the explanation of social 
change in the system differentiation theory and how is this explanation related to the theory of social 
evolution. From this concern, we delved into the diffuse explanatory field that 
separates the studies on differentiation and evolution. We concluded that, in spite of 
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the apparent confusion between two different research strategies, it is possible to 
observe that is a single model, in which the differentiation appears as a subordinated 
concept to an evolutionary theory. This way, it was possible to postulate that the 
research on differentiation of functional systems should be complemented with a 
research on evolutionary processes and acquisitions, along with the study of forms 
of differentiation that indicate large-scale structural changes. From this difference, it 
was possible to then characterize theories of functional differentiation in Chile, 
compare them, and observe their possible projections. 
 
Our third research inquiries were if there exist evolutionary acquisitions that have been a key 
factor to the process of differentiation of law in Chile and if so, what these would be. From the 
theoretical reflections of the previous chapter we dedicated ourselves to the study of 
a number of evolutionary acquisitions in order to understand the evolution of law in 
Chile. We postulated the legal organization, subjective rights, constitutions and 
human rights as elements that served as pre-adaptive advances in the evolution of 
Chilean law. From this analysis, it was possible to understand how certain 
institutions gave rise to further developments and enabled structural changes of 
major scope. 
 
The fourth research issues were if it is possible to identify relatively defined periods or phases 
in the differentiation of Chileans law and if so, what would its features, its characteristics, and 
processes be. From this, we observed a number of elements that make the 
characterization of different forms of differentiation possible. In this context we 
distinguished three forms of differentiation in Chile, which had, as a correlate, a 
kind of law: the dual form stratification and center/periphery, the form of functional 
differentiation with class structure, and the functional differentiation. For each of these forms 
we indicated the presence of a type of law: a law stratified and crossed by the duality 
estate/city as center/periphery form, a politicized law in the functionally differentiated 
society with class structure, and a functionally differentiated modern law with operational 
closure and differentiated from politics. We established in that place that, however, 
neither the forms of differentiation nor in the types of law are “pure” phenomena, 
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but they constitute core principles that organize the formation of social systems, 
and, therefore, it is possible to speak of overlaps and hybridizations in such forms 
and types. 
 
Finally, we asked about which tendencies could currently be observed in the development of 
Chilean law. We addressed this question suggesting a set of hypothesis on possible 
current tendencies of Chilean law, its problems and paradoxes. Our work was 
structured around four dimensions of meaning: factual, temporal, social, and spatial. 
We observed that in each of these dimensions arise new problems for legal system, 
such as the pressure for efficiency, internationalization, juridification, and 
autonomization. We complemented our analysis with a projection of these 
hypotheses in other Latin-American national legal systems. 
 
There is no doubt that in all these tasks we had to be cautious of not closing the 
research in favor of a totalizing coherence. Our purpose was not to generate a fully 
coherent scheme of the evolution of Chilean law. All the same, the evolutionary 
acquisitions and the forms of differentiation have an undeniable bias that arises 
from the theoretical approach used and the problems that have been previously 
mentioned. It is difficult for us to avoid the situation that the surprising findings 
remain largely invisible in the writing of the text, since, in its presentation, the 
results seem to be too coherent with the questions. But all this must be judged from 
our initial position. Since we have explicitly declared our problems and questions, as 
well as the sources with which we have constructed our analyses, future researches 
may refer to the matter and see with more clarity the blind spots and explanatory 
deficits in our research. This is the point for future possibilities of connection in the 
field of science. 
 
This way, it is possible to have certainty that the analyzed elements do not constitute 
an endpoint in the analysis of the differentiation of Chilean law, but, instead, starting 
points for further explorations. Trying to close the reflections by way of an 
integrative model – as Parsons’ model- is undoubtedly unsatisfactory. However, 
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despite being aware that the evolution of Chilean law is a constantly moving 
process, we have postulated a set of hypotheses on current tendencies that mark 
evidence for subsequent differentiation processes. 
 
A similar situation occurs in the analysis of the forms of differentiation of Chilean 
law. Indeed, here, and in a similar way to the analysis of the evolutionary 
acquisitions, we have emphasized forms of differentiation partly distant from the 
canon of the differentiation theory of luhmannian stamp. Due to our historical 
analysis, it was barely possible to add something about the law of segmentary 
society, since this form was present only in Chilean indigenous societies, which had 
a scarce impact in the current law (if there is, at all, any influence). We initiate our 
periodification with the stratification and center/periphery forms and through them we 
described a long period of validity of a stratified and territoriality dual law. We 
recurred to an alternative analysis in order to understand the passage of stratification 
to functional differentiation, and we spoke of a law of a functionally differentiated 
society with class structure, following a recommendation of Luhmann (1985) of his 
main model of forms of differentiation (Luhmann 1977, 1997a). There, we dealt 
with a politicized law, which remained stable in most of the twentieth century and 
caused a crisis only by the end of this century, which was rather motivated by 
external influences. We speak only of functional differentiation with respect to the 
law of ends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, where political 
dependencies of legal decisions have largely been dissolved. 
  
The sociological diagnoses that we have analyzed indicate different conditions from 
the ones raised by this research. As we saw, for Mascareño (2010) and Robles (2005, 
2006), Chilean functional differentiation is characterized by a duality between social 
networks and functionally differentiated systems. Robles (2006: 262) even speaks of 
a “functionally differentiated capitalist society”129 whose social classes have 
disappeared. Cousiño and Valenzuela (2012) in turn, choose to only emphasize the 
 
                                                            
129 A concept that also uses Uwe Schimank (2009). 
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differentiation of politics and economy, while Rodríguez (2007) points to a fully 
functional differentiation. Our approach allows us to indicate for future researches 
the hypothesis that functional differentiation in Chile is the result of parallel 
processes of system differentiation, which are governed by their own temporalities 
and structural characteristics. 
 
Unlike the aforementioned general diagnoses, and following the research we have 
conducted, it is possible to hypothesize that functional differentiation in Chile 
would be a process that is currently evolving, and it is crossed by conflicts and 
tensions inherent to it. Current social movements that protest in favor of 
educational rights would precisely indicate a change in the bearing points on which 
Chilean educational system has developed, which also had an impact on the self-
reflection of politics. The almost-total dependence on the market economy of 
Chilean education, mass media, and health system, allow us to question their 
possible differentiation as functional systems. This way, functional differentiation 
appears, not as a model or a central instance from which other systems would be 
sorted, but as a “horizon” of meaning (Nassehi 2004), which allows social systems 
to structure problems of order and of treatment of complexity, taking functional 
differentiation in systems as a possibility. 
 
The Chilean law constitutes a special case of a system that, although has a very large 
evolution, has developed a structural orientation towards functional differentiation 
only in recent decades, at the expense of its political dependences, which in turn 
allowed it to function throughout the twentieth century. Nevertheless, other social 
systems have failed to distance themselves from their dependences. Chilean 
educational system, health system, and mass media, for instance, are still marked by 
an “economization pressure” (Schimank 2009), which undoubtedly hinder their own 
development. As correctly indicated by Cousiño and Valenzuela (2012), the military 
dictatorship opted for the development of a market economy lacking of legal 
regulations, which leave education, health, and mass media subject to the swings of 
the markets. For law, this situation did not constitute a greater problem, as it was a 
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question of constitutionally regulated freedoms and whose norms must come only 
from the executive power. This situation is currently in a transition state towards 
major regulations, which come from the hand of a major judicialization of the 
“economic freedoms.” Nevertheless, this does not seem to demand further 
developments to the existing law, but only a canalization capacity through law for 
the generalized discontent with a neo-liberal economic development model. 
 
A distinctive aspect of Luhmann’s theory of differentiation lies in the non-teleological 
character of his approach. The autopoiesis concept reinforces this character, as this 
indicates that the system is reproduced to avoid its ending and is, therefore, anti-
teleological (Luhmann 1991a: 395). Differentiation processes have the same 
characteristic, since, similar to morphogenesis, its results cannot be anticipated but 
only deviations to its selectivity in every operation can be added (Luhmann 1991a: 
484ff). This change of perspective is of vital importance for differentiation theory. 
Unlike the “happiness” in Spencer’s industrial society (Spencer 1912: 600), 
“solidarity” for Durkheim (2001: 65) and “equilibrium” for Parsons (Parsons and 
Shils 1962: 108), differentiation process in Luhmann’s vision does not seek to satisfy 
these or other needs, but is largely a process related to the communicational character 
of society, its temporal operation capacity, and its orientation towards contingency. 
 
Functional differentiation rather disappoints the expectations of happiness, 
solidarity, or equilibrium, since its complexity makes the possibility of linking a wide 
temporal order explode. In this sense, modern society at operative level and in its 
risk awareness, not only has “no time for utopias” (Nassehi 1994: 71), but these, or 
the goal-oriented claims, are returned to society under the form of paradoxes. While 
the differentiation process can be understood as a modernization of law, it leads 
neither to a fairer nor better-oriented law. The sociology of law, in this context, 
should refocus its classical concern about social conditions of law for justice or 
inclusion, to the “unmarked state” (Spencer-Brown 1979) of differentiation process, 
to the recesses of a process, whose goals cannot be decided and that at operational 
level consists of a specific “praxis” of distinction (Nassehi 2009: 220). In the praxis 
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of law, the goals have the feature of appearing at empirical level for an observer. They 
can be attended, formulated, and reformulated, and their effects evaluated. For this 
praxis of law, however, these goals are only one side of the process whose unity can 
be described by the difference of paradoxes. The sociological perspective of law can, 
this way, describe the empirical operations of law in a contingent present, thus 
unlocking traditional semantics of the discipline and the inexhaustible 
modernization theory. 
 
Functional differentiation of law in Chile constitutes an interesting case in the 
evolution of national legal systems in the Latin-American region. From their 
analysis, it is possible to observe how a number of evolutionary acquisitions, which 
give rise to later developments, are selected and stabilized in the legal systems, in a 
different manner from the universalist analysis of law, such as that of Luhmann 
(1995a). The above discussion does not imply, of course, that Chile would represent 
an exceptional situation in Latin America, due to an evolutionary development near 
to that described by social systems theory regarding developed regions of the world. 
We have shown how various elements that characterize functional differentiation in 
a formal sense are not met in the Chilean case, such as the function of the 
separation between law and politics of constitutions, or the marked phase of 
functional differentiation with class structure with evident effects even today. What 
we can sustain, analogous to the explanations of cybernetics, is that social evolution 
of Chilean legal system has an equifinality that is similar to other world functional 
systems, namely, functional differentiation. 
  
The greatest current challenge for the law of a functionally differentiated society is 
its capacity to regulate conflicts in a society crossed by deep inequalities, as in the 
paradoxical Chilean modernization, where wealth production is similar to a 
developed country but the inequality in the distribution is equivalent to a third world 
nation (OECD 2012). On the capacity of law to operate as an “immune system” 
(Luhmann 1991a) in dealing with the conflicts caused by these inequalities, this 
depends on its structural stability or its possible changes to other forms of 
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differentiation that are difficult to foresee at present. Normative expectations are 
pinned on it, in the context of a growing discontent with politics and market 
economy that prevails today. 
 
Differentiation theory has several elements that can contribute to this analysis. 
Without the teleological optimism of a “classless society” or a “social equilibrium,” 
the theory of social systems differentiation indicates elements that allow us to 
understand how, in a micro and macro sense, structural changes are developed. 
Differentiation theory makes new phenomena visible from a functional standpoint, 
i.e., from the perspective of the duality problem/possible equivalent solutions. This 
interpretive framework abandoned semantics of “unity” or “integration” that 
permeated the whole sociology to the mid-twentieth century (Parsons 1966; 
Habermas 1973) and suggest instead an approach that stresses differentiation as 
central dynamic of social changes. This way, the functionally differentiated Chilean 
law is not destined to be a guarantor of the integration of society, but to be a 
functional mechanism for the treatment of differentiated normative expectations, as 
a mechanism equivalent to other possible solutions. Nevertheless, the distinction 
that law holds is the capacity of its symbolic medium for connecting with other 
functionally differentiated communications - a specific achievement of modernity 
whose yields have not yet been fully developed. 
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